Narrative:

After a normal engine start on the #2 engine, using a gpu, the captain initiated an engine start on the #1 engine. Start sequence indications were normal through approximately 30% RPM. At about 42% engine RPM the itt gauge took an instantaneous jump and pegged off scale (limit 1149 C). The needle then dropped as suddenly as it had risen. The captain aborted the engine start. After several mins of discussion, and a manual venting of the engine, it was decided the temperature deviation was a faulty gauge indication (caused by an electrical spike, etc) rather than an overtemp situation. It was also decided that another start would be attempted with the understanding that any abnormal indications whatsoever would be cause for engine shutdown. During this second attempt the itt began a rapid rise (albeit much slower than the original jump) and the attempt was aborted. We shut down the engines and called maintenance. They were fully informed of all engine indications during both attempts at start. Maintenance asked us to perform an engine vent cycle followed by a normal start, and if everything appeared normal continue normal operations. We returned to the aircraft talking the recommended actions and the engine started within temperature limits. As the load was light and we were very late, we returned west/O passenger. The following morning we were advised that the company was taking the stand that the itt had been exceeded and the FAA was being advised. Although maintenance had given us the green light, we should have grounded the aircraft after the first start. Contributing factors: 1) it was the first day that the captain and I had flown together. Had I been working with this captain longer and been more comfortable with him I, most likely, would have expressed my concern about the second start and continued operations. 2) the shift that day had a show time of XA30 and 6 legs. After the fourth leg which landed at XG30, there was a scheduled 3 hour and 55 min layover before out next trip was to begin. The aircraft that we were to take was late and our departure was at XK56, 4:43 hours after our previous flight. This scheduled break and the delay may have caused undue fatigue, and had a detrimental effect on our decision making abilities. 3) the mechanic erred in telling us to continue, and his input was given a higher level of validity than it should have been.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER LTT WAS FERRIED TO MDW FROM SBN AFTER FLT CREW EXPERIENCED A HOT ENGINE START.

Narrative: AFTER A NORMAL ENG START ON THE #2 ENG, USING A GPU, THE CAPT INITIATED AN ENG START ON THE #1 ENG. START SEQUENCE INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL THROUGH APPROX 30% RPM. AT ABOUT 42% ENG RPM THE ITT GAUGE TOOK AN INSTANTANEOUS JUMP AND PEGGED OFF SCALE (LIMIT 1149 C). THE NEEDLE THEN DROPPED AS SUDDENLY AS IT HAD RISEN. THE CAPT ABORTED THE ENG START. AFTER SEVERAL MINS OF DISCUSSION, AND A MANUAL VENTING OF THE ENG, IT WAS DECIDED THE TEMP DEVIATION WAS A FAULTY GAUGE INDICATION (CAUSED BY AN ELECTRICAL SPIKE, ETC) RATHER THAN AN OVERTEMP SITUATION. IT WAS ALSO DECIDED THAT ANOTHER START WOULD BE ATTEMPTED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ANY ABNORMAL INDICATIONS WHATSOEVER WOULD BE CAUSE FOR ENG SHUTDOWN. DURING THIS SECOND ATTEMPT THE ITT BEGAN A RAPID RISE (ALBEIT MUCH SLOWER THAN THE ORIGINAL JUMP) AND THE ATTEMPT WAS ABORTED. WE SHUT DOWN THE ENGS AND CALLED MAINT. THEY WERE FULLY INFORMED OF ALL ENG INDICATIONS DURING BOTH ATTEMPTS AT START. MAINT ASKED US TO PERFORM AN ENG VENT CYCLE FOLLOWED BY A NORMAL START, AND IF EVERYTHING APPEARED NORMAL CONTINUE NORMAL OPS. WE RETURNED TO THE ACFT TALKING THE RECOMMENDED ACTIONS AND THE ENG STARTED WITHIN TEMP LIMITS. AS THE LOAD WAS LIGHT AND WE WERE VERY LATE, WE RETURNED W/O PAX. THE FOLLOWING MORNING WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE COMPANY WAS TAKING THE STAND THAT THE ITT HAD BEEN EXCEEDED AND THE FAA WAS BEING ADVISED. ALTHOUGH MAINT HAD GIVEN US THE GREEN LIGHT, WE SHOULD HAVE GNDED THE ACFT AFTER THE FIRST START. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) IT WAS THE FIRST DAY THAT THE CAPT AND I HAD FLOWN TOGETHER. HAD I BEEN WORKING WITH THIS CAPT LONGER AND BEEN MORE COMFORTABLE WITH HIM I, MOST LIKELY, WOULD HAVE EXPRESSED MY CONCERN ABOUT THE SECOND START AND CONTINUED OPS. 2) THE SHIFT THAT DAY HAD A SHOW TIME OF XA30 AND 6 LEGS. AFTER THE FOURTH LEG WHICH LANDED AT XG30, THERE WAS A SCHEDULED 3 HR AND 55 MIN LAYOVER BEFORE OUT NEXT TRIP WAS TO BEGIN. THE ACFT THAT WE WERE TO TAKE WAS LATE AND OUR DEP WAS AT XK56, 4:43 HRS AFTER OUR PREVIOUS FLT. THIS SCHEDULED BREAK AND THE DELAY MAY HAVE CAUSED UNDUE FATIGUE, AND HAD A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON OUR DECISION MAKING ABILITIES. 3) THE MECHANIC ERRED IN TELLING US TO CONTINUE, AND HIS INPUT WAS GIVEN A HIGHER LEVEL OF VALIDITY THAN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.