Narrative:

The flight had experienced a 'steering inoperative' caution on the previous leg that led to landing and partial taxi in without nosewheel steering. I have operated/ferried aircraft in this configuration without difficulty on multiple occasions and have not considered it that serious of a malfunction once correctly planned for.the flight crew had unsuccessfully attempted to reset the system with maintenance assistance [at the previous stop]. After towing into gate; the system was reset and ops checked by local maintenance. The flight then continued. During the departure brief; the possible failure and abort scenarios with this system were reviewed. The departure was uneventful. During the arrival briefing; possible failures were again reviewed. The captain (ca) pilot flying (PF) had the QRH 'in the que' on the electronic flight bag (efb). The procedure was reviewed; including what we would advise the tower; taxi plan; etc.the arrival and approach were fairly routine. There was weather/precipitation in the area that led to deviations for weather and an arrival change. This required (2) runway changes in the brief and FMS; along with new taxi plan. We reviewed both normal and 'steering inoperative' taxi plans each time the runway changed. Upon gear extension outside the FAF...we again received the 'steering inoperative' message. The ca ran the QRH and after completing the QRH and normal checklists; we elected to continue. We advised tower of the malfunction and advised we would have a slower than normal exit off the runway. We also requested that after exiting; we could make a right turn.... This would enable a mostly straight taxi; away from other aircraft; and give us a place to stop and attempt a reset/consult with maintenance. Tower acknowledged the request and advised the flight behind us to prepare for the possibility of a go around. The first officer (first officer) continued the approach.the touchdown and initial roll was uneventful. However; the aircraft started and continued a fast left deviation from centerline; towards the left edge of the runway. I was initially expecting the first officer; PF to re-acquire the centerline; but it quickly became evident the turn was increasing. I stated 'I have the controls' and applied the normal differential corrections I have used in this malfunction scenario every time before; it was not effective. The aircraft continued left. I do not know what speed I stowed the reversers at; I did stow them to try to gain rudder effectiveness. Full right brake application had no effect on direction and the aircraft was now pointed off the runway at a fairly high rate of speed. It is worth noting two things here: 1) I have never had differential braking be ineffective in a nosewheel steering inoperative scenario. 2) the rate of closure with left edge of the runway essentially forced us into a 'maximum stop' scenario instantly. The first officer was already doing this; with maximum right pedal/brake deflection to assist me. I have no doubt that if we had delayed maximum effort stop any longer we would have exited the runway.the aircraft came to a stop approximately 10 to 15 feet from the left edge of [the runway]; pointed off the surface at approximately a 25 degree angle. The tower commanded the aircraft behind us to go around; as he believed us to be 'in the grass' off the runway. The stop was very 'jerky' and abrupt; and the max effort braking was unsettling to the passengers. The a flight attendant (flight attendant) later informed me several attempted to get out of their seats. As soon as she commanded them to sit; I waited for her PA to finish and made a PA for passengers to remain seated and wait for instructions.the tower was asking about our status/assistance required. We informed them that other than the steering issue; we had no other apparent concerns and all other indications were normal. We requested a tow team and this was dispatched.both the first officer and I remarked how unsuccessful we had been with differential braking for directional control. At this point; I looked down and saw the brake temperature monitoring system reading 4 4 5 0. (Later; at the gate; this outboard brake was cold to the touch. I believe this was a contributing factor.) the ground crew stated the left mains had left '30 feet' (their words) of skid marks as we stopped. They also remarked there were no skid marks on the right side.when the tow team arrived; even with the nosewheel steering in the 'off' position; they reported difficulty in straightening out the wheels to pull us in the bucket. It was 'trying to turn' in their words. We pulled both system circuit breakers and de-powered all hydraulics to attempt to relieve this condition.there may have been two mechanical issues at the same time; nose wheel steering; and an ineffective/ inoperative brake on the right outboard. The captain's familiarity with this malfunction led to a 'routine' state of mind. I clearly was not expecting a sudden emergency condition. The checklist does not direct to prepare for an emergency landing; which this quickly turned in to upon touchdown. The flight attendant's were not briefed to prepare the cabin. This could have had very negative results had the aircraft departed the runway/evacuation required.I will consider this malfunction an emergency/potential emergency going forward. I have had considerable experience with this scenario and have never had such an abrupt lateral deviation on the runway; without effective counter measures.I have evaluated whether we should have gone around. Since we had pre-briefed the failure; discussed the taxi plan; had the QRH ready; etc. It seemed like a satisfactory choice to continue. The tower was advised and ready to call the go-around for the following traffic. Had we gone around; we would have most likely done nothing different on the approach; landing; and rollout. Having said all that; we should have gone around; for one purpose- to prepare the cabin for a possible emergency landing; which I am now prepared to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL-65 Captain reported loss of aircraft control on landing due to a nosewheel steering failure and possible loss of the right; outboard brake. Aircraft did not depart the runway surface.

Narrative: The flight had experienced a 'Steering Inoperative' caution on the previous leg that led to landing and partial taxi in without nosewheel steering. I have operated/ferried aircraft in this configuration without difficulty on multiple occasions and have not considered it that serious of a malfunction once correctly planned for.The flight crew had unsuccessfully attempted to reset the system with Maintenance assistance [at the previous stop]. After towing into gate; the system was reset and ops checked by local Maintenance. The flight then continued. During the departure brief; the possible failure and abort scenarios with this system were reviewed. The departure was uneventful. During the arrival briefing; possible failures were again reviewed. The Captain (CA) Pilot Flying (PF) had the QRH 'in the que' on the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). The procedure was reviewed; including what we would advise the Tower; taxi plan; etc.The arrival and approach were fairly routine. There was weather/precipitation in the area that led to deviations for weather and an arrival change. This required (2) runway changes in the brief and FMS; along with new taxi plan. We reviewed both normal and 'Steering Inoperative' taxi plans each time the runway changed. Upon gear extension outside the FAF...we again received the 'Steering Inoperative' message. The CA ran the QRH and after completing the QRH and normal checklists; we elected to continue. We advised Tower of the malfunction and advised we would have a slower than normal exit off the runway. We also requested that after exiting; we could make a right turn.... This would enable a mostly straight taxi; away from other aircraft; and give us a place to stop and attempt a reset/consult with Maintenance. Tower acknowledged the request and advised the flight behind us to prepare for the possibility of a go around. The First Officer (FO) continued the approach.The touchdown and initial roll was uneventful. However; the aircraft started and continued a fast left deviation from centerline; towards the left edge of the runway. I was initially expecting the FO; PF to re-acquire the centerline; but it quickly became evident the turn was increasing. I stated 'I have the controls' and applied the normal differential corrections I have used in this malfunction scenario every time before; it was not effective. The aircraft continued left. I do not know what speed I stowed the reversers at; I did stow them to try to gain rudder effectiveness. Full right brake application had no effect on direction and the aircraft was now pointed off the runway at a fairly high rate of speed. It is worth noting two things here: 1) I have never had differential braking be ineffective in a nosewheel steering Inoperative scenario. 2) The rate of closure with left edge of the runway essentially forced us into a 'maximum stop' scenario instantly. The FO was already doing this; with maximum right pedal/brake deflection to assist me. I have no doubt that if we had delayed maximum effort stop any longer we would have exited the runway.The aircraft came to a stop approximately 10 to 15 feet from the left edge of [the runway]; pointed off the surface at approximately a 25 degree angle. The Tower commanded the aircraft behind us to go around; as he believed us to be 'in the grass' off the runway. The stop was very 'jerky' and abrupt; and the max effort braking was unsettling to the passengers. The A Flight Attendant (FA) later informed me several attempted to get out of their seats. As soon as she commanded them to sit; I waited for her PA to finish and made a PA for passengers to remain seated and wait for instructions.The tower was asking about our status/assistance required. We informed them that other than the steering issue; we had no other apparent concerns and all other indications were normal. We requested a tow team and this was dispatched.Both the FO and I remarked how unsuccessful we had been with differential braking for directional control. At this point; I looked down and saw the Brake Temperature Monitoring System reading 4 4 5 0. (Later; at the gate; this outboard brake was cold to the touch. I believe this was a contributing factor.) The ground crew stated the left mains had left '30 feet' (their words) of skid marks as we stopped. They also remarked there were no skid marks on the right side.When the tow team arrived; even with the nosewheel steering in the 'OFF' position; they reported difficulty in straightening out the wheels to pull us in the bucket. It was 'trying to turn' in their words. We pulled both system circuit breakers and de-powered all hydraulics to attempt to relieve this condition.There may have been two mechanical issues at the same time; nose wheel steering; and an ineffective/ inoperative brake on the right outboard. The Captain's familiarity with this malfunction led to a 'routine' state of mind. I clearly was not expecting a sudden emergency condition. The checklist does not direct to prepare for an emergency landing; which this quickly turned in to upon touchdown. The FA's were not briefed to prepare the cabin. This could have had very negative results had the aircraft departed the runway/evacuation required.I will consider this malfunction an emergency/potential emergency going forward. I have had considerable experience with this scenario and have never had such an abrupt lateral deviation on the runway; without effective counter measures.I have evaluated whether we should have gone around. Since we had pre-briefed the failure; discussed the taxi plan; had the QRH ready; etc. it seemed like a satisfactory choice to continue. The Tower was advised and ready to call the go-around for the following traffic. Had we gone around; we would have most likely done nothing different on the approach; landing; and rollout. Having said all that; we should have gone around; for one purpose- to prepare the cabin for a possible emergency landing; which I am now prepared to do.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.