Narrative:

I was the flying first officer on aircraft X; performing pilot monitoring duties. Approximately 5 hours into the flight at 37;000 feet; the other first officer and I heard what sounded like a gunshot going off on the flight deck. We could not immediately ascertain the source of the noise; but our attention was drawn to the front windscreen on the captain's side; which was producing considerable arcing.we looked closer to discover the entire captain's front windscreen had shattered; and was now arcing.I donned my oxygen mask and noted that we had an EICAS non-normal message; 'window heat left fwd'. I opened the checklist and turned off the fwd primary window heat switch. At which point we both noticed the window continued to arc.I called the captain; who was on break; informed him that his forward window had shattered; and he said he'd be right up.I began a search of the flight manual non-normals and found the unannunciated non-normal checklist labelled 'window damage; fwd left; right'; and began the checklist.we had already cut off the primary window heat switch; per the EICAS checklist; and the checklist then asked if the window was deformed or an air leak was observed. As it was completely dark outside we could not ascertain the extent of the damage to the windscreen; but we could see multiple large cracks across the entire windshield.the checklist said to land at nearest suitable airport in the event of window deformed or air leak; and we began looking at alternates; of which there were only two within an hour's flight time.the captain returned to the flight deck and the relief first officer (international relief officer) took his jumpseat. The captain immediately slowed the aircraft to 250 knots and asked for a descent to 33;000 feet; in order to decrease the differential pressure on the window. Upon reaching 33;000 and 250 knots I noted that our differential pressure had decreased from 8.6 psi to 4.7 psi. In addition; the captain turned off the backup left fwd window heat switch in an attempt to stop the electrical arcing; and the arcing stopped. It is important to note that neither of the non-normal checklists that we completed ever mentioned the backup window heat switch!the captain then had me take over as the pilot flying and he initiated a satellite call with dispatch and [maintenance]; and asked the [operations] to join the call.the [maintenance] representative was polite but to be honest; quite limited in his ability to provide the type of technical knowledge we needed on the 787 in order to make an informed decision. As we asked him for technical information on the viability of the remaining layers of the windscreen; his only input was that the window had multiple layers and that we had 'only lost the outer layer'. At no time did [maintenance] or dispatch offer to call boeing for further technical expertise on the shattered windshield. Had I thought of it at the time; I would have asked them to do so; since we did not feel any comfort in the expertise offered by [maintenance] for this event.the dispatcher and [operations] advocated for us to continue [to] our destination; since there was 787 maintenance there; and the passengers would be taken care of.I had advocated to the captain that we turn around and head for [diversion airport]; which; at the time of the window shattering; was 4 hours away; the same flying time that it would take us to continue to [our destination airport].my reasons for heading for [diversion airport] were: same flying time as it would be to continue to destination; it was a [company] station with [company] maintenance; there were multiple airports we could land at enroute; should the situation worsen; ATC coordination would get easier as we continued northbound; making contingencies easier to handle.ultimately; after discussion with the [operations] and dispatcher; the captain decided to continue to [our destination airport]; with the knowledge of 787 maintenance and a [company] station for support on landing.while we landed safely in [our destination airport]; I had multiple concerns about our further flight into with a compromised jet. Once we committed to continuing southbound; we had only two suitable airports identified by dispatch should our situation had worsened; and one of those was a 6500 foot runway.if the windscreen damage had worsened; and we had to descend to 10;000 feet in accordance with checklist procedures; ATC communication would have been impossible. ATC comms are marginal at best at 33;000 feet; 10;000 feet would have most likely left us with no ATC support during a divert.this event taught me many things; that our flight manual is woefully lacking in both its non-normal procedures (no mention of backup window heat at all); as well as the systems descriptions and amplifying information. It's the worst flight manual I have ever used in years of flying.this event left me with less than optimal faith in the depth of technical advice available from [maintenance]. The representative's only advice was like he was reading it from a script. When we're looking at a severely damaged windscreen; and [maintenance]'s best advice is that it 'should be ok' doesn't inspire confidence.also; after reflection; I think that we would have been better served had we [relayed our situation to ATC]; even if we continued to [our destination airport]. My reason for this is simple; if our situation had worsened; I.e.; loss of pressure and/or windscreen total failure; it would have been impossible for us to adequately communicate with [foreign] ATC to coordinate for a divert. We would have been down at 10;000 feet; most likely out of radio contact; and ATC would have no idea why or where we were going. Who knows if we would even have the ability to tell them. By an early [notification]; we would have had the opportunity to tell them of our intentions should the problem have gotten worse; and dispatch could have been coordinating as well.in all; I am proud of the way our crew handled this event. I think that it has uncovered gaps in our technical knowledge; checklist and flight manual procedures; and expertise available from [maintenance].

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B787 First Officer reported the flight deck windscreen shattered and the checklist did not give a clear resolution which led to poor CRM.

Narrative: I was the flying First Officer on Aircraft X; performing Pilot Monitoring duties. Approximately 5 hours into the flight at 37;000 feet; the other First Officer and I heard what sounded like a gunshot going off on the flight deck. We could not immediately ascertain the source of the noise; but our attention was drawn to the front windscreen on the Captain's side; which was producing considerable arcing.We looked closer to discover the entire Captain's front windscreen had shattered; and was now arcing.I donned my oxygen mask and noted that we had an EICAS non-normal message; 'WINDOW HEAT L FWD'. I opened the checklist and turned off the FWD PRIMARY WINDOW HEAT switch. At which point we both noticed the window continued to arc.I called the Captain; who was on break; informed him that his Forward Window had shattered; and he said he'd be right up.I began a search of the Flight Manual Non-Normals and found the unannunciated Non-normal checklist labelled 'Window Damage; FWD L; R'; and began the checklist.We had already cut off the Primary Window Heat switch; per the EICAS checklist; and the checklist then asked if the window was deformed or an air leak was observed. As it was completely dark outside we could not ascertain the extent of the damage to the windscreen; but we could see multiple large cracks across the entire windshield.The checklist said to land at nearest suitable airport in the event of window deformed or air leak; and we began looking at alternates; of which there were only two within an hour's flight time.The Captain returned to the Flight Deck and the Relief First Officer (IRO) took his jumpseat. The Captain immediately slowed the aircraft to 250 knots and asked for a descent to 33;000 feet; in order to decrease the differential pressure on the window. Upon reaching 33;000 and 250 knots I noted that our differential pressure had decreased from 8.6 PSI to 4.7 PSI. In addition; the Captain turned off the Backup L FWD Window Heat switch in an attempt to stop the electrical arcing; and the arcing stopped. It is important to note that neither of the Non-Normal checklists that we completed ever mentioned the Backup Window Heat switch!The Captain then had me take over as the Pilot Flying and he initiated a Satellite Call with Dispatch and [maintenance]; and asked the [operations] to join the call.The [maintenance] Representative was polite but to be honest; quite limited in his ability to provide the type of technical knowledge we needed on the 787 in order to make an informed decision. As we asked him for technical information on the viability of the remaining layers of the windscreen; his only input was that the window had multiple layers and that we had 'only lost the outer layer'. At no time did [maintenance] or Dispatch offer to call Boeing for further technical expertise on the shattered windshield. Had I thought of it at the time; I would have asked them to do so; since we did not feel any comfort in the expertise offered by [maintenance] for this event.The Dispatcher and [Operations] advocated for us to continue [to] our destination; since there was 787 maintenance there; and the passengers would be taken care of.I had advocated to the Captain that we turn around and head for [diversion airport]; which; at the time of the window shattering; was 4 hours away; the same flying time that it would take us to continue to [our destination airport].My reasons for heading for [diversion airport] were: Same flying time as it would be to continue to destination; it was a [company] station with [company] maintenance; there were multiple airports we could land at enroute; should the situation worsen; ATC coordination would get easier as we continued Northbound; making contingencies easier to handle.Ultimately; after discussion with the [operations] and Dispatcher; the Captain decided to continue to [our destination airport]; with the knowledge of 787 maintenance and a [company] station for support on landing.While we landed safely in [our destination airport]; I had multiple concerns about our further flight into with a compromised jet. Once we committed to continuing southbound; we had only two suitable airports identified by Dispatch should our situation had worsened; and one of those was a 6500 foot runway.If the windscreen damage had worsened; and we had to descend to 10;000 feet in accordance with checklist procedures; ATC communication would have been impossible. ATC comms are marginal at best at 33;000 feet; 10;000 feet would have most likely left us with no ATC support during a divert.This event taught me many things; that our Flight Manual is woefully lacking in both its Non-normal procedures (no mention of Backup Window Heat at all); as well as the systems descriptions and amplifying information. It's the worst flight manual I have ever used in years of flying.This event left me with less than optimal faith in the depth of technical advice available from [maintenance]. The representative's only advice was like he was reading it from a script. When we're looking at a severely damaged windscreen; and [maintenance]'s best advice is that it 'should be ok' doesn't inspire confidence.Also; after reflection; I think that we would have been better served had we [relayed our situation to ATC]; even if we continued to [our destination airport]. My reason for this is simple; if our situation had worsened; I.e.; loss of pressure and/or windscreen total failure; it would have been impossible for us to adequately communicate with [Foreign] ATC to coordinate for a divert. We would have been down at 10;000 feet; most likely out of radio contact; and ATC would have no idea why or where we were going. Who knows if we would even have the ability to tell them. By an early [notification]; we would have had the opportunity to tell them of our intentions should the problem have gotten worse; and Dispatch could have been coordinating as well.In all; I am proud of the way our crew handled this event. I think that it has uncovered gaps in our technical knowledge; checklist and flight manual procedures; and expertise available from [maintenance].

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.