Narrative:

Since we had previous problems in cancun with the communication and compliance with the B737 aircraft operating manual (aom) pushback and engine start procedures; I made a point of briefing the operations agent (a woman) that we needed to ensure the ramp crew complied with the company B737 pushback and engine start communications. I explained to her that I needed to be briefed on important safety issues like the number of people in the push; etc. I asked if she understood; and she said 'yes.'when we were ready to push; using my headset I provided my brief to the ramp agent and said that I was ready to hear his brief. The best brief I could get was 'captain; we are ready to push.' nothing more! Several different ramp people attempted to speak on the headset; but I never received any of the information required in the company B737 aom. Things like aircraft nose number; number of people in the push crew; wireless or wired; bypass pin in; walk around complete; bin doors and access panels secure; safety zone clear were not a part of the brief! I decided that the best thing to do would be to provide the ramp supervisor an opportunity to take a screenshot of my ipad with the company B737 aom pushback and engine start communications script. I asked the ramp agent to bring the jet way back to the jet so I could pass this information to the ramp crew. The ramp crew refused to bring the jet way back to the aircraft claiming that the airport controlled the movement of the jet way. There was absolute insolence; lack of respect; and stubbornness on the part of the cancun ramp crew. Finally; I was able to speak to the customer service supervisor through my open cockpit window. I had spoken to him earlier about passengers who were drinking alcohol from their own supply of alcohol during the flight to cancun. I explained the situation to him; and after 20 minutes of waiting; the jet way finally came back to the aircraft. I spent about two minutes explaining to the customer service supervisor the importance of the information contained in the briefing for safety reasons. He understood. I asked if he had ever seen the aom B-737 pushback and engine start communications. He said that he was aware that they were supposed to be used by the ramp agents during the pushback. He took a screen shot photo of my ipad; we closed the door; the jet way moved away; and we attempted to complete a safe pushback evolution. The ramp agent read something quickly from the screenshot script (as if he had no idea of the meaning of his words); but it did not include aircraft nose number; number of people in the pushback until I did a 'question and answer' discussion with him. He was confused when I asked how many people 'cuantas personas?' in the pushback crew. First; he answered four; then three; then four. I do not think he understood that the captain actually counts the number of people during the disconnect evolution to ensure all people are 'accounted for' to prevent the possibility of injury or worse to someone left under the aircraft. It took three attempts to get the ramp agent who was on the headset to disconnect from the aircraft. The other three ramp agents including the tug driver had already departed. The ramp agent on the headset is not visible to us when he is near the external power access panel. Captains need to be aware that in cancun and other latin american countries; the ramp agent talking to the captain is not the tug driver. So; when the tug driver drives away; don't think everyone is gone. There is still a person tethered to the side of the jet with the communications headset. The whole pushback evolution was an accident waiting to happen.preventative measures: we continue to have noncompliance with the B737 aom pushback and engine start communications in cancun. The items in that briefing are very important; 'written in blood' if you will. We should not have two standards for compliance with the B737 aom; one for the domestic operations in the USA where compliance is actually very good; and another set of standards for the latin american countries where compliance is very poor. The company standard operation procedures apply to both domestic and foreign airport operations. If it takes extra training and extra supervision/leadership to ensure compliance; we should invest in this effort in the name of standardization and safety. Nothing has improved in cancun since I wrote the last report nearly six months ago. Also; please ask cancun to make whatever changes are necessary to allow the jet bridge to return to the aircraft whenever the captain or first officer requests the jet bridge to return to the aircraft. There should be no delay when such a request is made.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported having difficulties coordinating pushback procedure with the ramp personnel; citing this has been an ongoing trend in Latin American airports.

Narrative: Since we had previous problems in Cancun with the communication and compliance with the B737 Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM) Pushback and Engine Start procedures; I made a point of briefing the Operations Agent (a woman) that we needed to ensure the Ramp Crew complied with the Company B737 Pushback and Engine Start Communications. I explained to her that I needed to be briefed on important safety issues like the number of people in the push; etc. I asked if she understood; and she said 'yes.'When we were ready to push; using my headset I provided my brief to the Ramp Agent and said that I was ready to hear his brief. The best brief I could get was 'Captain; we are ready to push.' Nothing more! Several different Ramp people attempted to speak on the headset; but I never received any of the information required in the Company B737 AOM. Things like aircraft nose number; number of people in the push Crew; wireless or wired; bypass pin in; walk around complete; bin doors and access panels secure; Safety Zone clear were NOT a part of the brief! I decided that the best thing to do would be to provide the Ramp Supervisor an opportunity to take a screenshot of my iPad with the Company B737 AOM Pushback and Engine Start Communications script. I asked the Ramp Agent to bring the jet way back to the jet so I could pass this information to the Ramp Crew. The Ramp Crew refused to bring the jet way back to the aircraft claiming that the airport controlled the movement of the jet way. There was absolute insolence; lack of respect; and stubbornness on the part of the Cancun Ramp Crew. Finally; I was able to speak to the Customer Service Supervisor through my open cockpit window. I had spoken to him earlier about Passengers who were drinking alcohol from their own supply of alcohol during the flight to Cancun. I explained the situation to him; and after 20 minutes of waiting; the jet way finally came back to the aircraft. I spent about two minutes explaining to the Customer Service Supervisor the importance of the information contained in the briefing for Safety reasons. He understood. I asked if he had ever seen the AOM B-737 Pushback and Engine Start Communications. He said that he was aware that they were supposed to be used by the Ramp Agents during the pushback. He took a screen shot photo of my iPad; we closed the door; the jet way moved away; and we attempted to complete a safe pushback evolution. The Ramp Agent read something quickly from the screenshot script (as if he had no idea of the meaning of his words); but it did not include aircraft nose number; number of people in the pushback until I did a 'question and answer' discussion with him. He was confused when I asked how many people 'Cuantas personas?' in the Pushback Crew. First; he answered four; then three; then four. I do not think he understood that the Captain actually counts the number of people during the disconnect evolution to ensure all people are 'accounted for' to prevent the possibility of injury or worse to someone left under the aircraft. It took three attempts to get the Ramp Agent who was on the headset to disconnect from the aircraft. The other three Ramp Agents including the Tug Driver had already departed. The Ramp Agent on the headset is not visible to us when he is near the external power access panel. Captains need to be aware that in Cancun and other Latin American countries; the Ramp Agent talking to the Captain is not the Tug Driver. So; when the Tug Driver drives away; don't think everyone is gone. There is still a person tethered to the side of the jet with the communications headset. The whole pushback evolution was an accident waiting to happen.Preventative Measures: We continue to have noncompliance with the B737 AOM Pushback and Engine Start Communications in Cancun. The items in that briefing are very important; 'written in blood' if you will. We should not have two standards for compliance with the B737 AOM; one for the domestic operations in the USA where compliance is actually very good; and another set of standards for the Latin American countries where compliance is very poor. The Company Standard Operation Procedures apply to both domestic and foreign airport operations. If it takes extra training and extra supervision/leadership to ensure compliance; we should invest in this effort in the name of standardization and safety. Nothing has improved in Cancun since I wrote the last Report nearly six months ago. Also; please ask Cancun to make whatever changes are necessary to allow the jet bridge to return to the aircraft whenever the Captain or First Officer requests the jet bridge to return to the aircraft. There should be NO delay when such a request is made.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.