Narrative:

The first two days of flying were demanding; but fatigue was not a major factor in this event. Ketchikan was clear of clouds with very light winds. I was the pilot monitoring and the first officer the pilot flying (PF). Prior to the descent point at cruise we set up and briefed the RNAV (rnp) M runway 11 approach. We planned to do the entire approach as plotted; even though it was in visual conditions. Center instructed us to contact ketchikan radio; and they subsequently requested that we make a position report on an 8-mile final. The approach pattern for runway 11 brought us on a gentle arcing turn to the right; which intercepted the final approach course just about 10 miles from the runway threshold. We heard radio transmitting with some traffic as we rounded the turn to final; descending through 3;000 as depicted on the chart. The PF commanded the start of the aircraft configuration for landing as we reached the 8-mile report fix; with the gear down and flaps initially set at 5 degrees. When we reported the 8-mile fix; we cancelled our IFR so that our company aircraft could continue unimpeded after us. Radio informed us of a helicopter in flight westbound with a sling load; but we could not determine the point from where the helicopter was westbound. The helicopter made some very brief and garbled position report; and that was mixed in with other helicopters making similar position reports with radio. All of the helicopters had call signs from same company; and there may have been four helicopters being dispatched from a nearby field; across the tongass narrows. It appeared that they were making multiple round robin trips to some location that crossed the approach path of aircraft landing on runway 11. We received a TA from one of the helicopters as we neared 2;000 feet on final. The PF commanded flaps 15 as we were nearing the final approach fix hekux. The PF slowed the rate of descent as we both strived to make visual contact with the traffic coming the opposite direction at our altitude. When we received the 'monitor vertical speed' RA; the PF leveled off and remained out of the red outlined zone depicted on the pfd. Neither of us could make visual contact with the helicopter; and I glanced back and forth at the TCAS display to aid in locating it. After the RA; the traffic did not appear to alter its flight course or altitude; and the altitude difference between us trended from 500 feet below; to our altitude; and finally to about 400 feet above us; as we continued east on the arrival path. My estimate was that the traffic was within 4-500 feet at our closest proximity; though we were not able to verify it visually. We did not hear the pilot of the helicopter respond to anything; whether or not he had us in sight; or whether he was taking evasive action. I assume he could see us because of our size and being visible from below. I anticipate that he was not able to alter his flight path because of his sling load; and due to economic considerations or hazards to people or structures below; he did not want to eject it.following the RA; both the PF and I agreed that we were too high to continue the approach. We reconfigured the aircraft for a missed approach and initially followed the missed approach procedure. After we commenced the missed approach procedure; radio seemed mystified about the call. Meanwhile he continued to make numerous radio calls to other helicopters in the area; including an update to our own that was approaching the area. The PF and I agreed that the best option was to land the opposite direction on runway 29 in an effort to not conflict with other inbound. However in the turn to final; the timing would not work. Inbound flight was aware of the problem; and they adjusted their flight path to follow us visually to runway 29 after us. The frequency was cluttered with numerous helicopters; radio acknowledging all of the calls; and us and coordinating our flight paths to runway 29. The event concluded with us being something less than 10 minutes later than our original time of arrival; and no further conflicts were encountered. Later on the ground; I quizzed radio about the helicopter operations; and he [as a] matter of fact described that as typical of the helicopter flight patterns.it is highly suggested that some sort of meeting be arranged between helicopter company; ketchikan radio; the FAA; and other operators at ketchikan airport. There seems to be some contract secured by the helicopter company that motivates them to operate sling loads right across the final approach fix; at the final approach altitude; from a nearby off airport site to a drop zone. Even when helicopters are landing at the same field as arriving aircraft; they are not supposed to be in the same pattern as fixed wing aircraft. In my opinion; this then makes this practice more egregious when rotor wing aircraft appear to be daisy chained in their pattern directly opposite of aircraft in a predetermined flight course to landing at a public airport. The fact that the helicopters are sling loading makes the operation more disconcerting; because there is thus a natural tendency to not alter their flight paths even when they are intentionally crossing approach fixes at similar altitudes as approaching aircraft. Compounding the problem are VHF radio equipment that transmits in garbled fashion; probably because of a helicopter's inherent background noise. Finally; position reports that use nomenclature and local names known only to them are worthless except only to themselves. It subconsciously reveals that the operation is focused mostly on their needs; and not with much consideration to other aircraft using the public approaches that overlap their customized flight paths.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier Captain reported a NMAC with a helicopter while on final approach.

Narrative: The first two days of flying were demanding; but fatigue was not a major factor in this event. Ketchikan was clear of clouds with very light winds. I was the Pilot Monitoring and the First Officer the Pilot Flying (PF). Prior to the descent point at cruise we set up and briefed the RNAV (RNP) M Runway 11 Approach. We planned to do the entire approach as plotted; even though it was in visual conditions. Center instructed us to contact Ketchikan Radio; and they subsequently requested that we make a position report on an 8-mile final. The approach pattern for Runway 11 brought us on a gentle arcing turn to the right; which intercepted the final approach course just about 10 miles from the runway threshold. We heard Radio transmitting with some traffic as we rounded the turn to final; descending through 3;000 as depicted on the chart. The PF commanded the start of the aircraft configuration for landing as we reached the 8-mile report fix; with the gear down and flaps initially set at 5 degrees. When we reported the 8-mile fix; we cancelled our IFR so that our company aircraft could continue unimpeded after us. Radio informed us of a helicopter in flight westbound with a sling load; but we could not determine the point from where the helicopter was westbound. The helicopter made some very brief and garbled position report; and that was mixed in with other helicopters making similar position reports with Radio. All of the helicopters had call signs from same company; and there may have been four helicopters being dispatched from a nearby field; across the Tongass Narrows. It appeared that they were making multiple round robin trips to some location that crossed the approach path of aircraft landing on Runway 11. We received a TA from one of the helicopters as we neared 2;000 feet on final. The PF commanded Flaps 15 as we were nearing the final approach fix HEKUX. The PF slowed the rate of descent as we both strived to make visual contact with the traffic coming the opposite direction at our altitude. When we received the 'Monitor Vertical Speed' RA; the PF leveled off and remained out of the red outlined zone depicted on the PFD. Neither of us could make visual contact with the helicopter; and I glanced back and forth at the TCAS display to aid in locating it. After the RA; the traffic did not appear to alter its flight course or altitude; and the altitude difference between us trended from 500 feet below; to our altitude; and finally to about 400 feet above us; as we continued east on the arrival path. My estimate was that the traffic was within 4-500 feet at our closest proximity; though we were not able to verify it visually. We did not hear the pilot of the helicopter respond to anything; whether or not he had us in sight; or whether he was taking evasive action. I assume he could see us because of our size and being visible from below. I anticipate that he was not able to alter his flight path because of his sling load; and due to economic considerations or hazards to people or structures below; he did not want to eject it.Following the RA; both the PF and I agreed that we were too high to continue the approach. We reconfigured the aircraft for a missed approach and initially followed the missed approach procedure. After we commenced the missed approach procedure; Radio seemed mystified about the call. Meanwhile he continued to make numerous radio calls to other helicopters in the area; including an update to our own that was approaching the area. The PF and I agreed that the best option was to land the opposite direction on Runway 29 in an effort to not conflict with other inbound. However in the turn to final; the timing would not work. Inbound flight was aware of the problem; and they adjusted their flight path to follow us visually to Runway 29 after us. The frequency was cluttered with numerous helicopters; Radio acknowledging all of the calls; and us and coordinating our flight paths to Runway 29. The event concluded with us being something less than 10 minutes later than our original time of arrival; and no further conflicts were encountered. Later on the ground; I quizzed Radio about the helicopter operations; and he [as a] matter of fact described that as typical of the helicopter flight patterns.It is highly suggested that some sort of meeting be arranged between Helicopter Company; Ketchikan Radio; the FAA; and other operators at Ketchikan Airport. There seems to be some contract secured by the helicopter company that motivates them to operate sling loads right across the final approach fix; at the final approach altitude; from a nearby off airport site to a drop zone. Even when helicopters are landing at the same field as arriving aircraft; they are not supposed to be in the same pattern as fixed wing aircraft. In my opinion; this then makes this practice more egregious when rotor wing aircraft appear to be daisy chained in their pattern directly opposite of aircraft in a predetermined flight course to landing at a public airport. The fact that the helicopters are sling loading makes the operation more disconcerting; because there is thus a natural tendency to not alter their flight paths even when they are intentionally crossing approach fixes at similar altitudes as approaching aircraft. Compounding the problem are VHF radio equipment that transmits in garbled fashion; probably because of a helicopter's inherent background noise. Finally; position reports that use nomenclature and local names known only to them are worthless except only to themselves. It subconsciously reveals that the operation is focused mostly on their needs; and not with much consideration to other aircraft using the public approaches that overlap their customized flight paths.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.