Narrative:

Per company guidance ([from] a form the company prepares for each airport with station operational details) the captain called 'iceman' [approximately] 30 minutes prior to departure to advise them that we would need to deice (a small amount of rime ice was found on leading edges of the wings during my preflight inspection). Iceman advised that we would need to taxi to the 'J pad' for deicing (an area adjacent to the approach end of runway 14). We reviewed the [company form] and jeppesen [airport diagram] prior to pushback; as the captain had not deiced in this location before and I had not done so in a couple of years; could not remember the details; and we were using a new deicing vendor.preflight activities; pushback; engine start and initial taxi proceeded normally. Taxi instructions were to proceed via taxiways B and J to the approach end of runway 14. As we approached the intersection of taxiways J and J1; after a brief hesitation because we were unsure where the deicing crew wanted us to go; ground control reiterated that he wanted us to proceed northwest-bound on taxiway J; as a 737 in the deice area (pad 3 or 4; facing taxiway J) was waiting for us to pass before taxiing out. We turned right onto taxiway J and saw the aircraft waiting. As we approached it; the captain biased his taxi about six feet to the right to ensure clearance from [the other aircraft's] nose while I watched out the right window to ensure clearance from a fence/wall on our right. After passing; we returned to the taxiway centerline. There were two deice trucks parked in the J pad; approximately at pad 2. They both appeared to be well inside the yellow line delineating the edge of the pad. After passing the trucks; we felt a small jolt; which we commented felt like we had run over a piece of ice.during this time; I was repeatedly trying to raise iceman on the published company operations frequency; but never received a reply. As we reached the hold bars at runway 14; a deicing employee ran toward us with wands indicating for us to stop; then pointing at the left wing. About this time; a flight attendant called to tell us that a passenger had reported seeing a piece fall off of the aircraft. The flight attendant later confirmed visually that the winglet was missing. We got permission from ground control to return to [the] gate where passengers were deplaned. Only after we began our return to the gate did iceman appear on the frequency; but I was unable to determine if it was our vendor or [another company]. In any case; I had to abandon the conversation to concentrate on ground control communications and the return taxi.there were no injuries aboard the aircraft and we were not informed of any on the ground. It was determined that the aircraft had struck the end of a parked; unattended deicing truck's bucket boom; removing the winglet from the end of the wing. The station manager approached us after passengers were deplaned to ask if we had been given a copy of [the vendor's] deicing information sheet (we had not). Upon reviewing the sheet; we discovered instructions to stop taxi at the intersection of taxiways J and J1 to await a follow-me or marshaller with further instructions. Had we known this; we could have communicated this requirement to ground control and the collision might have been avoided. It appears from the angle of the taxi lines inside the J pad that entering the pad would be most easily accomplished via taxiing northwest-bound on runway 14 from taxiway J1; not by taxiing southeast-bound from the approach end. This route would not have blocked the outbound aircraft; but ground control was insistent that we proceed up taxiway J to runway 14 (he repeated the instruction at least twice).it appears to me that this incident could have been avoided in several ways. 1. Increased vigilance on our part to see and avoid the deicing truck. It was parked in plain view; but we misjudged its position relative to the wingtip. 2. Deicing vendor guidance must be distributed to every flight crew; or included within the company's [station operational details] document. Crews should not be sent to an unfamiliar area with unknown procedures. 3. Deicing vendor personnel must actively monitor their radios; especially when they have been informed that an aircraft will be approaching for deicing. This is critical to ensure that approaching aircraft receive clear taxi instructions into an area congested with other aircraft and unusual ground vehicles. 4. There should be some coordination between ATC and deicing vendors who operate in the J pad; so that areas of responsibility are made clear and ATC does not direct aircraft to locations that the vendors are not expecting them to go.this is the second similar incident involving this airline's aircraft at this airport in the last ten months. The last one involved a deicing truck being toppled over on its side. We must get a handle on these procedures before someone is injured; or worse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported contacting a vehicle during taxi to the de-icing pad.

Narrative: Per company guidance ([from] a form the company prepares for each airport with station operational details) the Captain called 'Iceman' [approximately] 30 minutes prior to departure to advise them that we would need to deice (a small amount of rime ice was found on leading edges of the wings during my preflight inspection). Iceman advised that we would need to taxi to the 'J Pad' for deicing (an area adjacent to the approach end of Runway 14). We reviewed the [company form] and Jeppesen [airport diagram] prior to pushback; as the Captain had not deiced in this location before and I had not done so in a couple of years; could not remember the details; and we were using a new deicing vendor.Preflight activities; pushback; engine start and initial taxi proceeded normally. Taxi instructions were to proceed via Taxiways B and J to the approach end of Runway 14. As we approached the intersection of Taxiways J and J1; after a brief hesitation because we were unsure where the deicing crew wanted us to go; Ground Control reiterated that he wanted us to proceed northwest-bound on Taxiway J; as a 737 in the deice area (Pad 3 or 4; facing Taxiway J) was waiting for us to pass before taxiing out. We turned right onto Taxiway J and saw the aircraft waiting. As we approached it; the Captain biased his taxi about six feet to the right to ensure clearance from [the other aircraft's] nose while I watched out the right window to ensure clearance from a fence/wall on our right. After passing; we returned to the taxiway centerline. There were two deice trucks parked in the J Pad; approximately at Pad 2. They both appeared to be well inside the yellow line delineating the edge of the pad. After passing the trucks; we felt a small jolt; which we commented felt like we had run over a piece of ice.During this time; I was repeatedly trying to raise Iceman on the published company operations frequency; but never received a reply. As we reached the hold bars at Runway 14; a deicing employee ran toward us with wands indicating for us to stop; then pointing at the left wing. About this time; a Flight Attendant called to tell us that a passenger had reported seeing a piece fall off of the aircraft. The Flight Attendant later confirmed visually that the winglet was missing. We got permission from Ground Control to return to [the] gate where passengers were deplaned. Only after we began our return to the gate did Iceman appear on the frequency; but I was unable to determine if it was our vendor or [another company]. In any case; I had to abandon the conversation to concentrate on Ground Control communications and the return taxi.There were no injuries aboard the aircraft and we were not informed of any on the ground. It was determined that the aircraft had struck the end of a parked; unattended deicing truck's bucket boom; removing the winglet from the end of the wing. The station manager approached us after passengers were deplaned to ask if we had been given a copy of [the vendor's] deicing information sheet (we had not). Upon reviewing the sheet; we discovered instructions to stop taxi at the intersection of Taxiways J and J1 to await a follow-me or marshaller with further instructions. Had we known this; we could have communicated this requirement to Ground Control and the collision might have been avoided. It appears from the angle of the taxi lines inside the J Pad that entering the pad would be most easily accomplished via taxiing northwest-bound on Runway 14 from Taxiway J1; not by taxiing southeast-bound from the approach end. This route would not have blocked the outbound aircraft; but Ground Control was insistent that we proceed up Taxiway J to Runway 14 (he repeated the instruction at least twice).It appears to me that this incident could have been avoided in several ways. 1. Increased vigilance on our part to see and avoid the deicing truck. It was parked in plain view; but we misjudged its position relative to the wingtip. 2. Deicing vendor guidance must be distributed to every flight crew; or included within the company's [station operational details] document. Crews should not be sent to an unfamiliar area with unknown procedures. 3. Deicing vendor personnel must actively monitor their radios; especially when they have been informed that an aircraft will be approaching for deicing. This is critical to ensure that approaching aircraft receive clear taxi instructions into an area congested with other aircraft and unusual ground vehicles. 4. There should be some coordination between ATC and deicing vendors who operate in the J Pad; so that areas of responsibility are made clear and ATC does not direct aircraft to locations that the vendors are not expecting them to go.This is the second similar incident involving this airline's aircraft at this airport in the last ten months. The last one involved a deicing truck being toppled over on its side. We MUST get a handle on these procedures before someone is injured; or worse.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.