Narrative:

At FL310 enroute; ATC issued a late descent clearance to cross brigs at FL210 with subsequent clearances to descend to FL190 then FL180. During descent to FL180; ATC issued clearance direct to plume to cross plume at 9000'. Captain pilot flying (PF) programmed direct to plume and the crossing restriction of 9000' into FMC as I completed the remainder of my pilot monitoring (pm) arrival duties (including acquiring ATIS due to the difficulty acquiring the ATIS via comm 2 and an ACARS no comm earlier in the flight). Approximately ten miles from plume descending through 14;500'; as I realized we were high on the descent; ATC queried us due to the high altitude approaching plume. ATC then cleared us direct to sardi to cross sardi at 7000'; further stating that it had to be a crossing at 7000' at sardi. Just as the captain was programming the FMC direct to sardi to cross sardi at 7000'; the FMC cycled to the next waypoint and captain inadvertently selected direct to CCC (the fix after sardi). As the aircraft began to turn toward CCC; I informed captain of the FMC programming error. I then immediately selected heading sel and set a heading direct to sardi to avoid a course deviation as captain reprogrammed FMC for direct sardi and to cross sardi at 7000'. When captain realized the automation would not provide the immediate required descent rate to comply with the crossing restriction; he reduced the level of automation by disengaging the autopilot then autothrottles assuming manual control of the aircraft. Due to the late descent; multiple crossing restrictions and the required descent rate; both captain and I were well aware the descent was a priority and therefore the speed would be excessive despite our offshore location. Regardless; I advised captain of what he already knew; excessive airspeed inside 12 miles offshore below 10;000' would and did occur. Crossing restriction of 7000' at sardi was missed by approximately 500' as captain attempted to slow aircraft below 10;000' from a speed of approximately 285 knots as we approached the shoreline. Had the captain not assumed manual control of the aircraft when he did; we would have arrived at sardi well above the 7500' that we crossed the fix with a potential loss of separation. During landing rollout; ATC issued taxi clearance to exit runway with a right turn on taxiway east at end of the runway; which I restated to captain as I located taxiway east on the jepp 10-9. During landing rollout; as I was responding to taxi instructions; we received a call from [the flight attendant (flight attendant)] of a threat level 1 after a passenger threatened one of our flight attendant's. Captain answered flight attendant call then made a right turn onto [adjacent] runway. As captain turned; I directed him to make an immediate right turn on B3 after I realized where the aircraft was located; scanned the [runway] approach corridor and saw an inbound aircraft on final approximately five miles from the runway. I immediately advised tower we were exiting [the runway] at B3. Based upon the captain advising tower of the threat level 1; we required police to meet the aircraft (as I was determining where the captain had turned the aircraft on the airport surface since it was other than taxiway east at the end of runway [we landed on]). Ground cleared us via any route we selected to the gate. Captain taxied aircraft promptly to the gate via B3; C and south as I completed the after landing flow then contacted operations to advise them we were on the ground and required police to meet the aircraft at the gate for a threat level 1 passenger.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported breakdown of automation management and CRM during initial approach.

Narrative: At FL310 enroute; ATC issued a late descent clearance to cross BRIGS at FL210 with subsequent clearances to descend to FL190 then FL180. During descent to FL180; ATC issued clearance direct to PLUME to cross PLUME at 9000'. Captain Pilot Flying (PF) programmed direct to PLUME and the crossing restriction of 9000' into FMC as I completed the remainder of my Pilot Monitoring (PM) arrival duties (including acquiring ATIS due to the difficulty acquiring the ATIS via COMM 2 and an ACARS NO COMM earlier in the flight). Approximately ten miles from PLUME descending through 14;500'; as I realized we were high on the descent; ATC queried us due to the high altitude approaching PLUME. ATC then cleared us direct to SARDI to cross SARDI at 7000'; further stating that it had to be a crossing at 7000' at SARDI. Just as the Captain was programming the FMC direct to SARDI to cross SARDI at 7000'; the FMC cycled to the next waypoint and Captain inadvertently selected direct to CCC (the fix after SARDI). As the aircraft began to turn toward CCC; I informed Captain of the FMC programming error. I then immediately selected HDG SEL and set a heading direct to SARDI to avoid a course deviation as Captain reprogrammed FMC for direct SARDI and to cross SARDI at 7000'. When Captain realized the automation would not provide the immediate required descent rate to comply with the crossing restriction; he reduced the level of automation by disengaging the autopilot then autothrottles assuming manual control of the aircraft. Due to the late descent; multiple crossing restrictions and the required descent rate; both Captain and I were well aware the descent was a priority and therefore the speed would be excessive despite our offshore location. Regardless; I advised Captain of what he already knew; excessive airspeed inside 12 miles offshore below 10;000' would and did occur. Crossing restriction of 7000' at SARDI was missed by approximately 500' as Captain attempted to slow aircraft below 10;000' from a speed of approximately 285 knots as we approached the shoreline. Had the Captain not assumed manual control of the aircraft when he did; we would have arrived at SARDI well above the 7500' that we crossed the fix with a potential loss of separation. During landing rollout; ATC issued taxi clearance to exit runway with a right turn on Taxiway E at end of the Runway; which I restated to Captain as I located Taxiway E on the Jepp 10-9. During landing rollout; as I was responding to taxi instructions; we received a call from [the Flight Attendant (FA)] of a Threat Level 1 after a Passenger threatened one of our FA's. Captain answered FA call then made a right turn onto [adjacent] Runway. As Captain turned; I directed him to make an immediate right turn on B3 after I realized where the aircraft was located; scanned the [runway] approach corridor and saw an inbound aircraft on final approximately five miles from the runway. I immediately advised Tower we were exiting [the runway] at B3. Based upon the Captain advising Tower of the Threat Level 1; we required Police to meet the aircraft (as I was determining where the Captain had turned the aircraft on the airport surface since it was other than Taxiway E at the end of Runway [we landed on]). Ground cleared us via any route we selected to the gate. Captain taxied aircraft promptly to the Gate via B3; C and S as I completed the After Landing Flow then contacted operations to advise them we were on the ground and required Police to meet the aircraft at the Gate for a Threat Level 1 Passenger.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.