Narrative:

This event was very stressful and traumatic for me. I don't clearly recall every event or action that happened; due to the intense stress and trauma that I felt at this time. I'm attempting to recall this event to the best of my knowledge:aircraft X called for an IFR pickup. He asked if he should call me; or hcf center on 119.3. I asked his position; and he was just off the ZZZ airport; so I suggested calling 119.3; since I was very busy at the time. I was working R9 & R10 combined. I have; on numerous occasions mentioned to the atm (air traffic manager); and management; supervisors and oms (operations managers) that R9 & R10 shouldn't be constantly combined; because it is too busy a sector to be constantly combined. I even mentioned this during [a] briefing [this month]; where we were informed that R9 & R10 would always be combined; and it was solely up to the discretion of the supervisor in charge of the floor; if the sector would be de-combined. I believe; based on [that] briefing that the supervisor should have been monitoring the sector and have opened R10; since it was much too busy to work one person.R4 called me back and handed off aircraft X to me. I asked if they (as a trainee and as the instructor) gave him any instructions; and they said no. I verified aircraft X was still VFR; and they stated he was still VFR. I already had aircraft Y cleared for the ILS2 approach; and I had two aircraft on a downwind to the ILS; plus I had a VFR aircraft Z inbound to the field. I also had ogg tower calling with several IFR departures; but I was too busy to answer the calls from ogg tower; so they just launched the aircraft; without contacting me.I advised aircraft Z of all the inbound traffic; and told him to stay VFR and use caution. I also; to the best of my recollection; gave aircraft X a VFR altitude to maintain and a heading; but aircraft X advised me he was unable to maintain VFR; and did a 180 degree turn directly in the path of aircraft Y. At this point; I feared that aircraft X would crash head on into aircraft Y and kill every passenger on board aircraft Y; so I cancelled aircraft Y's ILS approach; gave a vector and an altitude. I had to descend aircraft Y down to get him out of the way of the inbounds on the vector from the north; so I had to turn him back toward the localizer. I was panicked and stressed at this point; and traumatized because I feared a crash was going to be imminent with aircraft Y and aircraft X; so my only option was to give aircraft Y an emergency vector direct to tebbs with an approach to clear every aircraft and keep the situation as safe as possible. Since tebbs has been moved; I vectored aircraft Y below the mvas; but I thought that was better than allowing two planes to crash in my sector; and I didn't have any assistance; because the supervisor did not open R10.I could continue to recall the event; but I'm being called back to the floor; since we are short staffed; yet again. I hope I recalled enough. I was trembling after the incident; and I don't even know how I gave a relief briefing to my relief.maui approach (hcf sectors 9 and 10) need to be de-combined. In the past; we would de-combine the sectors [during the day]. I still believe this is a good practice. The timing was mandated because a catastrophic event almost occurred where 3 planes almost had a mid-air. I don't want to see another event like that occur before our management decides to de-combine the sectors during busy periods. Just having this event caused me such trauma and stress that I can't even recall all the events clearly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HCF TRACON Controller reported descending an aircraft below MVA to avoid traffic in high-workload environment with combined sectors and low staffing.

Narrative: This event was very stressful and traumatic for me. I don't clearly recall every event or action that happened; due to the intense stress and trauma that I felt at this time. I'm attempting to recall this event to the best of my knowledge:Aircraft X called for an IFR pickup. He asked if he should call me; or HCF Center on 119.3. I asked his position; and he was just off the ZZZ airport; so I suggested calling 119.3; since I was very busy at the time. I was working R9 & R10 combined. I have; on numerous occasions mentioned to the ATM (Air Traffic Manager); and management; supervisors and Oms (Operations Managers) that R9 & R10 shouldn't be constantly combined; because it is TOO BUSY a sector to be constantly combined. I even mentioned this during [a] briefing [this month]; where we were informed that R9 & R10 would ALWAYS be combined; and it was solely up to the discretion of the Supervisor in charge of the floor; if the sector would be de-combined. I believe; based on [that] briefing that the supervisor should have been monitoring the sector and have opened R10; since it was much too busy to work one person.R4 called me back and handed off Aircraft X to me. I asked if they (as a trainee and as the instructor) gave him any instructions; and they said no. I verified Aircraft X was still VFR; and they stated he was still VFR. I already had Aircraft Y cleared for the ILS2 approach; and I had two aircraft on a downwind to the ILS; plus I had a VFR Aircraft Z inbound to the field. I also had OGG Tower calling with several IFR departures; but I was too busy to answer the calls from OGG Tower; so they just launched the aircraft; without contacting me.I advised Aircraft Z of all the inbound traffic; and told him to stay VFR and use caution. I also; to the best of my recollection; gave Aircraft X a VFR altitude to maintain and a heading; but Aircraft X advised me he was unable to maintain VFR; and did a 180 degree turn directly in the path of Aircraft Y. At this point; I feared that Aircraft X would crash head on into Aircraft Y and kill every passenger on board Aircraft Y; so I cancelled Aircraft Y's ILS approach; gave a vector and an altitude. I had to descend Aircraft Y down to get him out of the way of the inbounds on the vector from the north; so I had to turn him back toward the localizer. I was panicked and stressed at this point; and traumatized because I feared a crash was going to be imminent with Aircraft Y and Aircraft X; so my only option was to give Aircraft Y an emergency vector direct to TEBBS with an approach to clear every aircraft and keep the situation as safe as possible. Since TEBBS has been moved; I vectored Aircraft Y BELOW the MVAs; but I thought that was better than allowing two planes to crash in my sector; and I didn't have any assistance; because the supervisor did not open R10.I could continue to recall the event; but I'm being called back to the floor; since we are short staffed; yet again. I hope I recalled enough. I was trembling after the incident; and I don't even know how I gave a relief briefing to my relief.Maui Approach (HCF Sectors 9 and 10) NEED TO BE DE-COMBINED. In the past; we would de-combine the sectors [during the day]. I still believe this is a good practice. The timing was mandated because a catastrophic event almost occurred where 3 planes almost had a mid-air. I don't want to see another event like that occur before our management decides to de-combine the sectors during busy periods. Just having this event caused me such trauma and stress that I can't even recall all the events clearly.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.