Narrative:

I was the first officer and pilot monitoring on this flight; and the captain was the pilot flying. He is highly experienced but had not flown much in the last couple months. We have both flown this route dozens of times or more; and the flight was non-eventful until the approach. We were given a standard descent clearance that left us ample time to descend for the visual to runway xx. The captain previously did not brief or plan any specifics for how he was just going to descend; we briefed just the approach and the taxi in and airport details. After our descent clearance; the captain selected a very shallow descent than left us 20 miles out at around 15;000 feet on a straight in approach; much higher than our typical 3 degrees. The descent rate was then increased but by then it was too late to salvage the approach; but he continued towards the runway. Approximately 7 miles out and on a 30 degree angle to intercept the localizer course we were flaps 20; gear down and around two thousand feet high by my best guess. At this point the captain abruptly turned off the autopilot and quickly banked to the right in what was a poor attempt to lose altitude; which quickly exceeded 30 degrees of bank. I called 'watch the bank' just before we exceeded 45 degrees of bank and the aural bank angle was heard. The captain corrected back to the left but rapidly over corrected and I believe we had a bank angle aural that direction too. I believe we experienced a flap over speed briefly as well. We were rapidly approaching 1;000 feet at this point still over 200 knots and I called a go-around and notified ATC. On the go-around the captain was hesitant to employ any automation which led to another flap over speed as they retracted; despite numerous calls by me to monitor the speed. After we cleaned up we ran all the appropriate checklists and made a traffic pattern for a normal landing. I don't believe the captain made appropriate entries into the maintenance log for the flap over speeds or the go-around. Both overspeeds were less than 10 knots over the placarded speed. Fundamentally this was caused by poor planning. No descent plan was briefed or employed; and the initial descent rate was inadequate for us to fly a stable approach. I believe the captain had tunnel vision; and was hesitant to use me or ATC to help remedy the situation. The bank issues after disconnecting the autopilot were caused by faulty airplane handling skills and made it more difficult for me to assist or provide direction as the demand of hand flying further increased the tunnel vision effect; this tunnel vision and lack of automation use continued into the go-around and led to our flap over speed there. In addition I believe pride led to improper maintenance procedures being followed after the flight. All of this could have been avoided with proper planning; and good communication with me as the pm and ATC to help us descend. With just a few minutes of delay vector we could have easily flown a stable approach the first time; even with the late descent. I should have been more forceful when I noticed the descent planning; and I should questioned the captain's plan even though he was highly experienced.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported that while attempting to lose altitude on an unstable approach the Captain exceeded a 45-degree bank angle and a flap overspeed occurred. A second overspeed occurred during the subsequent go-around.

Narrative: I was the FO and Pilot Monitoring on this flight; and the Captain was the pilot flying. He is highly experienced but had not flown much in the last couple months. We have both flown this route dozens of times or more; and the flight was non-eventful until the approach. We were given a standard descent clearance that left us ample time to descend for the visual to Runway XX. The Captain previously did not brief or plan any specifics for how he was just going to descend; we briefed just the approach and the taxi in and airport details. After our descent clearance; the Captain selected a very shallow descent than left us 20 miles out at around 15;000 feet on a straight in approach; much higher than our typical 3 degrees. The descent rate was then increased but by then it was too late to salvage the approach; but he continued towards the runway. Approximately 7 miles out and on a 30 degree angle to intercept the localizer course we were flaps 20; gear down and around two thousand feet high by my best guess. At this point the Captain abruptly turned off the autopilot and quickly banked to the right in what was a poor attempt to lose altitude; which quickly exceeded 30 degrees of bank. I called 'watch the bank' just before we exceeded 45 degrees of bank and the aural BANK ANGLE was heard. The Captain corrected back to the left but rapidly over corrected and I believe we had a bank angle aural that direction too. I believe we experienced a flap over speed briefly as well. We were rapidly approaching 1;000 feet at this point still over 200 knots and I called a go-around and notified ATC. On the go-around the Captain was hesitant to employ any automation which led to another flap over speed as they retracted; despite numerous calls by me to monitor the speed. After we cleaned up we ran all the appropriate checklists and made a traffic pattern for a normal landing. I don't believe the Captain made appropriate entries into the maintenance log for the flap over speeds or the go-around. Both overspeeds were less than 10 knots over the placarded speed. Fundamentally this was caused by poor planning. No descent plan was briefed or employed; and the initial descent rate was inadequate for us to fly a stable approach. I believe the Captain had tunnel vision; and was hesitant to use me or ATC to help remedy the situation. The bank issues after disconnecting the autopilot were caused by faulty airplane handling skills and made it more difficult for me to assist or provide direction as the demand of hand flying further increased the tunnel vision effect; this tunnel vision and lack of automation use continued into the go-around and led to our flap over speed there. In addition I believe pride led to improper maintenance procedures being followed after the flight. All of this could have been avoided with proper planning; and good communication with me as the PM and ATC to help us descend. With just a few minutes of delay vector we could have easily flown a stable approach the first time; even with the late descent. I should have been more forceful when I noticed the descent planning; and I should questioned the Captain's plan even though he was highly experienced.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.