Narrative:

The event began as a normal approach to landing at hobby airport by crossing the field at 1500 from the west and entering a left downwind pattern for runway 12L. ATC advised me of traffic that just departed runway 12L turning northbound, cleared me to land, and instructed me to hold short of runway 22 (I did not acknowledge this transmission). An air carrier medium large transport was cleared for immediate takeoff on runway 22 and advised of approaching traffic for runway 12R, an aircraft was cleared across my runway (17L) via the red line (see enclosed diagram) for departure in runway 12R and told to hold short of runway 12. An light transport Y was then cleared to taxi into position on runway 22 and hold for takeoff. I advised tower that I was downwind and inquired whether there was traffic on final for runway 12R. I again was cleared to land on runway 12L and told to hold short of runway 22 for traffic. The transmission 'neg, there is no one on final for runway 12R' followed about 11 seconds later. Tower then cleared an small transport for landing on runway 12L advising that he was #2 following me (on base at a mile from the airport). Tower then cleared an air carrier large transport across my runway (12L) and 17. The light transport Y was cleared for takeoff on runway 22 and told that traffic on final for runway 12L (me) will hold short of runway 22. An small transport jet was told to taxi into position on runway 22 and hold for takeoff. I was cleared again for landing and instructed to hold short of runway 22. The light transport Y was also told again that I will hold short of runway 22 and I was instructed to stop. I could not stop in time to hold short of runway 22 and encroached his runway nearly causing a collision on the runway. (50' vertical and 20' lateral sep estimated). My approach to landing as stated before began as normal, however, it seems that as I completed my pattern and entered final approach that the situation became more critical. As I turned final I could see the air carrier large transport crossing my runway at a slow rate. When I was within 1/2 mi of the runway or closer, the large transport had just cleared my runway and appeared to stop or proceed extremely slow. I began to focus my attention on the wake turbulence being created by the jet blast, and realized that it presented a hazard because it was crossing my landing threshold. I decided it best to maintain altitude of about 100' until clear of the turbulence, then began my power reduction and descent to the runway. It seems that I allowed my airspeed to build sufficiently to prevent my aircraft from settling on the runway as needed to maintain maximum short field performance. As I touched down my aircraft floated and I did not obtain effective braking performance because of my excess airspeed and full flap extension (which I did not retract upon landing). My aircraft skidded on the runway after becoming settled and blew the right main tire as we skidded across runway 22 and veered right to avoid the light transport Y. I believe that there were several factors contributing to the incident that involved faulty judgement that led to bad decisions. The first of which was the perception of the controller that the large transport would not be a limiting factor on my landing performance and assumed that because holding short of runway 22 is a normal procedure that is accomplished routinely that I could complete the landing with no danger to myself or the departing light transport Y and cleared him across my runway. The second involves my judgement in not recognizing the seriousness of the situation that cold have been avoided by simply aborting the landing and making another attempt after completing another pattern (in retrospect I don't think that making a 360 degree turn for spacing would have been possible because of the traffic following me for landing). Thirdly, I think that because I was on a chkride with an FAA flight inspector in the aircraft that I was compelled to comply with me clearance and land as instructed; not only because I thought that he expected to see high performance from me as a pilot, but because he didn't seem to see a dangerous situation developing either. Lastly, I think that the concentration focused on the avoidance of the wake turbulence from the large transport distraction my attention from flying my aircraft as needed to make a precise short field approach and landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRITICAL GND CONFLICT BETWEEN SMA LNDG ON FAA CHECKRIDE AND DEPARTING CPR LTT Y.

Narrative: THE EVENT BEGAN AS A NORMAL APCH TO LNDG AT HOBBY ARPT BY XING THE FIELD AT 1500 FROM THE W AND ENTERING A L DOWNWIND PATTERN FOR RWY 12L. ATC ADVISED ME OF TFC THAT JUST DEPARTED RWY 12L TURNING NBND, CLRED ME TO LAND, AND INSTRUCTED ME TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22 (I DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THIS XMISSION). AN ACR MLG WAS CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF ON RWY 22 AND ADVISED OF APCHING TFC FOR RWY 12R, AN ACFT WAS CLRED ACROSS MY RWY (17L) VIA THE RED LINE (SEE ENCLOSED DIAGRAM) FOR DEP IN RWY 12R AND TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 12. AN LTT Y WAS THEN CLRED TO TAXI INTO POS ON RWY 22 AND HOLD FOR TKOF. I ADVISED TWR THAT I WAS DOWNWIND AND INQUIRED WHETHER THERE WAS TFC ON FINAL FOR RWY 12R. I AGAIN WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 12L AND TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22 FOR TFC. THE XMISSION 'NEG, THERE IS NO ONE ON FINAL FOR RWY 12R' FOLLOWED ABOUT 11 SECS LATER. TWR THEN CLRED AN SMT FOR LNDG ON RWY 12L ADVISING THAT HE WAS #2 FOLLOWING ME (ON BASE AT A MILE FROM THE ARPT). TWR THEN CLRED AN ACR LGT ACROSS MY RWY (12L) AND 17. THE LTT Y WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 22 AND TOLD THAT TFC ON FINAL FOR RWY 12L (ME) WILL HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22. AN SMT JET WAS TOLD TO TAXI INTO POS ON RWY 22 AND HOLD FOR TKOF. I WAS CLRED AGAIN FOR LNDG AND INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22. THE LTT Y WAS ALSO TOLD AGAIN THAT I WILL HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22 AND I WAS INSTRUCTED TO STOP. I COULD NOT STOP IN TIME TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22 AND ENCROACHED HIS RWY NEARLY CAUSING A COLLISION ON THE RWY. (50' VERTICAL AND 20' LATERAL SEP ESTIMATED). MY APCH TO LNDG AS STATED BEFORE BEGAN AS NORMAL, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS THAT AS I COMPLETED MY PATTERN AND ENTERED FINAL APCH THAT THE SITUATION BECAME MORE CRITICAL. AS I TURNED FINAL I COULD SEE THE ACR LGT XING MY RWY AT A SLOW RATE. WHEN I WAS WITHIN 1/2 MI OF THE RWY OR CLOSER, THE LGT HAD JUST CLRED MY RWY AND APPEARED TO STOP OR PROCEED EXTREMELY SLOW. I BEGAN TO FOCUS MY ATTN ON THE WAKE TURB BEING CREATED BY THE JET BLAST, AND REALIZED THAT IT PRESENTED A HAZARD BECAUSE IT WAS XING MY LNDG THRESHOLD. I DECIDED IT BEST TO MAINTAIN ALT OF ABOUT 100' UNTIL CLR OF THE TURB, THEN BEGAN MY PWR REDUCTION AND DSNT TO THE RWY. IT SEEMS THAT I ALLOWED MY AIRSPD TO BUILD SUFFICIENTLY TO PREVENT MY ACFT FROM SETTLING ON THE RWY AS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN MAX SHORT FIELD PERFORMANCE. AS I TOUCHED DOWN MY ACFT FLOATED AND I DID NOT OBTAIN EFFECTIVE BRAKING PERFORMANCE BECAUSE OF MY EXCESS AIRSPD AND FULL FLAP EXTENSION (WHICH I DID NOT RETRACT UPON LNDG). MY ACFT SKIDDED ON THE RWY AFTER BECOMING SETTLED AND BLEW THE R MAIN TIRE AS WE SKIDDED ACROSS RWY 22 AND VEERED R TO AVOID THE LTT Y. I BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT THAT INVOLVED FAULTY JUDGEMENT THAT LED TO BAD DECISIONS. THE FIRST OF WHICH WAS THE PERCEPTION OF THE CTLR THAT THE LGT WOULD NOT BE A LIMITING FACTOR ON MY LNDG PERFORMANCE AND ASSUMED THAT BECAUSE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 22 IS A NORMAL PROC THAT IS ACCOMPLISHED ROUTINELY THAT I COULD COMPLETE THE LNDG WITH NO DANGER TO MYSELF OR THE DEPARTING LTT Y AND CLRED HIM ACROSS MY RWY. THE SECOND INVOLVES MY JUDGEMENT IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION THAT COLD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY SIMPLY ABORTING THE LNDG AND MAKING ANOTHER ATTEMPT AFTER COMPLETING ANOTHER PATTERN (IN RETROSPECT I DON'T THINK THAT MAKING A 360 DEG TURN FOR SPACING WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE TFC FOLLOWING ME FOR LNDG). THIRDLY, I THINK THAT BECAUSE I WAS ON A CHKRIDE WITH AN FAA FLT INSPECTOR IN THE ACFT THAT I WAS COMPELLED TO COMPLY WITH ME CLRNC AND LAND AS INSTRUCTED; NOT ONLY BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT HE EXPECTED TO SEE HIGH PERFORMANCE FROM ME AS A PLT, BUT BECAUSE HE DIDN'T SEEM TO SEE A DANGEROUS SITUATION DEVELOPING EITHER. LASTLY, I THINK THAT THE CONCENTRATION FOCUSED ON THE AVOIDANCE OF THE WAKE TURB FROM THE LGT DISTR MY ATTN FROM FLYING MY ACFT AS NEEDED TO MAKE A PRECISE SHORT FIELD APCH AND LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.