Narrative:

We were a widebody transport twin, taking off from a high altitude airport, temperature 81 degrees. Were dispatched with a MEL item green brake system inoperative. Alternate yellow system selected, antiskid operable. With green system inoperative no automatic brakes could be used. Our company has normal takeoffs done with automatic brakes on and set to maximum for aborts. We used full power and a flaps 0 degrees for takeoff. At approximately 120 KTS #2 engine egt came up to red line; 'tweaked' throttle back a bit. At 135 KTS a bang was heard, a shudder vibration. It felt like tires had blown. We were approximately 20 KTS below V1 (155) I believe just as I started back with throttles #1 engine fire warning came on. Stopped aircraft with approximately 900' of runway remaining. Captain heard tower say fire seen from left engine. First officer and captain opened windows to check for fire. #1 engine was smoking. Completed checklists. Fire bottles shot to #1 engine. Fire out. Crash trucks arrived and sprayed engine down. We elected not to use emergency evacuation. Did keep doors armed until stairs arrived, buses arrived and all passengers had deplaned. One passenger given oxygen on aircraft after abort while awaiting buses. One passenger I believe went to hospital with shortness of breath. The cabin crew had been briefed before leaving lax the same morning. The first officer had made the takeoff in lax, an uneventful flight to den. We did discuss and brief the green system brake inoperative procedures. This brief was not as thorough for the takeoff in den. This was the first time I had flown with the green (normal) brakes inoperative. I had been used to automatic brakes with the widebody transport and with the medium large transport. My last high speed abort was at den several yrs before in the medium large transport. Maximum automatic brakes were used, no damage to aircraft. I believe we had first an uncontained engine failure that sent debris into the #1 and 5 tires also making for longer rollout. The company CCC program had all crew members working together. I had flown with the first officer and second officer before, we understood what needed to be done and spoke up. Having a second officer aboard allowed me more time to evaluate the situation and get information from fire chief. The first officer and second officer could run the many required checklists. They did a fine job. Supplemental information from acn 150628. Upon stopping the captain informed the cabin to remain seated. While the first officer contacted the tower. The second officer executed the engine failure/fire checklist. The #1 engine was secured and the fire put out using both the engine fire bottles. Our assessment was that we had had an engine fire, which was now extinguished. Our tires were blown on the left side but there were no brake fires. Consequently we did not order an emergency evacuation but chose rather to secure the cabin and ask for a stair truck and buses to evacuate and transport the passengers. A succession of checklist were then accomplished as per air carrier procedures, terminating with the securing aircraft checklist. Prior to turning off the batteries, we chose to start the APU. Both to assure communication and proper airflow throughout the cabin. The incident ended successfully with all passengers and crew evacuated and no injuries.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED AS WDB EXPERIENCES AN UNCONTAINED ENGINE EXPLOSION WITH VIBRATION AND YAW.

Narrative: WE WERE A WDB TWIN, TAKING OFF FROM A HIGH ALT ARPT, TEMP 81 DEGS. WERE DISPATCHED WITH A MEL ITEM GREEN BRAKE SYS INOP. ALTERNATE YELLOW SYSTEM SELECTED, ANTISKID OPERABLE. WITH GREEN SYS INOP NO AUTO BRAKES COULD BE USED. OUR COMPANY HAS NORMAL TKOFS DONE WITH AUTO BRAKES ON AND SET TO MAX FOR ABORTS. WE USED FULL PWR AND A FLAPS 0 DEGS FOR TKOF. AT APPROX 120 KTS #2 ENG EGT CAME UP TO RED LINE; 'TWEAKED' THROTTLE BACK A BIT. AT 135 KTS A BANG WAS HEARD, A SHUDDER VIBRATION. IT FELT LIKE TIRES HAD BLOWN. WE WERE APPROX 20 KTS BELOW V1 (155) I BELIEVE JUST AS I STARTED BACK WITH THROTTLES #1 ENG FIRE WARNING CAME ON. STOPPED ACFT WITH APPROX 900' OF RWY REMAINING. CAPT HEARD TWR SAY FIRE SEEN FROM L ENG. F/O AND CAPT OPENED WINDOWS TO CHK FOR FIRE. #1 ENG WAS SMOKING. COMPLETED CHKLISTS. FIRE BOTTLES SHOT TO #1 ENG. FIRE OUT. CRASH TRUCKS ARRIVED AND SPRAYED ENG DOWN. WE ELECTED NOT TO USE EMER EVACUATION. DID KEEP DOORS ARMED UNTIL STAIRS ARRIVED, BUSES ARRIVED AND ALL PAXS HAD DEPLANED. ONE PAX GIVEN OXYGEN ON ACFT AFTER ABORT WHILE AWAITING BUSES. ONE PAX I BELIEVE WENT TO HOSPITAL WITH SHORTNESS OF BREATH. THE CABIN CREW HAD BEEN BRIEFED BEFORE LEAVING LAX THE SAME MORNING. THE F/O HAD MADE THE TKOF IN LAX, AN UNEVENTFUL FLT TO DEN. WE DID DISCUSS AND BRIEF THE GREEN SYS BRAKE INOP PROCS. THIS BRIEF WAS NOT AS THOROUGH FOR THE TKOF IN DEN. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAD FLOWN WITH THE GREEN (NORMAL) BRAKES INOP. I HAD BEEN USED TO AUTO BRAKES WITH THE WDB AND WITH THE MLG. MY LAST HIGH SPD ABORT WAS AT DEN SEVERAL YRS BEFORE IN THE MLG. MAX AUTO BRAKES WERE USED, NO DAMAGE TO ACFT. I BELIEVE WE HAD FIRST AN UNCONTAINED ENG FAILURE THAT SENT DEBRIS INTO THE #1 AND 5 TIRES ALSO MAKING FOR LONGER ROLLOUT. THE COMPANY CCC PROGRAM HAD ALL CREW MEMBERS WORKING TOGETHER. I HAD FLOWN WITH THE F/O AND S/O BEFORE, WE UNDERSTOOD WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE AND SPOKE UP. HAVING A S/O ABOARD ALLOWED ME MORE TIME TO EVALUATE THE SITUATION AND GET INFO FROM FIRE CHIEF. THE F/O AND S/O COULD RUN THE MANY REQUIRED CHKLISTS. THEY DID A FINE JOB. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 150628. UPON STOPPING THE CAPT INFORMED THE CABIN TO REMAIN SEATED. WHILE THE F/O CONTACTED THE TWR. THE S/O EXECUTED THE ENG FAILURE/FIRE CHKLIST. THE #1 ENG WAS SECURED AND THE FIRE PUT OUT USING BOTH THE ENG FIRE BOTTLES. OUR ASSESSMENT WAS THAT WE HAD HAD AN ENG FIRE, WHICH WAS NOW EXTINGUISHED. OUR TIRES WERE BLOWN ON THE L SIDE BUT THERE WERE NO BRAKE FIRES. CONSEQUENTLY WE DID NOT ORDER AN EMER EVACUATION BUT CHOSE RATHER TO SECURE THE CABIN AND ASK FOR A STAIR TRUCK AND BUSES TO EVACUATE AND TRANSPORT THE PAXS. A SUCCESSION OF CHKLIST WERE THEN ACCOMPLISHED AS PER ACR PROCS, TERMINATING WITH THE SECURING ACFT CHKLIST. PRIOR TO TURNING OFF THE BATTERIES, WE CHOSE TO START THE APU. BOTH TO ASSURE COM AND PROPER AIRFLOW THROUGHOUT THE CABIN. THE INCIDENT ENDED SUCCESSFULLY WITH ALL PAXS AND CREW EVACUATED AND NO INJURIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.