Narrative:

Captain and first officer started and continued takeoff roll without the use of flight directors and auto thrust. First officer noticed at approximately 80 KIAS that the FMA had no information in it. First officer cross checked the captain FMA and noted a lack of information as well. The speed bug was set to 100 knots and approaching 100 KIAS first officer stated V1 (where the speed bug was set). The improper V1 call was immediately recognized by the captain. The proper V1 and vr information was displayed; called out; and rotation and lift-off happened at the appropriate time. Once safely airborne first officer and captain reselected their respective FD button and guidance returned within 5 to 10 seconds. First officer attempted to restore autothrust by selecting the appropriate button and pushing speed to enter the 'managed' speed mode. First officer and captain recognized that the aircraft was not accelerating on the appropriate schedule and noted 100 knots was still in the airspeed box with a 'dot' next to the airspeed. The captain then spun the airspeed to 250 and re-selected 'managed' mode. At this point the aircraft was in the normal flight director and autothrust.captain and first officer suspect that the flight directors and auto thrust kicked off at some point prior to 60 KIAS on the takeoff roll. While it is certainly possible that both flight directors and autothrust kicked off; it was not associated with any ECAM. It is possible that an ECAM message was inhibited based upon the critical phase of flight; it is much more likely that the flight directors were not selected on prior to take-off. Once the first officer recognized that there was an issue with the FMA it took far too long to communicate the issue to the captain; trap the error; and correct it. Depending on if/when the flight director turned off could point to poor flow/checklist adherence and poor automation management. The best way to avoid this situation in the future is to adhere to flows and checklists (depending on when the flight directors kicked off). Also; much better communication between first officer and captain. While the airworthiness and regime of flight were never in question first officer CRM was poor at best. Adherence to briefed procedure to include anything non-standard seen by the first officer should be plainly stated; the reason for this was a combination of poor sa regarding the level of automation being employed until approximately V1 and poor communication with the captain while attempting to restore the appropriate level of automation for the regime of flight (take-off).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported that they started and continued takeoff roll without the use of flight directors and autothrust.

Narrative: Captain and FO started and continued takeoff roll without the use of flight directors and auto thrust. FO noticed at approximately 80 KIAS that the FMA had no information in it. FO cross checked the Captain FMA and noted a lack of information as well. The speed bug was set to 100 Knots and approaching 100 KIAS FO stated V1 (where the speed bug was set). The improper V1 call was immediately recognized by the Captain. The proper V1 and Vr information was displayed; called out; and rotation and lift-off happened at the appropriate time. Once safely airborne FO and Captain reselected their respective FD button and guidance returned within 5 to 10 seconds. FO attempted to restore autothrust by selecting the appropriate button and pushing speed to enter the 'managed' speed mode. FO and Captain recognized that the aircraft was not accelerating on the appropriate schedule and noted 100 KNOTS was still in the airspeed box with a 'dot' next to the airspeed. The Captain then spun the airspeed to 250 and re-selected 'managed' mode. At this point the aircraft was in the normal flight director and autothrust.Captain and FO suspect that the flight directors and auto thrust kicked off at some point prior to 60 KIAS on the takeoff roll. While it is certainly possible that both flight directors and autothrust kicked off; it was not associated with any ECAM. It is possible that an ECAM message was inhibited based upon the critical phase of flight; it is much more likely that the flight directors were not selected on prior to take-off. Once the FO recognized that there was an issue with the FMA it took far too long to communicate the issue to the Captain; trap the error; and correct it. Depending on if/when the flight director turned off could point to poor flow/checklist adherence and poor automation management. The best way to avoid this situation in the future is to adhere to flows and checklists (depending on when the flight directors kicked off). Also; much better communication between FO and Captain. While the airworthiness and regime of flight were never in question FO CRM was poor at best. Adherence to briefed procedure to include anything non-standard seen by the FO should be plainly stated; the reason for this was a combination of poor SA regarding the level of automation being employed until approximately V1 and poor communication with the Captain while attempting to restore the appropriate level of automation for the regime of flight (take-off).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.