Narrative:

All radar sectors were combined on one scope and traffic was heavy. I was training a developmental whose experience level was not sufficient to handle the traffic. Cga X was on a right downwind vector for a visibility approach to runway 1R on about a 200 degree heading at 6000', descending faster than air carrier Y. Air carrier Y was on a right downwind vector for a visibility approach to runway 1R on about a 190 degree heading at 5000'. Courses were converging. Not wanting to overly distraction the developmental, I quickly instructed him to point cga X out to air carrier Y and get him to follow him for runway 1R, then clear cga X for approach. Instead he just cleared cga X, who immediately turned right in front of air carrier Y. Air carrier Y did not see cga X until projected courses were diverging and cga X was descending in front of him. By the time I could have transmitted, there was nothing that could have been done to make the situation any better, so I called traffic to each other until they saw each other. The pilots were startled by the proximity of the traffic. When the traffic was as heavy as it was, sectors should have been decombined, especially since we had the personnel available. Additionally, this developmental was not ready for this density of traffic. I should have taken the position from him when the traffic level grew to this point. Supplemental information from acn 152690. Our aircraft encountered a 'near-miss' with a commuter aircraft over the city of wichita, ks, in VFR conditions. Our aircraft was returning to ict on an IFR flight plan from stl. At 6000' and prior to our calling 'field in sight' we were cleared for a visibility approach to runway 1R at ict. We felt uneasy about both the clearance and the situation, so my co-captain responded 'with the field in sight, cga X cleared for the visibility to runway 1R.' the situation made us uneasy because of obvious controller training in progress, a training controller overloaded with numerous aircraft under his control, (I'd estimate 6-8 aircraft, all in close proximity to ict) and an arrival scenario that had several non-standard (but legal) altitude clrncs. Because of the unsettled condition and a heightened sense of awareness my co-captain spotted air carrier Y at our 4-5 O'clock position, same altitude a 'few' hundred yards away. We were unable to take evasive action. We discussed the incident with the shift supervisor of the wichita facility after landing at wichita.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ARRIVING CGA TURNED IN FRONT OF AN ACR CAUSING A CONIFLICTION. NO TRAFFIC WAS ISSUED RESULTING IN LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION.

Narrative: ALL RADAR SECTORS WERE COMBINED ON ONE SCOPE AND TFC WAS HVY. I WAS TRNING A DEVELOPMENTAL WHOSE EXPERIENCE LEVEL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO HANDLE THE TFC. CGA X WAS ON A R DOWNWIND VECTOR FOR A VIS APCH TO RWY 1R ON ABOUT A 200 DEG HDG AT 6000', DSNDING FASTER THAN ACR Y. ACR Y WAS ON A R DOWNWIND VECTOR FOR A VIS APCH TO RWY 1R ON ABOUT A 190 DEG HDG AT 5000'. COURSES WERE CONVERGING. NOT WANTING TO OVERLY DISTR THE DEVELOPMENTAL, I QUICKLY INSTRUCTED HIM TO POINT CGA X OUT TO ACR Y AND GET HIM TO FOLLOW HIM FOR RWY 1R, THEN CLR CGA X FOR APCH. INSTEAD HE JUST CLRED CGA X, WHO IMMEDIATELY TURNED R IN FRONT OF ACR Y. ACR Y DID NOT SEE CGA X UNTIL PROJECTED COURSES WERE DIVERGING AND CGA X WAS DSNDING IN FRONT OF HIM. BY THE TIME I COULD HAVE XMITTED, THERE WAS NOTHING THAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO MAKE THE SITUATION ANY BETTER, SO I CALLED TFC TO EACH OTHER UNTIL THEY SAW EACH OTHER. THE PLTS WERE STARTLED BY THE PROX OF THE TFC. WHEN THE TFC WAS AS HVY AS IT WAS, SECTORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECOMBINED, ESPECIALLY SINCE WE HAD THE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE. ADDITIONALLY, THIS DEVELOPMENTAL WAS NOT READY FOR THIS DENSITY OF TFC. I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE POS FROM HIM WHEN THE TFC LEVEL GREW TO THIS POINT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 152690. OUR ACFT ENCOUNTERED A 'NEAR-MISS' WITH A COMMUTER ACFT OVER THE CITY OF WICHITA, KS, IN VFR CONDITIONS. OUR ACFT WAS RETURNING TO ICT ON AN IFR FLT PLAN FROM STL. AT 6000' AND PRIOR TO OUR CALLING 'FIELD IN SIGHT' WE WERE CLRED FOR A VIS APCH TO RWY 1R AT ICT. WE FELT UNEASY ABOUT BOTH THE CLRNC AND THE SITUATION, SO MY CO-CAPT RESPONDED 'WITH THE FIELD IN SIGHT, CGA X CLRED FOR THE VIS TO RWY 1R.' THE SITUATION MADE US UNEASY BECAUSE OF OBVIOUS CTLR TRNING IN PROGRESS, A TRNING CTLR OVERLOADED WITH NUMEROUS ACFT UNDER HIS CTL, (I'D ESTIMATE 6-8 ACFT, ALL IN CLOSE PROX TO ICT) AND AN ARR SCENARIO THAT HAD SEVERAL NON-STANDARD (BUT LEGAL) ALT CLRNCS. BECAUSE OF THE UNSETTLED CONDITION AND A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF AWARENESS MY CO-CAPT SPOTTED ACR Y AT OUR 4-5 O'CLOCK POS, SAME ALT A 'FEW' HUNDRED YARDS AWAY. WE WERE UNABLE TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION. WE DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT WITH THE SHIFT SUPVR OF THE WICHITA FAC AFTER LNDG AT WICHITA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.