Narrative:

Previous crew reported that the autothrottles had kicked off on their flight. Local maintenance applied MEL to the aircraft. When we eventually got to go flying; we quickly found out that the thrust management computer (tmc) was also inoperative. At a very low altitude; in IMC with winter operations; we had to scramble to look up EPR (engine pressure ratio) thrust settings in the flight manual for our climb out. MEL has a note at the end that states that the thrust management computer and EICAS will work normally. It did not. We had no magenta thrust bugs on our EPR gauges. We had to look up and manually set our climb; cruise; and go around EPR thrust settings from our manual. We contacted [maintenance control] via sat communication enroute and explained our concerns. [Maintenance control] concurred that MEL was incorrect; and local maintenance should apply the correct MEL [at destination]. We were also told to write up the thrust management computer. We wrote up the tmc in ACARS enroute. Very long day for us. We had a return to gate caused by an engine anomaly; forcing an engine run up at the gate. Satisfied that the engine was safe; we accepted it for our flight. Winter ops then set in. Low visibility; snow; contamination checks; with the flight crew approaching their cco time. When we finally went flying; we were blindsided with no EPR thrust bugs. I would have thought that if the correct MEL was applied to this aircraft; there then would have been some mention of the tmc being inoperative; and that we would have to look up our own EPR settings. We could have briefed this; and prepared for this threat on the ground in the flight planning area. Very frustrating; and very unsafe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 First Officer reported the wrong MEL was applied to the inoperative Autothrottles. The flight crew was not prepared for the associated loss of the Thrust Management Computer after takeoff.

Narrative: Previous crew reported that the autothrottles had kicked off on their flight. Local maintenance applied MEL to the aircraft. When we eventually got to go flying; we quickly found out that the Thrust Management Computer (TMC) was also inoperative. At a very low altitude; in IMC with winter operations; we had to scramble to look up EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) thrust settings in the Flight Manual for our climb out. MEL has a note at the end that states that the Thrust Management Computer and EICAS will work normally. It did not. We had no magenta thrust bugs on our EPR gauges. We had to look up and manually set our climb; cruise; and go around EPR Thrust settings from our manual. We contacted [Maintenance Control] via SAT COM enroute and explained our concerns. [Maintenance Control] concurred that MEL was incorrect; and local Maintenance should apply the correct MEL [at destination]. We were also told to write up the Thrust Management Computer. We wrote up the TMC in ACARS enroute. Very long day for us. We had a return to gate caused by an engine anomaly; forcing an engine run up at the gate. Satisfied that the engine was safe; we accepted it for our flight. Winter ops then set in. Low visibility; snow; contamination checks; with the flight crew approaching their CCO time. When we finally went flying; we were blindsided with no EPR thrust bugs. I would have thought that if the correct MEL was applied to this aircraft; there then would have been some mention of the TMC being inoperative; and that we would have to look up our own EPR settings. We could have briefed this; and prepared for this threat on the ground in the flight planning area. Very frustrating; and very unsafe.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.