Narrative:

Flight departed fll on a standard clearance of runway heading to 3000'. The captain was flying the plane and I, the first officer, was doing the radio work. Upon contact with departure control we were cleared to 5000'. Before reaching 5000' we were cleared to 9000' on a heading of 080 degrees out of 4000'. Then we were given a frequency change. There was WX in the area so we had AR7 displayed on the HSI to help us determine the relation of the arwy to the WX. Our radar showed 2 medium sized, very intense level 4 or 5 buildups lined up north and south on AR7 that was 12 O'clock to us on the present assigned heading. We advised ATC that we would have to deviate left or right soon due to the buildups. ATC told us to 'turn right to 090 and climb to 15000 for vectors through AR7.' the captain had just engaged the autoplt, so the MCP was set by the captain. This is a company policy when the plane is being hand flown (autoplt not engaged) the MCP is set by the PNF. When the autoplt is engaged the MCP is set by the PF. The captain twisted the altitude knob toward 15000' and activated VNAV (vertical navigation). To start the plane climbing, then set heading knob to 090 degrees. The copilot responded, 'right to 090 up to 15000,' then checked the radar to make sure the heading would clear the WX. The plane soon achieved the new heading and began leveling at its new altitude. The captain commented, 'how come it's leveling here?', and made adjustments to the MCP altitude before the first officer looked up from the radar. At this time we broke out of the clouds in time to see an medium large transport crossing from right to left about 2-3 mi in front of us and ATC called to question our altitude. The new altitude was reported by the first officer as 'level at 16000,' which the first officer verified by looking at all 3 altimeters and the MCP altitude set by the captain. ATC then advised us we had only been cleared to 15000' and we should descend immediately. We complied as quickly as we could safely do so. The problem arose when the captain simply twisted the MCP altitude knob up to some higher valve than 9000' and activated VNAV west/O checking to verify where the knob stopped turning which was 15700', which also is why the captain noticed the plane leveling at 15700' and aid, 'how come it's leveling here?' therefore the captain adjusted the knob to the nearest altitude, which ended up to be 16000'. One contributing factor was the use of the MCP altitude knob set to a higher altitude rather than the specific assigned altitude. Another factor was the first officer should have observed the captain's inputs and corrected them when it occurred. In this case, the first officer made the mistake of assuming the captain used the MCP the same way he was taught to use it--which basically is, 'don't activate any mode on the MCP until you know you have verified what you've told the airplane to do.' one other factor was the first officer navigating around the thunderstorms and not including the captain's actions in his scan. This entire situation has taught the first officer something that he already knows and used to preach to his students--'somebody always has to be flying the plane.' supplemental information from acn 153588: our request was not immediately acknowledged (the controller was busy), but within a reasonable time were told to 'turn right to 090 and climb to 1-6000 for vectors through AR7.' I dialed in 16000' in the MCP as the first officer gave the 16000' readback to ATC (autoplt was engaged). Just after leveling at 16000', we broke into the clear and got a good view of the cells we had on radar just off to our left. That is when I saw another aircraft just below our altitude at 12-1 O'clock, crossing our flight path right to left at range of about 4 mi. As we passed behind the other aircraft's path, I could see that he too was at 16000'. About this time the controller told us to descend immediately to 15000'. We descended as I told the controller that we had the other aircraft in sight behind us on the left side and well clear. We were advised on the next frequency to contact ZMA during business hours, which we acknowledged. This message was given to us again by ZDC just north of wilmington, nc.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF ACR GETS VECTOR TO CIRCUMNAVIGATE TSTM DEPARTING FLL ALONG WITH INSTRUCTION TO CLIMB TO 15000'. CAPT SPINS ALT SELECT UP, BUT FAILS TO ACTUALLY SET IT AT 15000'. ACFT CLIMBS TO 16000' AND LOSES SEPARATION WITH AN MLG AT THE SAME ALT.

Narrative: FLT DEPARTED FLL ON A STANDARD CLRNC OF RWY HDG TO 3000'. THE CAPT WAS FLYING THE PLANE AND I, THE F/O, WAS DOING THE RADIO WORK. UPON CONTACT WITH DEP CTL WE WERE CLRED TO 5000'. BEFORE REACHING 5000' WE WERE CLRED TO 9000' ON A HDG OF 080 DEGS OUT OF 4000'. THEN WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE. THERE WAS WX IN THE AREA SO WE HAD AR7 DISPLAYED ON THE HSI TO HELP US DETERMINE THE RELATION OF THE ARWY TO THE WX. OUR RADAR SHOWED 2 MEDIUM SIZED, VERY INTENSE LEVEL 4 OR 5 BUILDUPS LINED UP N AND S ON AR7 THAT WAS 12 O'CLOCK TO US ON THE PRESENT ASSIGNED HDG. WE ADVISED ATC THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DEVIATE LEFT OR RIGHT SOON DUE TO THE BUILDUPS. ATC TOLD US TO 'TURN RIGHT TO 090 AND CLB TO 15000 FOR VECTORS THROUGH AR7.' THE CAPT HAD JUST ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT, SO THE MCP WAS SET BY THE CAPT. THIS IS A COMPANY POLICY WHEN THE PLANE IS BEING HAND FLOWN (AUTOPLT NOT ENGAGED) THE MCP IS SET BY THE PNF. WHEN THE AUTOPLT IS ENGAGED THE MCP IS SET BY THE PF. THE CAPT TWISTED THE ALT KNOB TOWARD 15000' AND ACTIVATED VNAV (VERT NAV). TO START THE PLANE CLBING, THEN SET HDG KNOB TO 090 DEGS. THE COPLT RESPONDED, 'RIGHT TO 090 UP TO 15000,' THEN CHKED THE RADAR TO MAKE SURE THE HDG WOULD CLR THE WX. THE PLANE SOON ACHIEVED THE NEW HDG AND BEGAN LEVELING AT ITS NEW ALT. THE CAPT COMMENTED, 'HOW COME IT'S LEVELING HERE?', AND MADE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE MCP ALT BEFORE THE F/O LOOKED UP FROM THE RADAR. AT THIS TIME WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS IN TIME TO SEE AN MLG XING FROM RIGHT TO LEFT ABOUT 2-3 MI IN FRONT OF US AND ATC CALLED TO QUESTION OUR ALT. THE NEW ALT WAS RPTED BY THE F/O AS 'LEVEL AT 16000,' WHICH THE F/O VERIFIED BY LOOKING AT ALL 3 ALTIMETERS AND THE MCP ALT SET BY THE CAPT. ATC THEN ADVISED US WE HAD ONLY BEEN CLRED TO 15000' AND WE SHOULD DSND IMMEDIATELY. WE COMPLIED AS QUICKLY AS WE COULD SAFELY DO SO. THE PROB AROSE WHEN THE CAPT SIMPLY TWISTED THE MCP ALT KNOB UP TO SOME HIGHER VALVE THAN 9000' AND ACTIVATED VNAV W/O CHKING TO VERIFY WHERE THE KNOB STOPPED TURNING WHICH WAS 15700', WHICH ALSO IS WHY THE CAPT NOTICED THE PLANE LEVELING AT 15700' AND AID, 'HOW COME IT'S LEVELING HERE?' THEREFORE THE CAPT ADJUSTED THE KNOB TO THE NEAREST ALT, WHICH ENDED UP TO BE 16000'. ONE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE USE OF THE MCP ALT KNOB SET TO A HIGHER ALT RATHER THAN THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNED ALT. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THE F/O SHOULD HAVE OBSERVED THE CAPT'S INPUTS AND CORRECTED THEM WHEN IT OCCURRED. IN THIS CASE, THE F/O MADE THE MISTAKE OF ASSUMING THE CAPT USED THE MCP THE SAME WAY HE WAS TAUGHT TO USE IT--WHICH BASICALLY IS, 'DON'T ACTIVATE ANY MODE ON THE MCP UNTIL YOU KNOW YOU HAVE VERIFIED WHAT YOU'VE TOLD THE AIRPLANE TO DO.' ONE OTHER FACTOR WAS THE F/O NAVIGATING AROUND THE TSTMS AND NOT INCLUDING THE CAPT'S ACTIONS IN HIS SCAN. THIS ENTIRE SITUATION HAS TAUGHT THE F/O SOMETHING THAT HE ALREADY KNOWS AND USED TO PREACH TO HIS STUDENTS--'SOMEBODY ALWAYS HAS TO BE FLYING THE PLANE.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 153588: OUR REQUEST WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY ACKNOWLEDGED (THE CTLR WAS BUSY), BUT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME WERE TOLD TO 'TURN RIGHT TO 090 AND CLB TO 1-6000 FOR VECTORS THROUGH AR7.' I DIALED IN 16000' IN THE MCP AS THE F/O GAVE THE 16000' READBACK TO ATC (AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED). JUST AFTER LEVELING AT 16000', WE BROKE INTO THE CLR AND GOT A GOOD VIEW OF THE CELLS WE HAD ON RADAR JUST OFF TO OUR LEFT. THAT IS WHEN I SAW ANOTHER ACFT JUST BELOW OUR ALT AT 12-1 O'CLOCK, XING OUR FLT PATH RIGHT TO LEFT AT RANGE OF ABOUT 4 MI. AS WE PASSED BEHIND THE OTHER ACFT'S PATH, I COULD SEE THAT HE TOO WAS AT 16000'. ABOUT THIS TIME THE CTLR TOLD US TO DSND IMMEDIATELY TO 15000'. WE DSNDED AS I TOLD THE CTLR THAT WE HAD THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT BEHIND US ON THE LEFT SIDE AND WELL CLR. WE WERE ADVISED ON THE NEXT FREQ TO CONTACT ZMA DURING BUSINESS HRS, WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED. THIS MESSAGE WAS GIVEN TO US AGAIN BY ZDC JUST N OF WILMINGTON, NC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.