Narrative:

The inbound flight was delayed about an hour; so time constraints already pushed us to be thorough but quick. We were made aware that the APU gen was deferred and planned to start an engine at the gate accordingly. Having the APU gen deferred was already creating an abnormal operation. Once we got clearance to start the engine the captain elected to start engine 2 first. The start occurred normally and it was verified that the engine (idg 2) had taken the electrical load properly. At that point the captain deselected the gpu; at which point screens shut off and numerous EICAS messages appeared. We concluded there was a possible power transfer issue. Later suspected it to be an idg 2 fail. At this point we proceeded to contact maintenance control. After a lengthier discussion maintenance control instructed us to start both engines at the gate prior to disconnecting the gpu; in an attempt to eliminate the gpu from the equation of the idg fail. This seemed abnormal to me but I assumed that because the instruction was from maintenance control; it must be ok. After attempting the dual engine start and before deselecting the gpu button; the idg 1 failed. It was at this point we finally turned to the miac and properly addressed the issue. After following the miac we proceeded to call maintenance control and have the issue sorted.having known that the day was starting with a delayed inbound flight and a more abnormal MEL; we should have been more cognizant of the possible errors already creeping up. The failure of idg 2 on the first start up took me by surprise and my first thought was that the gpu had failed before we had a complete power transfer. I didn't realize it was the idg; and that thought failed to create a mindset to jump into the miac; which it should have. Secondly; when maintenance control instructed us to start 2 engines at the gate I should have been more vocal about my suspicions on that procedure. The failure of idg 1 was a definitive EICAS message which at that point it became clear what our actions were next.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 flight crew reported electrical issues on start up which resulted in a lengthy maintenance procedure. With the addition of time pressure from gate agents; the Captain concluded the event with a fatigue call.

Narrative: The inbound flight was delayed about an hour; so time constraints already pushed us to be thorough but quick. We were made aware that the APU Gen was deferred and planned to start an engine at the gate accordingly. Having the APU Gen deferred was already creating an abnormal operation. Once we got clearance to start the engine the captain elected to start engine 2 first. The start occurred normally and it was verified that the engine (IDG 2) had taken the electrical load properly. At that point the captain deselected the GPU; at which point screens shut off and numerous EICAS messages appeared. We concluded there was a possible power transfer issue. Later suspected it to be an IDG 2 fail. At this point we proceeded to contact maintenance control. After a lengthier discussion maintenance control instructed us to start both engines at the gate prior to disconnecting the GPU; in an attempt to eliminate the GPU from the equation of the IDG fail. This seemed abnormal to me but I assumed that because the instruction was from maintenance control; it must be ok. After attempting the dual engine start and before deselecting the GPU button; the IDG 1 failed. It was at this point we finally turned to the MIAC and properly addressed the issue. After following the MIAC we proceeded to call maintenance control and have the issue sorted.Having known that the day was starting with a delayed inbound flight and a more abnormal MEL; we should have been more cognizant of the possible errors already creeping up. The failure of IDG 2 on the first start up took me by surprise and my first thought was that the GPU had failed before we had a complete power transfer. I didn't realize it was the IDG; and that thought failed to create a mindset to jump into the MIAC; which it should have. Secondly; when maintenance control instructed us to start 2 engines at the gate I should have been more vocal about my suspicions on that procedure. The failure of IDG 1 was a definitive EICAS message which at that point it became clear what our actions were next.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.