Narrative:

I was the PF (pilot flying) on the arrival to atl. We were filed for the hobtt 2 arrival but atl was landing east. We anticipated an arrival change so I briefed both the ILS 9R and ILS 10 approaches prior to descent; but we had the 9R approach loaded after atl center changed our arrival to the gndlf 2. We were given a 'descend via' clearance for the gndlf 2 but told to maintain 310 IAS with published speeds at gndlf which is 250 KT at or above 11;000 feet. There was no expect runway communication from ATC at that time. Just prior to gndlf as I was slowing to 250 KTS and leveling at 11;000 feet we received a runway clearance for ILS 10. We were level at 11;000 feet and 250 KIAS as I directed the first officer (first officer) to load the ILS 10 and verify the waypoints. While we were rechecking the waypoints and debriefing the highlights of the approach to runway 10; we were queried by approach as to whether we were 'descending via'. It was then I noticed that we were still at 11;000 feet when we should have been at 8;000 feet for shulr. We were approximately 1 NM from shulr. We began an expedited descent to 8;000 feet and were cleared to 5;000 feet from approach and told to expedite through 4;000 feet. We were next cleared to 3;000 feet and cleared for the visual approach to [runway] 10. No further inquiry or attention was given by approach pertaining to the deviation at shulr. We completed the approach and landing normally.the cause was due to channelized attention on getting the correct runway loaded and briefed while on a 'descend via' clearance. Despite my attempt to get ahead of the workload by briefing a primary and backup approach; the combination of speed change; descend via; later than usual runway assignment and lack of proper monitoring between crew; I did not continue my descent past gndlf and missed the crossing restriction at shulr.I debriefed the situation with the first officer and took responsibility for the deviation but emphasized that we needed to do a better job of crosschecking and backing each other up during the high workload phase and in aovs (areas of vulnerability). In situations where I have received an 'expect runway' communication from center or the first approach controller; further upstream; I have been better prepared and approach can be loaded and changes briefed during a lower workload period. Suggest ATC emphasize 'expect runway' communication at first opportunity when a crew checks on.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 flight crew reported failure to monitor automation during 'descending via' resulting in undershoot of crossing restriction.

Narrative: I was the PF (pilot flying) on the arrival to ATL. We were filed for the HOBTT 2 arrival but ATL was landing east. We anticipated an arrival change so I briefed both the ILS 9R and ILS 10 approaches prior to descent; but we had the 9R approach loaded after ATL Center changed our arrival to the GNDLF 2. We were given a 'descend via' clearance for the GNDLF 2 but told to maintain 310 IAS with published speeds at GNDLF which is 250 KT at or above 11;000 feet. There was no expect runway communication from ATC at that time. Just prior to GNDLF as I was slowing to 250 KTS and leveling at 11;000 feet we received a runway clearance for ILS 10. We were level at 11;000 feet and 250 KIAS as I directed the FO (First Officer) to load the ILS 10 and verify the waypoints. While we were rechecking the waypoints and debriefing the highlights of the approach to Runway 10; we were queried by Approach as to whether we were 'descending via'. It was then I noticed that we were still at 11;000 feet when we should have been at 8;000 feet for SHULR. We were approximately 1 NM from SHULR. We began an expedited descent to 8;000 feet and were cleared to 5;000 feet from Approach and told to expedite through 4;000 feet. We were next cleared to 3;000 feet and cleared for the visual approach to [Runway] 10. No further inquiry or attention was given by Approach pertaining to the deviation at SHULR. We completed the approach and landing normally.The cause was due to channelized attention on getting the correct runway loaded and briefed while on a 'descend via' clearance. Despite my attempt to get ahead of the workload by briefing a primary and backup approach; the combination of speed change; descend via; later than usual runway assignment and lack of proper monitoring between crew; I did not continue my descent past GNDLF and missed the crossing restriction at SHULR.I debriefed the situation with the FO and took responsibility for the deviation but emphasized that we needed to do a better job of crosschecking and backing each other up during the high workload phase and in AOVs (Areas of Vulnerability). In situations where I have received an 'expect runway' communication from Center or the first Approach controller; further upstream; I have been better prepared and approach can be loaded and changes briefed during a lower workload period. Suggest ATC emphasize 'expect runway' communication at first opportunity when a crew checks on.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.