Narrative:

During preflight crew briefed the anchorage 8 departure off runway 25L. We reviewed the performance data and discussed the higher rotate speed of 190. We also reviewed wind shear procedures. We taxied to the runway and were number 3 for departure. The first aircraft took off and reported a 20 KT airspeed loss. The captain said; 'how about I do this takeoff and I'll give it back to you when we get airborne'? First officer replied 'okay'. Then a 747 in front of us was cleared for takeoff and we were cleared to line up and wait. Sitting on the runway; we watched the 747 rotate and drift left; and within a couple of minutes; they reported that they got a wind shear alert at 400 feet.first officer said to the capt. 'We can't take off in known wind shear.' captain pointed to his navigational display and [said]; 'there's nothing on my screen.' tower cleared us for takeoff and captain pushed the power levers up. He rotated after vr and before 190 knots we got into turbulence around 500 feet and shortly thereafter got the tail wind shear warning. Pilot monitoring pushed throttles forward; pressed G/a (go around) button and engaged auto flight. We were through it around 1500 feet and made our level off altitude at 4000 feet where we finished the after takeoff checklist. The captain wrote up the GPWS in the aircraft release.there was a disagreement between pilot monitoring and pilot flying. The pilot monitoring said we couldn't take off in known wind shear based on 3 data points. 1.) ATIS2.) aircraft with the 20 knot airspeed loss and 3.) the 747 in front of us that reported wind shear alert at 400 feet.the captain decided it's okay because he is relying on the technology of the predictive wind shear system (pws). I think that's what he meant when he pointed to his navigational display and said; 'there's nothing on my screen'. Here's the problem; he didn't see anything on the screen because there was no pws installed on [that] aircraft.when pilots fly different models of airplanes with different configurations; it can become very confusing. Also; when tower cleared us for takeoff there is an underlying pressure to react to the instructions. We were not on the same page at all. I was confused by his statement and should have stopped him right there. He was confused by aircraft systems. We definitely did not have a shared mental model. Instead of slowing down and getting clarification; we flew into a dangerous situation that could have been avoided.the pilot flying was confused because of lack systems knowledge. There could be more simulated time for wind shear systems; pws; GPWS; heck throw TCAS in there as well. There is no time to pull out the book during these escape maneuvers. The pilot monitoring should have reiterated using more direct language that meant we are not going to take off!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 First Officer reported they took off into known windshear conditions because the Captain thought the aircraft was equipped with predictive windshear capability; but it was not.

Narrative: During preflight crew briefed the Anchorage 8 departure off Runway 25L. We reviewed the performance data and discussed the higher rotate speed of 190. We also reviewed wind shear procedures. We taxied to the runway and were number 3 for departure. The first aircraft took off and reported a 20 KT airspeed loss. The Captain said; 'How about I do this takeoff and I'll give it back to you when we get airborne'? First Officer replied 'OKAY'. Then a 747 in front of us was cleared for takeoff and we were cleared to line up and wait. Sitting on the runway; we watched the 747 rotate and drift left; and within a couple of minutes; they reported that they got a wind shear alert at 400 feet.First Officer said to the Capt. 'We can't take off in known wind shear.' Captain pointed to his Navigational Display and [said]; 'There's nothing on my screen.' Tower cleared us for takeoff and Captain pushed the power levers up. He rotated after Vr and before 190 knots we got into turbulence around 500 feet and shortly thereafter got the tail wind shear warning. Pilot Monitoring pushed throttles forward; pressed G/A (Go Around) button and engaged auto flight. We were through it around 1500 feet and made our level off altitude at 4000 feet where we finished the after takeoff checklist. The Captain wrote up the GPWS in the Aircraft Release.There was a disagreement between Pilot Monitoring and Pilot Flying. The Pilot Monitoring said we couldn't take off in known wind shear based on 3 data points. 1.) ATIS2.) Aircraft with the 20 knot airspeed loss and 3.) The 747 in front of us that reported wind shear alert at 400 feet.The Captain decided it's OKAY because he is relying on the technology of the Predictive Wind shear System (PWS). I think that's what he meant when he pointed to his Navigational Display and said; 'There's nothing on my screen'. Here's the problem; he didn't see anything on the screen because there was no PWS installed on [that] aircraft.When pilots fly different models of airplanes with different configurations; it can become very confusing. Also; when Tower cleared us for takeoff there is an underlying pressure to react to the instructions. We were not on the same page at all. I was confused by his statement and should have stopped him right there. He was confused by aircraft systems. We definitely did not have a shared mental model. Instead of slowing down and getting clarification; we flew into a dangerous situation that could have been avoided.The Pilot Flying was confused because of lack systems knowledge. There could be more simulated time for wind shear systems; PWS; GPWS; heck throw TCAS in there as well. There is no time to pull out the book during these escape maneuvers. The Pilot Monitoring should have reiterated using more direct language that meant we are NOT going to take off!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.