Narrative:

While cruising at FL280 on J-174 just north of the norfolk (orf) VOR. I was occupying the captain's seat on an air carrier medium large transport with a check captain occupying the right seat during my initial 25 hour IOE. The check captain was the PF. At a point approximately 40 mi north of orf, washington center gave us a clearance to cross norfolk at FL240. As the PNF, I acknowledged the new altitude and set and armed it in the FMA. At the time, and for the next several mins, we were distraction by multiple thunderstorms that required deviations off of J-174. At about 15 mi north of orf we broke clear of the thunderstorms and were proceeding toward orf when we received a frequency change. I checked in with washington center at FL280 while still about 10 mi north or orf. Washington acknowledged and asked us to verify that we had clearance to FL240. I looked at the altitude window in the FMA and saw that it was set and armed for 240 and replied that we had pilot's discretion to FL240. The check captain (PF) then made an aggressive descent to FL240, completing the level-off within the zone of confusion of the orf VOR. I do not believe that safety was compromised in this case, but there is definitely a potential for this type of thing to happen where conflicting traffic would be involved. I have never flown a 2-MAN airplane in commercial aviation before now, yet I am a new captain on one. And in spite of having an experienced check captain occupying the other seat, and in spite of the fact that I followed my company's procedures (the PNF is responsible for handling the radio and setting and arming altitude in the FMA), I now realize how easily a breakdown or lack of communication can lead to trouble. In retrospect, I have 2 thoughts on this. My first reaction is that as captain, I should not have allowed this situation to develop. Even though the 2-MAN cockpit concept divides responsibilities for the PF and the PNF, the captain has the ultimate responsibility to ensure the flight is performed safely and correctly. From now on, I will make a conscious effort to make sure the copilot understands the clearance that I received, acknowledged, set and armed. My second, and somewhat opp reaction, is that a 2-MAN cockpit is extremely intensive for both crew members and that, at times, the captain has to entrust the flying of the airplane to the copilot west/O having the luxury of constant supervision to ensure that he does it correctly. Supplemental information from acn 154398. ATC issued descent from FL280 to cross norfolk VOR at FL240 to first officer while captain (PF) was being served a crew meal. Due to confusion caused by transfer of flying and communication duties to first officer and untimely meal service, captain missed the crossing instructions issued by ATC. First officer assumed he was aware of clearance and did not apprise him of same when captain returned to PF status. Frequency change was issued as orf/VOR reached at which time first officer checked in with only present altitude of FL280. ATC issued an immediate descent to FL240 and ask altitude previously assigned. First officer was confused as to whether the previous clearance was at pilot's discretion or whether to cross orf VOR at FL240. First officer was experienced as first officer but was receiving his initial operating experience as captain on an aircraft in which he was not experienced.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG FLT CREW WITH CAPT ON IOE FAILS TO INITIATE A TIMELY DESCENT IN RESPONSE TO ATC CLRNC.

Narrative: WHILE CRUISING AT FL280 ON J-174 JUST N OF THE NORFOLK (ORF) VOR. I WAS OCCUPYING THE CAPT'S SEAT ON AN ACR MLG WITH A CHK CAPT OCCUPYING THE R SEAT DURING MY INITIAL 25 HR IOE. THE CHK CAPT WAS THE PF. AT A POINT APPROX 40 MI N OF ORF, WASHINGTON CTR GAVE US A CLRNC TO CROSS NORFOLK AT FL240. AS THE PNF, I ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEW ALT AND SET AND ARMED IT IN THE FMA. AT THE TIME, AND FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL MINS, WE WERE DISTR BY MULTIPLE TSTMS THAT REQUIRED DEVS OFF OF J-174. AT ABOUT 15 MI N OF ORF WE BROKE CLR OF THE TSTMS AND WERE PROCEEDING TOWARD ORF WHEN WE RECEIVED A FREQ CHANGE. I CHKED IN WITH WASHINGTON CTR AT FL280 WHILE STILL ABOUT 10 MI N OR ORF. WASHINGTON ACKNOWLEDGED AND ASKED US TO VERIFY THAT WE HAD CLRNC TO FL240. I LOOKED AT THE ALT WINDOW IN THE FMA AND SAW THAT IT WAS SET AND ARMED FOR 240 AND REPLIED THAT WE HAD PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL240. THE CHK CAPT (PF) THEN MADE AN AGGRESSIVE DSNT TO FL240, COMPLETING THE LEVEL-OFF WITHIN THE ZONE OF CONFUSION OF THE ORF VOR. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED IN THIS CASE, BUT THERE IS DEFINITELY A POTENTIAL FOR THIS TYPE OF THING TO HAPPEN WHERE CONFLICTING TFC WOULD BE INVOLVED. I HAVE NEVER FLOWN A 2-MAN AIRPLANE IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION BEFORE NOW, YET I AM A NEW CAPT ON ONE. AND IN SPITE OF HAVING AN EXPERIENCED CHK CAPT OCCUPYING THE OTHER SEAT, AND IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT I FOLLOWED MY COMPANY'S PROCS (THE PNF IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDLING THE RADIO AND SETTING AND ARMING ALT IN THE FMA), I NOW REALIZE HOW EASILY A BREAKDOWN OR LACK OF COM CAN LEAD TO TROUBLE. IN RETROSPECT, I HAVE 2 THOUGHTS ON THIS. MY FIRST REACTION IS THAT AS CAPT, I SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED THIS SITUATION TO DEVELOP. EVEN THOUGH THE 2-MAN COCKPIT CONCEPT DIVIDES RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PF AND THE PNF, THE CAPT HAS THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THE FLT IS PERFORMED SAFELY AND CORRECTLY. FROM NOW ON, I WILL MAKE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO MAKE SURE THE COPLT UNDERSTANDS THE CLRNC THAT I RECEIVED, ACKNOWLEDGED, SET AND ARMED. MY SECOND, AND SOMEWHAT OPP REACTION, IS THAT A 2-MAN COCKPIT IS EXTREMELY INTENSIVE FOR BOTH CREW MEMBERS AND THAT, AT TIMES, THE CAPT HAS TO ENTRUST THE FLYING OF THE AIRPLANE TO THE COPLT W/O HAVING THE LUXURY OF CONSTANT SUPERVISION TO ENSURE THAT HE DOES IT CORRECTLY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 154398. ATC ISSUED DSNT FROM FL280 TO CROSS NORFOLK VOR AT FL240 TO F/O WHILE CAPT (PF) WAS BEING SERVED A CREW MEAL. DUE TO CONFUSION CAUSED BY TRANSFER OF FLYING AND COM DUTIES TO F/O AND UNTIMELY MEAL SVC, CAPT MISSED THE XING INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY ATC. F/O ASSUMED HE WAS AWARE OF CLRNC AND DID NOT APPRISE HIM OF SAME WHEN CAPT RETURNED TO PF STATUS. FREQ CHANGE WAS ISSUED AS ORF/VOR REACHED AT WHICH TIME F/O CHKED IN WITH ONLY PRESENT ALT OF FL280. ATC ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE DSNT TO FL240 AND ASK ALT PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED. F/O WAS CONFUSED AS TO WHETHER THE PREVIOUS CLRNC WAS AT PLT'S DISCRETION OR WHETHER TO CROSS ORF VOR AT FL240. F/O WAS EXPERIENCED AS F/O BUT WAS RECEIVING HIS INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE AS CAPT ON AN ACFT IN WHICH HE WAS NOT EXPERIENCED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.