Narrative:

We were executing a visual approach. I was the pilot monitoring. Weather conditions were night VMC with a 30 knot tailwind at altitude. Prior to arrival; we received the ATIS and determined that the wind was 160 at 9 knots (a 9 knot tailwind component) on a dry runway. The landing performance data indicated a factored field length of 4;500 feet for runway XX1; or 3;700 feet for runway XX2. (The runway is 7;000 feet total length.) I suggested to the captain (who was the pilot flying) that we should execute a visual approach to runway XX2. The captain declined my suggestion and elected to proceed with the straight-in landing on XX1; since the tailwind was within our SOP limitations. We were fully configured and stabilized on the approach before arriving at 1;000 feet hat (height above threshold). The speed bug was set to the proper vref speed for our landing weight. I noted that the tailwind at 1;000 feet hat was 22 knots; and requested a wind check from the tower. The wind was still at 9 knots; within our SOP. Given the turbulence; I felt uncomfortable with the captain's decision to land XX1. I commented that 'the van is going to be here late anyways; so we're not really saving any time.' the captain elected to continue and land on XX1. I noted that the green line was bouncing around significantly; at times jumping 5 or 10 knots above the speed bug. The captain maintained the aircraft's speed at the top of the bug. At an altitude that I do not recall (I believe it was between 500 feet and 1;000 feet hat); the stick shaker activated momentarily. The aircraft's speed was stable and at the top of the bug; and the bug was set correctly. The windshear warning did not activate. As I wasn't touching the controls; I didn't feel the shaker; I only heard it. I said 'whoa; whoa!' but the shaker stopped before I could call for a go-around. The captain said 'we're fine; we're landing;' and continued to a normal landing. On the ground we discussed the event and I suggested that we should have gone around.given that we were properly configured and on speed for our landing weight (in fact we were a few knots fast); I believe that the rapidly changing wind direction and speed is what caused the shaker to momentarily activate. The green line's erratic behavior; I am guessing; was influenced by these rapidly changing conditions. However; I also believe that if we had elected the more conservative option (executing a visual pattern to land on runway XX2; rather than pushing the SOP tailwind limit in order to land straight in); we may not have experienced the shaker. I would say the contributing factors here were 1) the captain's desire to minimize the time enroute; and 2) my failure to decisively call for a go-around. I have flown with this captain at least 50 times; and he has nearly 20 years experience in the airplane. I therefore deferred to his judgement; both on the question of which runway to land on; and when he announced he was continuing to land after the shaker event; I did not call for a go-around.in both new-hire and recurrent training; more emphasis should perhaps be placed on an important aspect of CRM; namely; that if either crewmember (especially first officers paired with very senior captains) feel uncomfortable about any aspect of the aircraft state; that they should and must voice that discomfort. I did so; but in a very mild and indirect way. Once that decision was made to land on the tailwind runway; though; I'm not sure anything could have prevented that shaker from activating; aside from the crew flying the approach much faster than vref; which would have introduced yet another threat.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported a normal landing preceded by a brief stick shaker event due to landing with an unstable tailwind.

Narrative: We were executing a visual approach. I was the Pilot Monitoring. Weather conditions were night VMC with a 30 knot tailwind at altitude. Prior to arrival; we received the ATIS and determined that the wind was 160 at 9 knots (a 9 knot tailwind component) on a dry runway. The landing performance data indicated a factored field length of 4;500 feet for Runway XX1; or 3;700 feet for Runway XX2. (The runway is 7;000 feet total length.) I suggested to the Captain (who was the Pilot Flying) that we should execute a visual approach to Runway XX2. The Captain declined my suggestion and elected to proceed with the straight-in landing on XX1; since the tailwind was within our SOP limitations. We were fully configured and stabilized on the approach before arriving at 1;000 feet HAT (Height Above Threshold). The speed bug was set to the proper Vref speed for our landing weight. I noted that the tailwind at 1;000 feet HAT was 22 knots; and requested a wind check from the Tower. The wind was still at 9 knots; within our SOP. Given the turbulence; I felt uncomfortable with the Captain's decision to land XX1. I commented that 'the van is going to be here late anyways; so we're not really saving any time.' The Captain elected to continue and land on XX1. I noted that the green line was bouncing around significantly; at times jumping 5 or 10 knots above the speed bug. The Captain maintained the aircraft's speed at the top of the bug. At an altitude that I do not recall (I believe it was between 500 feet and 1;000 feet HAT); the stick shaker activated momentarily. The aircraft's speed was stable and at the top of the bug; and the bug was set correctly. The windshear warning did not activate. As I wasn't touching the controls; I didn't feel the shaker; I only heard it. I said 'Whoa; whoa!' but the shaker stopped before I could call for a go-around. The Captain said 'We're fine; we're landing;' and continued to a normal landing. On the ground we discussed the event and I suggested that we should have gone around.Given that we were properly configured and on speed for our landing weight (in fact we were a few knots fast); I believe that the rapidly changing wind direction and speed is what caused the shaker to momentarily activate. The green line's erratic behavior; I am guessing; was influenced by these rapidly changing conditions. However; I also believe that if we had elected the more conservative option (executing a visual pattern to land on Runway XX2; rather than pushing the SOP tailwind limit in order to land straight in); we may not have experienced the shaker. I would say the contributing factors here were 1) the Captain's desire to minimize the time enroute; and 2) my failure to decisively call for a go-around. I have flown with this Captain at least 50 times; and he has nearly 20 years experience in the airplane. I therefore deferred to his judgement; both on the question of which runway to land on; and when he announced he was continuing to land after the shaker event; I did not call for a go-around.In both new-hire and recurrent training; more emphasis should perhaps be placed on an important aspect of CRM; namely; that if either crewmember (especially First Officers paired with very senior Captains) feel uncomfortable about any aspect of the aircraft state; that they should and must voice that discomfort. I did so; but in a very mild and indirect way. Once that decision was made to land on the tailwind runway; though; I'm not sure anything could have prevented that shaker from activating; aside from the crew flying the approach much faster than Vref; which would have introduced yet another threat.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.