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Commuter light transport failed to climb to 13000' as cleared. Remained at 12000' until ARTCC amended clearance to 11000'.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 148787 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199006 |
| Day | Sun |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | atc facility : tys |
| State Reference | TN |
| Altitude | msl bound lower : 12000 msl bound upper : 13000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | artcc : ztl |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng |
| Flight Phase | cruise other |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 2440 flight time type : 260 |
| ASRS Report | 148787 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | altitude deviation : undershoot non adherence : clearance other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
| Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance none taken : anomaly accepted |
| Consequence | Other |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Captain was flying, first officer was working center frequency. Center told us to climb to 13000'. First officer acknowledged, set the altitude in ADF as reminder. The error was discovered about 10 min later when cleared down to 11000'. We descended and ATC never said or inquired about our altitude. The contributing factors I feel are as follows: the controller did not sound very busy, and never 'noticed' that we never climbed to 13000'. I don't know if it was lack of vigilance or if he was 'secretly' writing a report up on us. The captain was in a 'foul mood' from the very beginning of the flight. The captain did not follow company procedures in regards to checklists. Ie, he would not call for before takeoff checklists. The captain attitude was 'you (first officer) know what checklist is next, so go ahead and run it'. This caused considerable confusion for the first officer because it deviated so far from the standard procedures we were taught during training. It kept the first officer 'behind' the plane. In addition, the captain was too laid back about everything including the failure to climb. He told me 'don't worry about it.' his attitude toward checklist, safety, and standard procedures made me feel uncomfortable flying with him. At times, I felt he was deliberately trying to set me up for a mistake, or to see how frustrated he could make me get. Preoccupation by first officer or captain actions and attitudes prevented first officer from properly monitoring flight progression. Company and airline union probation power and rules effectively limit any action that can be taken by a probationary first officer to correct any sits of this type. For example, would the chief pilot of the company believe the word of a probationary first officer over a senior union captain? The real world answer of course is no. No one on probation wants to risk his/her job even for safety unless it is of some type of extreme situation, ie, life-threatening event or situation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: COMMUTER LTT FAILED TO CLIMB TO 13000' AS CLEARED. REMAINED AT 12000' UNTIL ARTCC AMENDED CLRNC TO 11000'.
Narrative: CAPT WAS FLYING, FO WAS WORKING CTR FREQ. CTR TOLD US TO CLB TO 13000'. FO ACKNOWLEDGED, SET THE ALT IN ADF AS REMINDER. THE ERROR WAS DISCOVERED ABOUT 10 MIN LATER WHEN CLRED DOWN TO 11000'. WE DSNDED AND ATC NEVER SAID OR INQUIRED ABOUT OUR ALT. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS I FEEL ARE AS FOLLOWS: THE CTLR DID NOT SOUND VERY BUSY, AND NEVER 'NOTICED' THAT WE NEVER CLBED TO 13000'. I DON'T KNOW IF IT WAS LACK OF VIGILANCE OR IF HE WAS 'SECRETLY' WRITING A RPT UP ON US. THE CAPT WAS IN A 'FOUL MOOD' FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE FLT. THE CAPT DID NOT FOLLOW COMPANY PROCS IN REGARDS TO CHKLISTS. IE, HE WOULD NOT CALL FOR BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS. THE CAPT ATTITUDE WAS 'YOU (FO) KNOW WHAT CHKLIST IS NEXT, SO GO AHEAD AND RUN IT'. THIS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION FOR THE FO BECAUSE IT DEVIATED SO FAR FROM THE STANDARD PROCS WE WERE TAUGHT DURING TRAINING. IT KEPT THE FO 'BEHIND' THE PLANE. IN ADDITION, THE CAPT WAS TOO LAID BACK ABOUT EVERYTHING INCLUDING THE FAILURE TO CLB. HE TOLD ME 'DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT.' HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD CHKLIST, SAFETY, AND STANDARD PROCS MADE ME FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE FLYING WITH HIM. AT TIMES, I FELT HE WAS DELIBERATELY TRYING TO SET ME UP FOR A MISTAKE, OR TO SEE HOW FRUSTRATED HE COULD MAKE ME GET. PREOCCUPATION BY FO OR CAPT ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES PREVENTED FO FROM PROPERLY MONITORING FLT PROGRESSION. COMPANY AND AIRLINE UNION PROBATION PWR AND RULES EFFECTIVELY LIMIT ANY ACTION THAT CAN BE TAKEN BY A PROBATIONARY FO TO CORRECT ANY SITS OF THIS TYPE. FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD THE CHIEF PLT OF THE COMPANY BELIEVE THE WORD OF A PROBATIONARY FO OVER A SENIOR UNION CAPT? THE REAL WORLD ANSWER OF COURSE IS NO. NO ONE ON PROBATION WANTS TO RISK HIS/HER JOB EVEN FOR SAFETY UNLESS IT IS OF SOME TYPE OF EXTREME SIT, IE, LIFE-THREATENING EVENT OR SIT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.