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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1538089 |
Time | |
Date | 201804 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Turbine Engine |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144 Flight Crew Total 3502 Flight Crew Type 2037 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Type 1196 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
All preflight activities through the takeoff roll were normal. Planned takeoff was flaps 15; V1 - 130; vr - 151; V2 - 154. The captain taxied into position on runway 34L as tower cleared us for takeoff. I took control of the aircraft while stopped on the runway; but the parking brake was not set. Takeoff roll was normal with all required callouts. At 125 KIAS the captain called 'V1' then 'rotate' at approximately 151 KIAS. I rotated to approximately 15 degrees and called for gear up. Airspeed was approximately 173 KIAS.at 200 feet above field elevation there was an abnormal noise and a cyclical yaw to the right. Initially; I thought there was a problem with the gear during retraction as I noticed the gear door lights were still illuminated. At that moment tower transmitted to inform us they observed torching coming from the right engine. After scanning the engine instruments combined with the popping noises and cyclical yaw; we determined we were experiencing a compressor stall on the right engine.at that time; I requested heading select to maintain centerline; vertical speed of +100; cms (228 KIAS); and autothrottle off. The captain then began to reduce the right thrust lever towards idle. Once the thrust lever was at or near idle; the popping noise and cyclical yaw stopped and the aircraft was easily controlled with reduced thrust on the right engine. We continued to climb straight ahead and accelerate. I asked for flaps to 5 and we decided to maintain 200 KIAS at flaps 5 as we returned to the airport. The captain [advised ATC] and stated out intentions to return. We were cleared to maintain 9;000 MSL and turned to a 260 heading. After the captain ensured I was ready to begin our return; the clearance was accepted.the captain initially opened the engine failure checklist but determined the appropriate checklist was the engine limit or surge or stall. As the captain was running the checklists and coordinating with dispatch and the flight attendants; I engaged the right autopilot and took over ATC communications. We were turned to a downwind leg and maintained 9;000 MSL.I then began to prepare for the approach. I changed the runway in the FMC and tuned in the ILS frequency/ILS course and determined the approach reference and target airspeeds. ATC relayed ATIS information [and] asked for our preferred runway and length of final. I felt that a 10 mile final was more than adequate but was concerned about having enough time to complete the necessary checklists. We agreed upon a 10 mile final and requested 34R. The captain continued with checklists and we briefed the approach as well as a possible engine out go-around. We set auto brakes to 3 and set flaps 20 reference at 157.we were cleared to 8;000 MSL and a 020 heading then cleared the approach to 34R. We called the runway in sight and were then cleared for the visual. I descended to 7;500 MSL and initially stated I wanted to intercept glidepath from 7;500 MSL. I started to configure the aircraft with flaps 15 and the captain suggested a delay until the glideslope was intercepted and I agreed. I descended another 500 feet to 7;000 MSL before capturing glideslope. We configured the aircraft with flaps 20 and gear. The landing checklist was completed. We were cleared to land. Target airspeed was set at 165.the landing was a degraded thrust landing. The touchdown was normal. I stated my intention to only use the left engine reverser and then started to apply brakes 3 to 4 seconds after touchdown. The autobrakes were clicked off around 90 to 100 KIAS and the captain directed me to stop straight ahead on the runway to allow the fire/rescue crews to check out the aircraft. We came to a stop; set the parking brake; and changed to an operations frequency to talk with the fire crews. The right engine was shut down. We switched to the status page on the engine CRT.the brake temperatures were all 1's and 2's. The fire crews cleared us to taxi back to the terminal. Weinformed tower we were ready to taxi to the gate. As we cleared the runway the brake temperatures increased and on taxiway F we saw 3 brake modules showing 5. The rest were at 3 or 4. The brake temperature light also illuminated. The captain directed me to check the brake cooling tables in the QRH and to inform maintenance of potential hot brakes. Before I could go all the way through the brake cooling tables; maintenance advised us to proceed to the gate and there would be personnel there to handle the hot brake situation. We ensured they were aware of the actual brake temperature numbers and again they advised us to return to the gate. Taxi back from that point to the gate was uneventful. At the time the aircraft was stopped at the gate; all the brake temperatures were 4 or below.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Boeing 757 flight crew reported a right engine compressor stall shortly after rotation.
Narrative: All preflight activities through the takeoff roll were normal. Planned takeoff was flaps 15; V1 - 130; VR - 151; V2 - 154. The Captain taxied into position on Runway 34L as Tower cleared us for takeoff. I took control of the aircraft while stopped on the runway; but the parking brake was not set. Takeoff roll was normal with all required callouts. At 125 KIAS the Captain called 'V1' then 'Rotate' at approximately 151 KIAS. I rotated to approximately 15 degrees and called for gear up. Airspeed was approximately 173 KIAS.At 200 feet above field elevation there was an abnormal noise and a cyclical yaw to the right. Initially; I thought there was a problem with the gear during retraction as I noticed the gear door lights were still illuminated. At that moment Tower transmitted to inform us they observed torching coming from the right engine. After scanning the engine instruments combined with the popping noises and cyclical yaw; we determined we were experiencing a compressor stall on the right engine.At that time; I requested heading select to maintain centerline; vertical speed of +100; CMS (228 KIAS); and autothrottle off. The Captain then began to reduce the right thrust lever towards idle. Once the thrust lever was at or near idle; the popping noise and cyclical yaw stopped and the aircraft was easily controlled with reduced thrust on the right engine. We continued to climb straight ahead and accelerate. I asked for flaps to 5 and we decided to maintain 200 KIAS at flaps 5 as we returned to the airport. The Captain [advised ATC] and stated out intentions to return. We were cleared to maintain 9;000 MSL and turned to a 260 heading. After the Captain ensured I was ready to begin our return; the clearance was accepted.The Captain initially opened the Engine Failure checklist but determined the appropriate checklist was the Engine Limit or Surge or Stall. As the Captain was running the checklists and coordinating with Dispatch and the Flight Attendants; I engaged the right autopilot and took over ATC communications. We were turned to a downwind leg and maintained 9;000 MSL.I then began to prepare for the approach. I changed the runway in the FMC and tuned in the ILS frequency/ILS course and determined the approach reference and target airspeeds. ATC relayed ATIS information [and] asked for our preferred runway and length of final. I felt that a 10 mile final was more than adequate but was concerned about having enough time to complete the necessary checklists. We agreed upon a 10 mile final and requested 34R. The Captain continued with checklists and we briefed the approach as well as a possible engine out go-around. We set auto brakes to 3 and set flaps 20 REF at 157.We were cleared to 8;000 MSL and a 020 heading then cleared the approach to 34R. We called the runway in sight and were then cleared for the visual. I descended to 7;500 MSL and initially stated I wanted to intercept glidepath from 7;500 MSL. I started to configure the aircraft with flaps 15 and the Captain suggested a delay until the glideslope was intercepted and I agreed. I descended another 500 feet to 7;000 MSL before capturing glideslope. We configured the aircraft with flaps 20 and gear. The Landing Checklist was completed. We were cleared to land. Target airspeed was set at 165.The landing was a degraded thrust landing. The touchdown was normal. I stated my intention to only use the left engine reverser and then started to apply brakes 3 to 4 seconds after touchdown. The autobrakes were clicked off around 90 to 100 KIAS and the Captain directed me to stop straight ahead on the runway to allow the Fire/Rescue crews to check out the aircraft. We came to a stop; set the parking brake; and changed to an Operations frequency to talk with the fire crews. The right engine was shut down. We switched to the Status page on the engine CRT.The brake temperatures were all 1's and 2's. The fire crews cleared us to taxi back to the terminal. Weinformed Tower we were ready to taxi to the gate. As we cleared the runway the brake temperatures increased and on taxiway F we saw 3 brake modules showing 5. The rest were at 3 or 4. The brake temperature light also illuminated. The Captain directed me to check the brake cooling tables in the QRH and to inform Maintenance of potential hot brakes. Before I could go all the way through the brake cooling tables; Maintenance advised us to proceed to the gate and there would be personnel there to handle the hot brake situation. We ensured they were aware of the actual brake temperature numbers and again they advised us to return to the gate. Taxi back from that point to the gate was uneventful. At the time the aircraft was stopped at the gate; all the brake temperatures were 4 or below.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.