Narrative:

We recently took a massive step backwards and went back to archaic departure procedures. Where once we had RNAV departures that worked wonderfully; some genius decided that in the interest of being expeditious but less safe we'd go back to radar vector departures. I have yet to find an individual who likes these new departures better. Tower; maybe?in any case; I was just shipped and started working aircraft X level at 11;000 heading into the downwind. At this time I noticed a company CRJ2 depart and behind him aircraft Y. Both departure aircraft were with the departure controller and should [have] been climbing to 10;000 until clear of my downwind traffic. Most crj's pass beneath the downwind around 7;000 feet on their climb to 10;000. I noticed that aircraft Y was climbing extremely fast and started issuing a traffic call when aircraft Y was showing 9;600. As I was finishing the traffic call to inform aircraft X that aircraft Y was climbing to 10;000 aircraft Y blew through his altitude and showed 10;300. Aircraft X then informed me that he was responding to a TCAS/RA. I informed aircraft X that it appeared the traffic was going through his assigned altitude and aircraft X replied; 'yea we're climbing.' aircraft Y ended up climbing to 10;900 before he stopped his climb. I did not issue a traffic alert because it should have just been a traffic call with aircraft Y leveling at 10;000. By the time aircraft Y flew through his assigned altitude; aircraft X was already responding to the TCAS/RA. Afterwards; I talked to the departure controller and we reviewed the tapes and aircraft Y didn't even check in until he was at 10;300. Tower shipped aircraft Y without issuing traffic and once aircraft Y checked in with the departure controller his first response was radar contact descend immediately and maintain 9;000.we have had a bunch of issues and confusion with the new radar vector departure procedures. The old ones being RNAV provided better course guidance and a much safer operation. Since the implementation of the new procedures we have had a recent increase in pilots doing unexpected things. Doubt it will happen but I think most of us in the TRACON would prefer to go back to the much safer RNAV departures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: S56 Controller reported receiving a handoff that was in conflict due to change in departure procedures.

Narrative: We recently took a massive step backwards and went back to archaic departure procedures. Where once we had RNAV departures that worked wonderfully; some genius decided that in the interest of being expeditious but less safe we'd go back to radar vector departures. I have yet to find an individual who likes these new departures better. Tower; maybe?In any case; I was just shipped and started working Aircraft X level at 11;000 heading into the downwind. At this time I noticed a company CRJ2 depart and behind him Aircraft Y. Both departure aircraft were with the Departure controller and should [have] been climbing to 10;000 until clear of my downwind traffic. Most CRJ's pass beneath the downwind around 7;000 feet on their climb to 10;000. I noticed that Aircraft Y was climbing extremely fast and started issuing a traffic call when Aircraft Y was showing 9;600. As I was finishing the traffic call to inform Aircraft X that Aircraft Y was climbing to 10;000 Aircraft Y blew through his altitude and showed 10;300. Aircraft X then informed me that he was responding to a TCAS/RA. I informed Aircraft X that it appeared the traffic was going through his assigned altitude and Aircraft X replied; 'yea we're climbing.' Aircraft Y ended up climbing to 10;900 before he stopped his climb. I did not issue a traffic alert because it should have just been a traffic call with Aircraft Y leveling at 10;000. By the time Aircraft Y flew through his assigned altitude; Aircraft X was already responding to the TCAS/RA. Afterwards; I talked to the Departure controller and we reviewed the tapes and Aircraft Y didn't even check in until he was at 10;300. Tower shipped Aircraft Y without issuing traffic and once Aircraft Y checked in with the Departure controller his first response was Radar Contact descend immediately and maintain 9;000.We have had a bunch of issues and confusion with the new radar vector departure procedures. The old ones being RNAV provided better course guidance and a much safer operation. Since the implementation of the new procedures we have had a recent increase in pilots doing unexpected things. Doubt it will happen but I think most of us in the TRACON would prefer to go back to the much safer RNAV departures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.