Narrative:

I was working departure position. Aircraft X checked in climbing to 2;000 feet which is an unusual altitude since departures are issued 5;000 feet unless otherwise coordinated. I climbed the aircraft to 7;000 feet to remain within my airspace. Aircraft Y was on a limited data tower (T) tag heading northbound. The conflict alert went off and I issued traffic to aircraft X who was about to merge with aircraft Y that appeared to be on a southbound heading.I had no knowledge that aircraft Y was operating within the confines of the departure corridor at 2;600 feet. No coordination was ever done with me about the aircraft or that departures would be climbing to 2;000 feet only. I did not see the aircraft operating in the departure corridor at an altitude that; in my opinion; is unsafe. T (tower) tags are seen constantly throughout the day because numerous helicopters; state police; miami police; and emergency aircraft operate within the tower area 500 feet or below. Any other unusual situation or aircraft that would be operating at a different altitude is coordinated with appropriate sectors; however; this was not done with me.after the event it was brought to my knowledge that the other departure controller coordinated with the local controller in the tower for aircraft Y to be in the area doing survey/photo air work. The supervisor in the TRACON verbally coordinated with the approach controllers about the aircraft as he ventured into the approach airspace as well. No coordination verbally; or a point-out was ever done with me. Aircraft Y also had 18 tarp (traffic analysis and review tool) hits on him which shows that he was in an unsafe area to be working.it is unsafe to be issuing departing aircraft 2;000 because they could become a conflict with low level IFR aircraft that operate 10 miles from mia at 2;000 feet. Aircraft should not be allowed to operate at the altitude in such close proximity to the airport especially at times of arrival or departure banks. Coordination/communication needs to be done with all sectors prior to allowing an unusual situation to occur. The controller that is initially coordinating and approving air work to be done needs to communicate with all other sectors and controllers that will be impacted. They must 'close the loop' and not leave sectors in the dark or without information that is going to impact their operation.aircraft doing air work in the departure corridor should be speaking with a departure controller or if they are on the tower frequency then departure aircraft should not be switched to the departure controller until they are not a factor with the other aircraft on the tower frequency. Traffic should be issued to the departing aircraft by the local controller if he has both aircraft on his frequency. We should not jeopardize the safety of the operation and multiple passenger airlines for someone who wants to take pictures during busy times of the day. It is not unusual for controllers to feel pressured by the supervisor in charge to accommodate these photo missions or aircraft doing survey work even at times when the controllers feel it is unsafe to be allowing it. The dynamic needs to be changed. If a controller feels that an aircraft working in a location is going to impact the operation or the safety of the operation they should be supported by the supervisor not pressured to be put in an uncomfortable working environment. The supervisor also needs to be making sure that all controller and sectors that will be impacted are informed; coordinated with and on board with the unusual situation that will be occurring.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIA Departure Controller and flight crew reported a NMAC with a VFR aircraft operating in the departure corridor.

Narrative: I was working Departure position. Aircraft X checked in climbing to 2;000 feet which is an unusual altitude since departures are issued 5;000 feet unless otherwise coordinated. I climbed the aircraft to 7;000 feet to remain within my airspace. Aircraft Y was on a limited data tower (T) tag heading northbound. The Conflict Alert went off and I issued traffic to Aircraft X who was about to merge with Aircraft Y that appeared to be on a southbound heading.I had no knowledge that Aircraft Y was operating within the confines of the departure corridor at 2;600 feet. No coordination was ever done with me about the aircraft or that departures would be climbing to 2;000 feet only. I did not see the aircraft operating in the departure corridor at an altitude that; in my opinion; is unsafe. T (Tower) tags are seen constantly throughout the day because numerous helicopters; state police; Miami police; and emergency aircraft operate within the Tower Area 500 feet or below. Any other unusual situation or aircraft that would be operating at a different altitude is coordinated with appropriate sectors; however; this was not done with me.After the event it was brought to my knowledge that the other Departure Controller coordinated with the Local Controller in the tower for Aircraft Y to be in the area doing survey/photo air work. The Supervisor in the TRACON verbally coordinated with the approach controllers about the aircraft as he ventured into the approach airspace as well. No coordination verbally; or a point-out was ever done with me. Aircraft Y also had 18 TARP (Traffic Analysis and Review Tool) hits on him which shows that he was in an unsafe area to be working.It is unsafe to be issuing departing aircraft 2;000 because they could become a conflict with low level IFR aircraft that operate 10 miles from MIA at 2;000 feet. Aircraft should not be allowed to operate at the altitude in such close proximity to the airport especially at times of arrival or departure banks. Coordination/Communication needs to be done with all sectors prior to allowing an unusual situation to occur. The controller that is initially coordinating and approving air work to be done needs to communicate with all other sectors and controllers that will be impacted. They must 'close the loop' and not leave sectors in the dark or without information that is going to impact their operation.Aircraft doing air work in the departure corridor should be speaking with a Departure Controller or if they are on the Tower frequency then departure aircraft should not be switched to the departure controller until they are not a factor with the other aircraft on the Tower frequency. Traffic should be issued to the Departing aircraft by the Local controller if he has both aircraft on his frequency. We should not jeopardize the safety of the operation and multiple passenger airlines for someone who wants to take pictures during busy times of the day. It is not unusual for controllers to feel pressured by the supervisor in charge to accommodate these photo missions or aircraft doing survey work even at times when the controllers feel it is unsafe to be allowing it. The dynamic needs to be changed. If a controller feels that an aircraft working in a location is going to impact the operation or the safety of the operation they should be supported by the supervisor not pressured to be put in an uncomfortable working environment. The supervisor also needs to be making sure that ALL CONTROLLER AND SECTORS that will be impacted are informed; coordinated with and on board with the unusual situation that will be occurring.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.