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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1543463 |
Time | |
Date | 201805 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZKC.ARTCC |
State Reference | KS |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | No Aircraft |
Flight Phase | Other All |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Traffic Management |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 9 Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Other / Unknown Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
By the time I arrived at xa:00; there was a large developed thunderstorm that stretched from irw up to just south of mci; and was expanding on the eastern side down to the jln area. The thunderstorm was not in the tcf (tfm convective forecast) tool which all the tmus (traffic management units) use in managing routes. Looking at the traffic coming the tmc (traffic management coordinator) I relieved at the tmnc position was concerned about the amount of aircraft headed towards that thunderstorm. The tmc I relieved had contacted severe weather at the command center to relay this information; and to ask for help in moving aircraft around the area of weather. The specialist at command center said the sectors were still combined; that the sectors needed to be split so [the specialist] could get a better idea of the numbers before they could move any aircraft. The NAS monitor has this function to look at what the volume would be if the sectors were split; so the tmc at command center could have looked at it without the sectors being split. My guess is they were using this as an excuse to not have to do anything. The ZKC tmc pressed the issue; and the command center tmc [said] they needed to tell the areas they needed to split out the sectors. ZKC tmc said they would forward that information to the supervisors; but it wasn't the tmc's call to make in the area. ZKC tmc explained to command center that they were trying to do their job and move the airplanes away from the weather. Command center said they would take a look at it. There were 14 aircraft that were identified in the request as candidates to move.command center called back and said they moved 2 sfo landing aircraft away from the weather; and said they saw our internal departures and said we could handle the volume with miles-in-trail (mit). I explained this was not a volume issue; this was a safety issue. I explained this was a thunderstorm that was not forecast in tcf. It was a large thunderstorm; that even though it was predicted to dissipate eventually; that was more than 4 hours down the road and didn't fix the issue of the aircraft that were headed directly at it now. Command center again explained that they did not move aircraft for combined sectors; to which I responded that yes; they did. I informed [command center tmc that] I have been in tmu several years; and I've frequently witnessed them moving aircraft for combined sectors in other ARTCC's.first; the unprofessional; condescending attitude that this tmc at command center frequently allays through their communications with us needs to stop. Their attitude towards doing their job is conveyed as 'here's why I'm not going to help' instead of 'what is your problem; and how would you like me to help fix it?' that's not a pipe dream. That should be a daily mantra to live by working in this safety-related job.second; with all the dynamics that play into air traffic; a one-size-fits-all policy is dangerous. It doesn't take into account special situations that arise due to the fluidity and ever-changing way of a safety-related job. In this job; you have to be able to think outside the box. You have to be able to be flexible and open to the possibility that all of our rules can't capture or apply to every event that comes up. If a large thunderstorm develops that was missed by our forecasters; or not agreed to by the forecasters in the field with the command center forecasters; digging your heels in and saying 'we can't do this because this weather wasn't forecast' or 'your sectors are still combined.' command center puts playbooks (daily national flow control plan) out before centers split their sectors. Command center calls and has our center move aircraft for other centers that have combined sectors. The 'policy' doesn't seem to be a hard and fast rule as much as it is a 'pick and choose' rule. Today we asked for aircraft to be moved that were headed for a large thunderstorm. This was a safety issue; plain and simple. We get paid a great deal of money to protect the flying public. If the first thing we do when asked to do something is to look for an excuse to not do our jobs; we are failing the flying public. If this is truly a hard and fast policy; it needs to be changed. You can't work in a dynamic industry with an inability to be flexible and adaptive to change.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZKC Center Traffic Management Coordinator reported the Command Center Traffic Management Unit refused to comply with a request to reroute aircraft due to thunderstorms.
Narrative: By the time I arrived at XA:00; there was a large developed thunderstorm that stretched from IRW up to just south of MCI; and was expanding on the eastern side down to the JLN area. The thunderstorm was not in the TCF (TFM Convective Forecast) tool which all the TMUs (Traffic Management Units) use in managing routes. Looking at the traffic coming the TMC (Traffic Management Coordinator) I relieved at the TMNC position was concerned about the amount of aircraft headed towards that thunderstorm. The TMC I relieved had contacted Severe Weather at the Command Center to relay this information; and to ask for help in moving aircraft around the area of weather. The specialist at Command Center said the sectors were still combined; that the sectors needed to be split so [the specialist] could get a better idea of the numbers before they could move any aircraft. The NAS monitor has this function to look at what the volume would be if the sectors were split; so the TMC at Command Center could have looked at it without the sectors being split. My guess is they were using this as an excuse to not have to do anything. The ZKC TMC pressed the issue; and the Command Center TMC [said] they needed to tell the areas they needed to split out the sectors. ZKC TMC said they would forward that information to the supervisors; but it wasn't the TMC's call to make in the area. ZKC TMC explained to Command Center that they were trying to do their job and move the airplanes away from the weather. Command Center said they would take a look at it. There were 14 aircraft that were identified in the request as candidates to move.Command Center called back and said they moved 2 SFO landing aircraft away from the weather; and said they saw our internal departures and said we could handle the volume with Miles-in-Trail (MIT). I explained this was not a volume issue; this was a safety issue. I explained this was a thunderstorm that was not forecast in TCF. It was a large thunderstorm; that even though it was predicted to dissipate eventually; that was more than 4 hours down the road and didn't fix the issue of the aircraft that were headed directly at it now. Command Center again explained that they did not move aircraft for combined sectors; to which I responded that yes; they did. I informed [Command Center TMC that] I have been in TMU several years; and I've frequently witnessed them moving aircraft for combined sectors in other ARTCC's.First; the unprofessional; condescending attitude that this TMC at Command Center frequently allays through their communications with us needs to stop. Their attitude towards doing their job is conveyed as 'Here's why I'm not going to help' instead of 'What is your problem; and how would you like me to help fix it?' That's not a pipe dream. That should be a daily mantra to live by working in this safety-related job.Second; with all the dynamics that play into air traffic; a one-size-fits-all policy is dangerous. It doesn't take into account special situations that arise due to the fluidity and ever-changing way of a safety-related job. In this job; you have to be able to think outside the box. You have to be able to be flexible and open to the possibility that all of our rules can't capture or apply to every event that comes up. If a large thunderstorm develops that was missed by our forecasters; or not agreed to by the forecasters in the field with the Command Center forecasters; digging your heels in and saying 'We can't do this because this weather wasn't forecast' or 'Your sectors are still combined.' Command Center puts Playbooks (Daily National Flow Control plan) out before Centers split their sectors. Command Center calls and has our Center move aircraft for other Centers that have combined sectors. The 'policy' doesn't seem to be a hard and fast rule as much as it is a 'pick and choose' rule. Today we asked for aircraft to be moved that were headed for a large thunderstorm. This was a safety issue; plain and simple. We get paid a great deal of money to protect the flying public. If the first thing we do when asked to do something is to look for an excuse to NOT do our jobs; we are failing the flying public. If this is truly a hard and fast policy; it needs to be changed. You can't work in a dynamic industry with an inability to be flexible and adaptive to change.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.