Narrative:

We were on final approach when TRACON cancelled our approach clearance due to insufficient spacing with preceding aircraft (I think). The crew executed missed approach/go-around from approximately 2000 feet on final. Approach gave us a 090 heading (I think) and 3000 feet altitude. During the missed approach maneuver; the captain disconnected the autopilot. At approximately 40 degrees through the turn we received the 'bank angle' (35 degrees) warning from the aircraft. The captain corrected the bank angle situation and I began monitoring what the first officer was doing (go around configuration) and crosschecking his fmas. I then moved my scan to the MCP to crosscheck the approach tile; altitude and heading in the MCP.I then noticed that the bank angle (voice warning again) had again increased to approximately 45 degrees and we were descending while still IMC. I directed the captain to correct the bank angle; which he did; rolled wings level on a southeast heading and climbed to 3000 feet. Once we were wings level and climbing; I focused my attention on the first officer's attitude indicator and noticed that the airspeed had increased into the 'red over speed zipper.' I think I said 'airspeed' but I can't be sure because at this point I was more concerned that we didn't enter an unusual attitude again. We eventually got onto a 090 heading and 3000 feet wings level. The approach controller did notify us that we had triggered a 'low altitude warning' on their end. During debrief; the captain stated that he thought we had 'bottomed out' at 1;700 feet on the recovery. The second approach and landing was uneventful.there was too tight of spacing with a lot of aircraft landing in memphis. Temporary disorientation and task saturation at the end of a long flight. It was obvious that approach was 'maxed out' with several aircraft recovering; with unusually high winds at 3-4000 feet and only two runways in a south configuration. We knew that the spacing was tight on the aircraft ahead of us. As a crew; we should have briefed the missed approach/go-around procedure 'just in case.' believe it or not; a go-around at decision altitude; climbing straight ahead; flying the published missed seems easy. We train a lot for that. It's the missed approach from 2000 feet that seems to catch crews off guard. I think it's worth adding a section/procedure in the flight operation manual; which addresses the go around from a 'cancelled approach clearance' when the aircraft isn't at decision altitude/MDA; and when the crew isn't going to fly the 'published missed approach.' it should include what the procedure is and at what point prior to entering 'app mode.' what is the MCP flow (deselect the app tile or not?) after the go-around items. What to do if the aircraft is in 'app mode.' these procedures have been part of the manuals in the past; but I can't seem to find where it is written in the operations manual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported they received bank angle warnings; low altitude warning from ATC; and an over-speed warning while manually flying an ATC directed go-around.

Narrative: We were on final approach when TRACON cancelled our approach clearance due to insufficient spacing with preceding aircraft (I think). The crew executed missed approach/go-around from approximately 2000 feet on final. Approach gave us a 090 heading (I think) and 3000 feet altitude. During the missed approach maneuver; the Captain disconnected the autopilot. At approximately 40 degrees through the turn we received the 'bank angle' (35 degrees) warning from the aircraft. The Captain corrected the bank angle situation and I began monitoring what the First Officer was doing (go around configuration) and crosschecking his FMAs. I then moved my scan to the MCP to crosscheck the approach tile; altitude and heading in the MCP.I then noticed that the bank angle (voice warning again) had again increased to approximately 45 degrees and we were descending while still IMC. I directed the Captain to correct the bank angle; which he did; rolled wings level on a southeast heading and climbed to 3000 feet. Once we were wings level and climbing; I focused my attention on the First Officer's attitude indicator and noticed that the airspeed had increased into the 'red over speed zipper.' I think I said 'airspeed' but I can't be sure because at this point I was more concerned that we didn't enter an unusual attitude again. We eventually got onto a 090 heading and 3000 feet wings level. The Approach Controller did notify us that we had triggered a 'low altitude warning' on their end. During debrief; the Captain stated that he thought we had 'bottomed out' at 1;700 feet on the recovery. The second approach and landing was uneventful.There was too tight of spacing with a lot of aircraft landing in Memphis. Temporary disorientation and task saturation at the end of a long flight. It was obvious that Approach was 'maxed out' with several aircraft recovering; with unusually high winds at 3-4000 feet and only two runways in a South configuration. We knew that the spacing was tight on the aircraft ahead of us. As a crew; we should have briefed the missed approach/go-around procedure 'just in case.' Believe it or not; a go-around at Decision Altitude; climbing straight ahead; flying the published missed seems easy. We train a lot for that. It's the missed approach from 2000 feet that seems to catch crews off guard. I think it's worth adding a section/procedure in the Flight Operation Manual; which addresses the go around from a 'cancelled approach clearance' when the aircraft isn't at Decision Altitude/MDA; and when the crew isn't going to fly the 'published missed approach.' It should include what the procedure is and at what point prior to entering 'app mode.' What is the MCP flow (deselect the app tile or not?) after the go-around items. What to do if the aircraft is in 'app mode.' These procedures have been part of the manuals in the past; but I can't seem to find where it is written in the Operations manual.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.