Narrative:

Enroute with 3 passengers and a dog operating under far part 91K. Both pilots were seated in their respective seats cruising at FL430 in smooth; clear air with unrestricted visibility. The master warning chimed and began flashing red with a red cas message 'right oil pressure low' displayed on the EICAS. The oil pressure indication was reading 25 in red and decreasing. I the PIC (pilot in command) was the flying pilot and stated that I have the controls and the radios and directed the sic (second in command) to accomplish the QRH for low oil pressure. I then [advised ATC] and informed him that we had lost an engine and needed a lower altitude. As the sic performed the required items on the checklist (with confirmation from the PIC on critical items) ATC gave us several choices of diversionary airports. We chose ZZZ because it was off the nose and we knew that they had emergency equipment because they had airline service. In addition; it was about the perfect distance for us to accomplish the required checklists; brief the passengers and descend at a reasonable rate that wouldn't alarm the passengers any further. After the sic completed the QRH I directed him to go to the qrc for the remaining checklists because I felt that the qrc was written to mirror all of our standard sops and that the QRH was very generic. Coming through FL280 we started the APU to reduce the electrical load on the operating generator. After receiving vectors for our descent and lining up on an 18 mile final; approach control informed us that the emergency equipment was still 8 to 10 minutes from the airfield. We elected to continue the visual approach backed up with the RNAV and made a normal landing. Due to taxiway construction we back taxied on the runway and taxied into the FBO ramp where we were met by the emergency equipment. At some point I queried the tower controller about the emergency equipment not being at the airport and he informed me that they are only on station when the airline flights are operating.after shutting down the aircraft we checked on our pax who seemed very calm and not alarmed at all. They made several comments about our calm demeanor and asked several questions before we escorted them into the FBO so that they could call [company customer service]. I began making the required company notifications as I was visually inspecting the aircraft for signs of an oil leak. The oil reservoir indicated that it was full on the fueling panel and the sight gauge on the engine indicated full as well. While I was mostly happy with our performance and of course the outcome; I identified a couple things that could have gone more smoothly. I didn't brief the sic on my opinion of the qrc being better than the QRH for completing the engine inop approach and landing checklists. In addition; I inadvertently called the secondary phone number to report an aircraft emergency to [operations control] and it rang 11 or 12 times before a maintenance tech answered the phone. I'm sure that there were other issues or omissions that I'm unaware of because of the stress of the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Challenger 350 Captain reported an in-flight Oil Pressure Low warning; the crew elected to divert.

Narrative: Enroute with 3 Passengers and a dog operating under FAR part 91K. Both Pilots were seated in their respective seats cruising at FL430 in smooth; clear air with unrestricted visibility. The master warning chimed and began flashing red with a red CAS message 'R OIL Pressure Low' displayed on the EICAS. The oil pressure indication was reading 25 in red and decreasing. I the PIC (Pilot in Command) was the flying Pilot and stated that I have the controls and the radios and directed the SIC (Second in Command) to accomplish the QRH for Low Oil Pressure. I then [advised ATC] and informed him that we had lost an engine and needed a lower altitude. As the SIC performed the required items on the checklist (with confirmation from the PIC on critical items) ATC gave us several choices of diversionary airports. We chose ZZZ because it was off the nose and we knew that they had emergency equipment because they had airline service. In addition; it was about the perfect distance for us to accomplish the required checklists; brief the passengers and descend at a reasonable rate that wouldn't alarm the passengers any further. After the SIC completed the QRH I directed him to go to the QRC for the remaining checklists because I felt that the QRC was written to mirror all of our standard SOPs and that the QRH was very generic. Coming through FL280 we started the APU to reduce the electrical load on the operating generator. After receiving vectors for our descent and lining up on an 18 mile final; approach control informed us that the emergency equipment was still 8 to 10 minutes from the airfield. We elected to continue the visual approach backed up with the RNAV and made a normal landing. Due to taxiway construction we back taxied on the runway and taxied into the FBO ramp where we were met by the emergency equipment. At some point I queried the tower controller about the emergency equipment not being at the airport and he informed me that they are only on station when the airline flights are operating.After shutting down the aircraft we checked on our pax who seemed very calm and not alarmed at all. They made several comments about our calm demeanor and asked several questions before we escorted them into the FBO so that they could call [company customer service]. I began making the required company notifications as I was visually inspecting the aircraft for signs of an oil leak. The oil reservoir indicated that it was full on the fueling panel and the sight gauge on the engine indicated full as well. While I was mostly happy with our performance and of course the outcome; I identified a couple things that could have gone more smoothly. I didn't brief the SIC on my opinion of the QRC being better than the QRH for completing the engine inop approach and landing checklists. In addition; I inadvertently called the secondary phone number to report an aircraft emergency to [operations control] and it rang 11 or 12 times before a maintenance tech answered the phone. I'm sure that there were other issues or omissions that I'm unaware of because of the stress of the situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.