Narrative:

During this flight we encountered conditions that were worse than forecast. Pireps were reporting light icing in the area; and convective activity was not present. After departure we encountered moderate icing; and cells with moderate precipitation started to build. We broke out on top at approximately 16;500 ft. I had filed 17;000 ft and ended up climbing to FL210 as final altitude due to convective activity. During climb out we also encountered degraded climb performance due to icing conditions. The weather at [the destination airport] was reported as 5000 ft overcast; which would mean we would break out at around 11000 ft; we broke out at about 12000 ft. We were VFR at this point and continued to land. The reasons I [chose] to remain on the ground was as follows. Approximately 15 minutes after landing the field when IFR with ceilings down to 100 ft obscured; and down to 1/4th mile visibility; line of convective activity. Moderate to severe icing reports; updated forecast for super cooled water droplets. There was also issues with the GPS where the first officer (first officer) and I were not on the same page on what was going on. He was concerned with ATC instructions; and I was trying to slow down and get everything in order. I became frustrated that we were being rushed; and did not get my point across effectively that we needed to slow down and ask for more time. This experience was frustrating for me; and I was not in a mindset to fly; the first officer was also not in a mindset to fly. We did not feel this way until after shutdown and the passenger was inside the terminal we kept our composure while flying and in front of the passenger. These reasons for not flying are due to my belief that they compromised safety of flight. After landing the company decided that they were going to communicate to us through the first officer; instead of myself. He was insistent on wanting to drive instead of fly; and at the time I was also not wanting to fly and stated such. After following [the first officer's] advice of going to sit down and eat I did feel better; and would probably have felt ok to fly after some rest; the storm did remain in the area until after midnight. After returning to the airport we were informed that we would drive the crew car back to [the departure airport]. I feel that it's also important to note that we were delayed for our flight over 16 hours; and were supposed to fly the overnight the day before. We refused the aircraft due to safety concerns. My first officer and I were already stressed due to this issue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air taxi Captain reported several weather issues and lack of company support that led to a canceled flight.

Narrative: During this flight we encountered conditions that were worse than forecast. Pireps were reporting light icing in the area; and convective activity was not present. After departure we encountered moderate icing; and cells with moderate precipitation started to build. We broke out on top at approximately 16;500 ft. I had filed 17;000 ft and ended up climbing to FL210 as final altitude due to convective activity. During climb out we also encountered degraded climb performance due to icing conditions. The weather at [the destination airport] was reported as 5000 ft overcast; which would mean we would break out at around 11000 ft; we broke out at about 12000 ft. We were VFR at this point and continued to land. The reasons I [chose] to remain on the ground was as follows. Approximately 15 minutes after landing the field when IFR with ceilings down to 100 ft obscured; and down to 1/4th mile visibility; line of convective activity. Moderate to severe icing reports; updated forecast for super cooled water droplets. There was also issues with the GPS where the FO (First Officer) and I were not on the same page on what was going on. He was concerned with ATC instructions; and I was trying to slow down and get everything in order. I became frustrated that we were being rushed; and did not get my point across effectively that we needed to slow down and ask for more time. This experience was frustrating for me; and I was not in a mindset to fly; the FO was also not in a mindset to fly. We did not feel this way until after shutdown and the passenger was inside the terminal we kept our composure while flying and in front of the passenger. These reasons for not flying are due to my belief that they compromised safety of flight. After landing the company decided that they were going to communicate to us through the FO; instead of myself. He was insistent on wanting to drive instead of fly; and at the time I was also not wanting to fly and stated such. After following [the First Officer's] advice of going to sit down and eat I did feel better; and would probably have felt ok to fly after some rest; the storm did remain in the area until after midnight. After returning to the airport we were informed that we would drive the crew car back to [the departure airport]. I feel that it's also important to note that we were delayed for our flight over 16 hours; and were supposed to fly the overnight the day before. We refused the aircraft due to safety concerns. My FO and I were already stressed due to this issue.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.