Narrative:

Flight began normally with an on time push back at msp. During the engine start of engine 2 the engine experienced a hung start. The ECAM was announced and another start was conducted automatically and successfully. We then proceeded normally to the takeoff end of runway 30L. After being cleared for takeoff; we lined up and performed a static takeoff as per the first flight of day procedures. The engines both responded normally up to 50% N1. I then released the brakes and went to flx/mct (continuous thrust) for takeoff power. Engine 1 developed takeoff power yet engine 2 was not and was lingering around 55% N1. This caused a large yawing moment during the roll and thus I had to put in a large amount of left rudder. The first officer (first officer) and I immediately looked at the engine gauges as this didn't feel normal. The first officer and I both noted that engine 2 was not at takeoff power and I made the quick decision to abort the takeoff at a speed of approximately 20-30 KIAS. We then announced our aborted takeoff to tower and were instructed to exit the runway if we were able. As I turned off the runway and onto the taxiway; we then experienced the engine 2 failure. At this point we were on an active taxiway and msp ground control told us we were fine to conduct whatever business we needed to conduct in order to assess the situation as we were not in the way of anyone and it was still quite early. I then phoned [maintenance control] and walked them through what had happened. We all agreed there was no indication of a fire and that it was an unusual failure. [Maintenance control] then asked us if we were able to restart the engine. We attempted to do that; yet the engine performed an abnormal hot start and automatically aborted. We then determined obviously; that we had a significant mx (maintenance) issue and decided to secure the engine and return to the gate under our own power. I think it important to note that at issue here was what would have happened had the #2 engine restarted. And I can say that the first officer and I immediately discussed this as [maintenance control] asked us to restart the engine. We both agreed that at this point; we were troubleshooting for [maintenance control] and we had no intention of going flying after an anomalous engine failure.the reason I'm writing this report is not for the way the flight crew handled this aborted takeoff event; it's for the events that transpired after the engine failure. In my opinion the first officer and I handled the aborted takeoff absolutely safely and by the book. I think at issue here was what happened after. In retrospect; I believe the safe course of action at this point would have been to return to the gate and have mx troubleshoot the aircraft at the safety of a gated area without the passengers on board should any strange event occur. It was a mistake to contact [maintenance control] and attempt any troubleshooting with such a critical component such as the engine with passengers on board and on the airport grounds and not in the gated area. I realize now that in my attempt to help keep the operation moving; I may have bypassed the safest course of action as did [maintenance control] in the suggestion to attempt to restart the engine with passengers on board. After such an unusual event as an engine failure; both the flight crew and [maintenance control] should have realized the serious nature of the event and treated it as such. Because again; what would we have done had the engine restarted? Well; again; the flight crew had already decided we were not going flying; so why attempt to fix the problem with passengers on board when we knew we were going back to the gate anyway? So I believe in retrospect; this is where I was in error with my judgment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff following an engine malfunction.

Narrative: Flight began normally with an on time push back at MSP. During the engine start of ENG 2 the engine experienced a hung start. The ECAM was announced and another start was conducted automatically and successfully. We then proceeded normally to the takeoff end of RWY 30L. After being cleared for takeoff; we lined up and performed a static takeoff as per the first flight of day procedures. The engines both responded normally up to 50% N1. I then released the brakes and went to FLX/MCT (Continuous Thrust) for takeoff power. Engine 1 developed takeoff power yet engine 2 was NOT and was lingering around 55% N1. This caused a large yawing moment during the roll and thus I had to put in a large amount of left rudder. The FO (First Officer) and I immediately looked at the engine gauges as this didn't feel normal. The FO and I both noted that engine 2 was NOT at takeoff power and I made the quick decision to abort the takeoff at a speed of approximately 20-30 KIAS. We then announced our aborted takeoff to tower and were instructed to exit the runway if we were able. As I turned off the runway and onto the taxiway; we then experienced the Engine 2 failure. At this point we were on an active taxiway and MSP ground control told us we were fine to conduct whatever business we needed to conduct in order to assess the situation as we were not in the way of anyone and it was still quite early. I then phoned [Maintenance Control] and walked them through what had happened. We all agreed there was no indication of a fire and that it was an unusual failure. [Maintenance Control] then asked us if we were able to restart the engine. We attempted to do that; yet the engine performed an abnormal hot start and automatically aborted. We then determined obviously; that we had a significant MX (Maintenance) issue and decided to secure the engine and return to the gate under our own power. I think it important to note that at issue here was what would have happened HAD the #2 Engine restarted. And I can say that the FO and I immediately discussed this as [Maintenance Control] asked us to restart the engine. We both agreed that at this point; we were troubleshooting for [Maintenance Control] and we had no intention of going flying after an anomalous engine failure.The reason I'm writing this report is NOT for the way the flight crew handled this aborted takeoff event; it's for the events that transpired AFTER the engine failure. In my opinion the FO and I handled the aborted takeoff absolutely safely and by the book. I think at issue here was what happened after. In retrospect; I believe the safe course of action at this point would have been to return to the gate and have MX troubleshoot the aircraft at the safety of a gated area without the passengers on board should any strange event occur. It was a mistake to contact [Maintenance Control] and attempt any troubleshooting with such a critical component such as the engine with passengers on board and on the airport grounds and NOT in the gated area. I realize now that in my attempt to help keep the operation moving; I may have bypassed the safest course of action as did [Maintenance Control] in the suggestion to attempt to restart the engine with passengers on board. After such an unusual event as an engine failure; both the flight crew AND [Maintenance Control] should have realized the serious nature of the event and treated it as such. Because again; what would we have done had the engine restarted? Well; again; the flight crew had already decided we were NOT going flying; so why attempt to fix the problem with passengers on board when we knew we were going back to the gate anyway? So I believe in retrospect; this is where I was in error with my judgment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.