Narrative:

A preflight examination of the aircraft equipment aircraft logbook showed a placard which stated that both main landing gear door hinge covers were removed/missing for maintenance. The preflight walk around revealed that only one hinge cover door was missing on each side. (The forward ones were missing). The aircraft confign deviation list (cdl) shows that there are 2 hinge covers on each gear and states that 2 on 1 side may be missing. There is no mention in the cdl about 1 missing hinge cover on each side. The captain requested clarification/ approval to launch with a missing hinge cover. Maintenance directed that it was ok to fly. The captain required maintenance to write it up that way in the logbook, then we launched. Maintenance personnel subsequently verified from aircraft mfr that the aircraft was not certified to fly in that confign. The aircraft had been operated in that confign for several days prior to our flight. Supplemental information from acn 154094. I called maintenance at dfw plus tech services for aircraft type and was told in rather strong terms that the sign off was legal and the aircraft agreed with cdl restrictions. I found out I was right maintenance was wrong and I was wrong in taking off. Aircraft not airworthy. Airline management followed up this resulting delay (20 mins) with an unsigned ACARS message indicating I was charged with a crew delay, 'debrief on hotline'. This message sent during sterile cockpit period on taxi out. Receipt of this administrative admonishment prior to takeoff, in my opinion directly affected the safe operation of the flight due to the mental frustration of the events.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT FLT CREW AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL DISAGREE ON INTERPRETATION OF MEL REQUIREMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT LOGBOOK SIGN-OFF. FLT CREW TOOK FLT, HOWEVER, MAINTENANCE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THAT FTL WAS IN VIOLATION OF MEL AND MFR RECOMMENDATIONS. FLT DISPATCH ISSUED AN ADMONISHMENT VIA ACARS ABOUT THE DELAY, DURING A STERILE COCKPIT PERIOD.

Narrative: A PREFLT EXAMINATION OF THE ACFT EQUIP ACFT LOGBOOK SHOWED A PLACARD WHICH STATED THAT BOTH MAIN LNDG GEAR DOOR HINGE COVERS WERE REMOVED/MISSING FOR MAINT. THE PREFLT WALK AROUND REVEALED THAT ONLY ONE HINGE COVER DOOR WAS MISSING ON EACH SIDE. (THE FORWARD ONES WERE MISSING). THE ACFT CONFIGN DEV LIST (CDL) SHOWS THAT THERE ARE 2 HINGE COVERS ON EACH GEAR AND STATES THAT 2 ON 1 SIDE MAY BE MISSING. THERE IS NO MENTION IN THE CDL ABOUT 1 MISSING HINGE COVER ON EACH SIDE. THE CAPT REQUESTED CLARIFICATION/ APPROVAL TO LAUNCH WITH A MISSING HINGE COVER. MAINT DIRECTED THAT IT WAS OK TO FLY. THE CAPT REQUIRED MAINT TO WRITE IT UP THAT WAY IN THE LOGBOOK, THEN WE LAUNCHED. MAINT PERSONNEL SUBSEQUENTLY VERIFIED FROM ACFT MFR THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT CERTIFIED TO FLY IN THAT CONFIGN. THE ACFT HAD BEEN OPERATED IN THAT CONFIGN FOR SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO OUR FLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 154094. I CALLED MAINT AT DFW PLUS TECH SVCS FOR ACFT TYPE AND WAS TOLD IN RATHER STRONG TERMS THAT THE SIGN OFF WAS LEGAL AND THE ACFT AGREED WITH CDL RESTRICTIONS. I FOUND OUT I WAS RIGHT MAINT WAS WRONG AND I WAS WRONG IN TAKING OFF. ACFT NOT AIRWORTHY. AIRLINE MGMNT FOLLOWED UP THIS RESULTING DELAY (20 MINS) WITH AN UNSIGNED ACARS MESSAGE INDICATING I WAS CHARGED WITH A CREW DELAY, 'DEBRIEF ON HOTLINE'. THIS MESSAGE SENT DURING STERILE COCKPIT PERIOD ON TAXI OUT. RECEIPT OF THIS ADMINISTRATIVE ADMONISHMENT PRIOR TO TKOF, IN MY OPINION DIRECTLY AFFECTED THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE FLT DUE TO THE MENTAL FRUSTRATION OF THE EVENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.