Narrative:

First officer was flying the leg. Briefed a ILS to runway xxl; flaps 30 and autobrakes level 1. Runway exit plan was to the right on [the] taxiway. Normal landing; in the touchdown zone. Speed brake deployed. First officer (first officer) selected reverse at which time we both noticed an amber rev light over the right EPR (engine pressure ratio) gauge. First officer maintained idle reverse until 80 knots; then stowed reverse handles. Right engine reverser did not stow and rev light remained illuminated. Tower instructed us to taxi across runway xxr; then join [the taxiway] to the gate. Then tower notified us that smoke was coming out of the right engine and that the right reverser was still deployed. We transferred aircraft control below 80 knots; I cleared runway xxl and made an immediate right turn onto taxiway P. I shut down the right engine; stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. We requested emergency equipment as the tower told us that smoke was still coming from the right engine. First officer started the APU; then began looking for an appropriate checklist. EICAS showed: right hydraulic system press amber rev above right EPR gauge. Status page showed right hydraulic qty 0.18 (rf)first officer and I accomplished 3 checklists from the qrc: initially we ran the: engine fire hydraulic system press (right) there was no smoke in the cabin or cockpit and there was no fire indication at any time. I informed the flight attendants and passengers what was happening and to please remain seated until we had a clear answer from the fire department. The fire department arrived and spoke with us over the tower frequency. They inspected the right engine; verifying it was still smoking then asked us to shut down the left engine. They further stated that fuel was pouring out of the engine; it was hydraulic fluid. Next they told us we would have to evacuate the aircraft. I questioned what type of evacuation they wanted; slides or stairs as we I had seen a truck with air-stairs approaching us. They verified that we would use the air-stairs to exit the aircraft. First officer made several attempts to contact station operations; unsuccessfully. She was able to reach maintenance and requested tow equipment and a bus for the passengers. They arrived promptly and came up to the flight deck to assess. Maintenance gave us a frequency to contact operations; we asked them to coordinate the bus from the airport operator as well as a tug for the airplane. I made a call to the flight attendants informing them of this plan and to disarm aircraft door 1L only. I then made a PA to the passengers tellingly them to calmly exit the aircraft at the front left exit. I told them to move carefully and orderly; which they did with the assistance of the flight attendants. The airport operator brought the air-stairs to door 1L. The passengers exited with no injury. I did not exit with the passengers as the fire department and police had the passengers cordoned off in a safe area; clear of the aircraft and were making a count to verify everyone was accounted for. First officer and I ran the after landing and parking checklists to verify everything was in order. Initially we were going to ride to the terminal with the passengers; but opted to stay with the airplane and be towed to [the] gate. We spoke with the flight attendants to ensure they were all ok; they stated they were. Once we reached the gate; we went out onto the ramp to inspect the airplane. Apparently a part of the T/right (thrust reverser) had failed and hydraulic fluid poured forward into the engine [as] well as all over the fuselage and wing. First officer and I debriefed to determine if there was anything else we could have done; or missed. We couldn't determine anything was missed. Items we thought of that we did were appropriate and we took our time before moving switches and handles. The first officer did an outstanding job. She was proactive; calm; asked questions; and made suggestions. We used our CRM (crew resource management) / vvm (verbalize; verify; monitor) skills to the best ofour ability. Despite being cleared by the tower to cross [the] runway; I instinctively turned right onto [the] taxiway. I know we would be clear of any traffic; runways and open ramp areas. I also knew that there would be room on this taxiway for emergency equipment and also an evacuation if needed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Boeing 757 flight crew reported one thrust reverser failed to operate normally during the landing roll followed by visible smoke from the associated engine.

Narrative: First Officer was flying the leg. Briefed a ILS to Runway XXL; flaps 30 and autobrakes level 1. Runway exit plan was to the right on [the] taxiway. Normal landing; in the touchdown zone. Speed brake deployed. F/O (First Officer) selected reverse at which time we both noticed an amber REV light over the right EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) gauge. F/O maintained idle reverse until 80 knots; then stowed reverse handles. Right engine reverser did not stow and REV light remained illuminated. Tower instructed us to taxi across Runway XXR; then join [the taxiway] to the gate. Then Tower notified us that smoke was coming out of the right engine and that the right reverser was still deployed. We transferred aircraft control below 80 knots; I cleared Runway XXL and made an immediate right turn onto taxiway P. I shut down the right engine; stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. We requested emergency equipment as the Tower told us that smoke was still coming from the right engine. F/O started the APU; then began looking for an appropriate checklist. EICAS showed: R HYD SYS PRESS amber REV above right EPR gauge. STATUS page showed R HYD QTY 0.18 (rf)F/O and I accomplished 3 checklists from the QRC: Initially we ran the: ENG FIRE HYD SYS PRESS (R) There was no smoke in the cabin or cockpit and there was no FIRE indication at any time. I informed the flight attendants and passengers what was happening and to please remain seated until we had a clear answer from the fire department. The fire department arrived and spoke with us over the tower frequency. They inspected the right engine; verifying it was still smoking then asked us to shut down the left engine. They further stated that fuel was pouring out of the engine; it was hydraulic fluid. Next they told us we would have to evacuate the aircraft. I questioned what type of evacuation they wanted; slides or stairs as we I had seen a truck with air-stairs approaching us. They verified that we would use the air-stairs to exit the aircraft. First Officer made several attempts to contact Station Operations; unsuccessfully. She was able to reach Maintenance and requested tow equipment and a bus for the passengers. They arrived promptly and came up to the flight deck to assess. Maintenance gave us a frequency to contact Operations; we asked them to coordinate the bus from the airport operator as well as a tug for the airplane. I made a call to the Flight Attendants informing them of this plan and to disarm aircraft door 1L only. I then made a PA to the passengers tellingly them to calmly exit the aircraft at the front left exit. I told them to move carefully and orderly; which they did with the assistance of the Flight Attendants. The airport operator brought the air-stairs to door 1L. The passengers exited with no injury. I did not exit with the passengers as the fire department and police had the passengers cordoned off in a safe area; clear of the aircraft and were making a count to verify everyone was accounted for. F/O and I ran the after landing and parking checklists to verify everything was in order. Initially we were going to ride to the terminal with the passengers; but opted to stay with the airplane and be towed to [the] gate. We spoke with the Flight Attendants to ensure they were all ok; they stated they were. Once we reached the gate; we went out onto the ramp to inspect the airplane. Apparently a part of the T/R (thrust reverser) had failed and hydraulic fluid poured forward into the engine [as] well as all over the fuselage and wing. F/O and I debriefed to determine if there was anything else we could have done; or missed. We couldn't determine anything was missed. Items we thought of that we did were appropriate and we took our time before moving switches and handles. The F/O did an outstanding job. She was proactive; calm; asked questions; and made suggestions. We used our CRM (Crew Resource Management) / VVM (Verbalize; Verify; Monitor) skills to the best ofour ability. Despite being cleared by the Tower to cross [the] runway; I instinctively turned right onto [the] taxiway. I know we would be clear of any traffic; runways and open ramp areas. I also knew that there would be room on this taxiway for emergency equipment and also an evacuation if needed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.