Narrative:

As pilot flying (PF) during my from runway 16L at rno; at approximately 500' AGL; the aircraft suddenly encountered windshear. No windshear advisories were on ATIS or issued by ATC (tower; other aircraft; etc.); no windshear cautions or warnings were provided by the aircraft; and there were no visual cues along the flight path in VMC to provide warning of the impending windshear. Immediately upon entering the windshear; the aircraft felt 'squirrelly' and yawed slightly; the airspeed rapidly decayed; moderate chop was felt; and the active two-tone siren sounded followed by the aural declaration 'windshear; windshear; windshear.' simultaneous with entering the windshear; tower asked us to change our squawk and advised us of two or three gliders ahead and above us on our departure path. The PF immediately executed the windshear recovery maneuver on the hgs and the first officer (first officer) pilot monitoring (pm) promptly backed up all steps during maneuver execution. The pm then advised tower to standby and that we were in the midst of windshear attempting recovery. Total time in windshear was estimated to be approximately 15 seconds; although temporal distortion may have been encountered; and data review may disprove this time estimate. Total airspeed loss/slowest airspeed was not remembered by either pilot. Our annual windshear training; although hoped to never be used; had paid off! Once the PF and pilot monitoring (pm) agreed the aircraft was finally stable again (airspeed recovered; aircraft gaining altitude away from critical terrain); the aircraft was deconfigured; and then priority attention was given to the gliders in our flight path ahead. ATC issued us a lower level off altitude to avoid the (unseen) gliders; the pm provided tower our windshear parameters/ conditions; and then we were handed off to departure control. Climbout was flown in moderate chop as we headed southbound on the departure. Once the chop abated and we were handed off to center; I asked the first officer (first officer) to call and see if the flight attendants were ok and to see if any passengers were aware of what had taken place. The a flight attendant (flight attendant) felt the maneuver and heard the 2-tone siren and other noise; but thought the passengers only thought we were in bad chop although they felt the power increase. Essentially no one was aware of the magnitude of what had taken place; and as captain; I felt it best to not say anything further to the passengers about it myself; nor would the flight attendants (although I did make the flight attendant aware). Since everything was now fine and we were safely away; I did not want to create undue anxiety for anyone onboard. Once at our cruise altitude; I then provided dispatch with a full ACARS report of what had taken place. The remainder of the flight was flown uneventfully.rno airport has always been a high-emphasis concern for us here at company for the potential for a disastrous mishap. Today; thanks to our excellent training; one was avoided. After the fact though; I believe one thing (further) we can do to give our aircrew the best and safest chance to increase the odds of success on rno departures; would be to not allow reduced thrust takeoffs; and exclusively use full max takeoffs in the future. High potential for chop (at the least); windshear; or engine-loss on takeoff in the rno environment demands that we use every tool available to us to maintain the safest operation for our passengers; crews; and aircraft. We simply cannot afford a hull loss; and this environment is a setup for one. Strong operational risk management demands we look at this again and choose a safer alternative...max thrust on all rno departures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported low altitude windshear encounter and recovery on climbout.

Narrative: As Pilot Flying (PF) during my from runway 16L at RNO; at approximately 500' AGL; the aircraft suddenly encountered windshear. No windshear advisories were on ATIS or issued by ATC (Tower; other aircraft; etc.); no windshear cautions or warnings were provided by the aircraft; and there were no visual cues along the flight path in VMC to provide warning of the impending windshear. Immediately upon entering the windshear; the aircraft felt 'squirrelly' and yawed slightly; the airspeed rapidly decayed; moderate chop was felt; and the active two-tone siren sounded followed by the aural declaration 'Windshear; Windshear; Windshear.' Simultaneous with entering the windshear; Tower asked us to change our squawk and advised us of two or three gliders ahead and above us on our departure path. The PF immediately executed the Windshear Recovery Maneuver on the HGS and the First Officer (FO) Pilot Monitoring (PM) promptly backed up all steps during maneuver execution. The PM then advised Tower to standby and that we were in the midst of windshear attempting recovery. Total time in windshear was estimated to be approximately 15 seconds; although temporal distortion may have been encountered; and data review may disprove this time estimate. Total airspeed loss/slowest airspeed was not remembered by either Pilot. Our annual windshear training; although hoped to never be used; had paid off! Once the PF and Pilot Monitoring (PM) agreed the aircraft was finally stable again (airspeed recovered; aircraft gaining altitude away from critical terrain); the aircraft was deconfigured; and then priority attention was given to the gliders in our flight path ahead. ATC issued us a lower level off altitude to avoid the (unseen) gliders; the PM provided tower our windshear parameters/ conditions; and then we were handed off to Departure Control. Climbout was flown in moderate chop as we headed southbound on the Departure. Once the chop abated and we were handed off to Center; I asked the First Officer (FO) to call and see if the Flight Attendants were ok and to see if any Passengers were aware of what had taken place. The A Flight Attendant (FA) felt the maneuver and heard the 2-tone siren and other noise; but thought the Passengers only thought we were in bad chop although they felt the power increase. Essentially no one was aware of the magnitude of what had taken place; and as Captain; I felt it best to not say anything further to the Passengers about it myself; nor would the Flight Attendants (although I did make the FA aware). Since everything was now fine and we were safely away; I did not want to create undue anxiety for anyone onboard. Once at our cruise altitude; I then provided Dispatch with a full ACARS report of what had taken place. The remainder of the flight was flown uneventfully.RNO airport has always been a high-emphasis concern for us here at Company for the potential for a disastrous mishap. Today; thanks to our excellent training; one was avoided. After the fact though; I believe one thing (further) we can do to give our aircrew the best and safest chance to increase the odds of success on RNO departures; would be to not allow reduced thrust takeoffs; and exclusively use full Max takeoffs in the future. High potential for chop (at the least); windshear; or engine-loss on takeoff in the RNO environment demands that we use every tool available to us to maintain the safest operation for our Passengers; Crews; and aircraft. We simply cannot afford a hull loss; and this environment is a setup for one. Strong Operational Risk Management demands we look at this again and choose a safer alternative...Max thrust on all RNO departures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.