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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 151523 |
Time | |
Date | 199007 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : maf |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 2000 msl bound upper : 2000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : maf |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach descent other |
Route In Use | approach : circling enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 5500 flight time type : 75 |
ASRS Report | 151523 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : approach |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : clearance other anomaly |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
As our flight approached midland, ATIS said to expect visuals to runway 16R. We left our cruising altitude and left center for approach. Midland approach gave us a descent to 5000' then cleared us for a VOR approach to runway 16R. Sounds simple but human factors such as complacency and confusion made for a crew being behind the aircraft. I started my descent anticipating a visibility to runway 16R. Had I expected a VOR approach to runway 16R, I would have had the chart (I had the airport diagram) and would have descended earlier. In addition, approach had asked (before being cleared for the VOR approach) if we had intercepted the inbound VOR right. That was a surprise because neither of us heard that clearance. I said no, (the captain was on the unicom frequency), after the controllers question. The copilot was back on the approach frequency. The controller then asked if we wanted the VOR because the WX was lower than the ATIS said. The copilot (not exactly knowing our position) answered yes and the controller immediately cleared us for the VOR approach before I could do anything. So here I am: a high, fast, with no approach chart doing 290 KTS, 7 mi from the airport trying to find the chart. I believe if I hadn't been distraction by the facts that it was possible that I hadn't complied with his clearance to intercept the inbound right and that my copilot spoke too soon west/O knowing what I wanted or was expecting as to our approaching the airport and that I didn't have the VOR chart within easy access, I could have done the approach and slowed below 200 KTS before entering the air traffic area. Instead I was too high and fast crossing over the top of the airport (about 2000' AGL) and had to circle visly and land on runway 10. The controller didn't say anything but I felt he was aware of my sloppy approach. We fly this trip 5 days a week and I feel my complacency as well as my coplts was the biggest factor in this event.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: BIZJET LTT DOES NOT SET UP APCH PROPERLY DUE COCKPIT CONFUSION ABOUT LATE CHANGE IN APCH, AND EXCEEDS SPEED LIMIT IN ATA.
Narrative: AS OUR FLT APCHED MIDLAND, ATIS SAID TO EXPECT VISUALS TO RWY 16R. WE LEFT OUR CRUISING ALT AND L CTR FOR APCH. MIDLAND APCH GAVE US A DSNT TO 5000' THEN CLRED US FOR A VOR APCH TO RWY 16R. SOUNDS SIMPLE BUT HUMAN FACTORS SUCH AS COMPLACENCY AND CONFUSION MADE FOR A CREW BEING BEHIND THE ACFT. I STARTED MY DSNT ANTICIPATING A VIS TO RWY 16R. HAD I EXPECTED A VOR APCH TO RWY 16R, I WOULD HAVE HAD THE CHART (I HAD THE ARPT DIAGRAM) AND WOULD HAVE DSNDED EARLIER. IN ADDITION, APCH HAD ASKED (BEFORE BEING CLRED FOR THE VOR APCH) IF WE HAD INTERCEPTED THE INBND VOR R. THAT WAS A SURPRISE BECAUSE NEITHER OF US HEARD THAT CLRNC. I SAID NO, (THE CAPT WAS ON THE UNICOM FREQ), AFTER THE CTLRS QUESTION. THE COPLT WAS BACK ON THE APCH FREQ. THE CTLR THEN ASKED IF WE WANTED THE VOR BECAUSE THE WX WAS LOWER THAN THE ATIS SAID. THE COPLT (NOT EXACTLY KNOWING OUR POS) ANSWERED YES AND THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY CLRED US FOR THE VOR APCH BEFORE I COULD DO ANYTHING. SO HERE I AM: A HIGH, FAST, WITH NO APCH CHART DOING 290 KTS, 7 MI FROM THE ARPT TRYING TO FIND THE CHART. I BELIEVE IF I HADN'T BEEN DISTR BY THE FACTS THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT I HADN'T COMPLIED WITH HIS CLRNC TO INTERCEPT THE INBND R AND THAT MY COPLT SPOKE TOO SOON W/O KNOWING WHAT I WANTED OR WAS EXPECTING AS TO OUR APCHING THE ARPT AND THAT I DIDN'T HAVE THE VOR CHART WITHIN EASY ACCESS, I COULD HAVE DONE THE APCH AND SLOWED BELOW 200 KTS BEFORE ENTERING THE ATA. INSTEAD I WAS TOO HIGH AND FAST XING OVER THE TOP OF THE ARPT (ABOUT 2000' AGL) AND HAD TO CIRCLE VISLY AND LAND ON RWY 10. THE CTLR DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING BUT I FELT HE WAS AWARE OF MY SLOPPY APCH. WE FLY THIS TRIP 5 DAYS A WK AND I FEEL MY COMPLACENCY AS WELL AS MY COPLTS WAS THE BIGGEST FACTOR IN THIS EVENT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.