Narrative:

According to the logbook the aircraft had not been flown for 10 days. Maintenance, including a new interior, had been done at oak. I did not discover this until reveiwing the logbook after I had done the exterior preflight. Since it was first officer's leg, I did the exterior while he started the cockpit setup. The trip was uneventful until the approach phase. During the approach at bur with first officer at the controls, the right main gear 'unsafe' red light came on and stayed on during gear extension with no green down and locked light. We were about 8-10 mi out at about 3000'-4000' and 180 KTS. IAS with 5 degrees flaps. I recycled gear with the same result. After first officer made a go-around, I made a PA announcement regarding the gear light problem and while being vectored in the bur area we cycled the gear several times. After talking to maintenance, we cycled the gear at 270 KTS (at 10000'), the maximum gear extension speed. Initially I suspected a gear light problem since I had seen similar problems while on the large transport which were corrected before landing. First officer went to the cabin to check the gear down locks through the view port and the first F/a was called to the cockpit to discuss an emergency evacuation preparation. After first officer came back, he called maintenance, then reentered the cabin. He then confirmed the right main gear was up. He resumed his duties and prepared for a landing at lax. The F/as were very professional and did not 'chime' us or in anyway disrupt our procedures. They were very patient and probably understanding of the workload in the cockpit. When asked to prepare the cabin they did so in minimum time and reconfirmed the brace signal. When finished they informed me that they were returning to their seats for the landing. An air traffic controller told us that another aircraft had seen the right gear up with the others down. Also later while passing near bur the tower saw the right main gear up. At no time did I consider the landing to be life threatening, even with one main gear up because of the engine size. When the right main gear was confirmed up, we elected to go to lax instead ofa planned pass by bur tower. First officer and I set up for lax an he began checklists including the 'partial gear or gear up landing checklist.' lax was chosen for its long runways and emergency equipment. I asked that emergency equipment be standing by and assumed that they knew from bur approach that our right gear was up. On our way to lax, I informed the passengers of the problem and told them the landing should not be a major problem because of the large diameter engine, but that we would evacuate the aircraft when it came to a stop. When the right engine did contact the pavement, directional control was maintained and deceleration was fine until at a very slow speed the aircraft began turning to the right with some shaking. I shut down both engines to stop the aircraft, set the brake, pulled the fire handles (including APU) and rotated the #2 fire handle to discharge the extinguisher. I suspected some friction fire where the engine was in contact with the runway. Evacuation went smoothly. In fact by the time (only a few seconds) first officer and I entered the cabin the F/a's had all slides inflated, and all but about 10 passengers off. These were waiting to go out the left wing exit so we redirected them to the front doors. Then the crew exited. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Callback completed to reporter #2. Mechanics discovered that when the aircraft was svced prior to this flight, the right gear strut was svced and a mechanic had left a flashlight resting above the gear uplock actuator. When the gear recycled, the flashlight was crushed by the actuator and the actuator was dented. This prevented the actuator from being able to pull the gear uplock pin. After the incident, the flight crew re-enacted the scenario in the simulator. The company suggested that the crew might have taken more time to confer with the company in order to find a solution. During callback, the first officer said that both he and the captain had recently come from flying larger aircraft, and that their perception of just what constituted a critically low fuel state was distorted by their previous experience in that otheracft. The flight landed with 6000 pounds of fuel remaining, and the company thought that, had the flight crew used an additional 2000 pounds, they would have gained perhaps 15-20 mins of time for troubleshooting and preparation. As it was the first officer said that, once the decision was made to go to lax, the flight crew was so busy in trying to prepare for the landing that they completely forgot about the gear problem. The flight crew was unable to complete the prelndg checklists prior to landing, as they were entirely consumed with trying to configure the aircraft, comply with ATC instructions, pull out their approach plates, watch out for traffic, and reprogram the FMC. Only about 5 mins elapsed between decision to land at lax and T/D. Had the crew been able to confer with the company more extensively, the company had a special team that could have been hooked up across the country with direct communication between them and the flight crew for purposes of troubleshooting and preparing for an emergency landing. That team would have suggested that the flight crew attempt to deploy the landing gear by using the t-handle located in the cockpit floor. Although the flight crews are not told this during their training, that t-handle actually had a direct cable connection to the gear unlock pin, and the possibility exists that the crew could have manually extracted it. There is no reference to using the t-handle in the gear up landing procedure because its use is usually predicated on a loss of hydraulic power which did not exist in this circumstance. Company had only recently promoted the use of the troubleshooting team in their flight crew newsletter, but reporter had not yet read it. The first officer suggested that the company more clearly mark the location of the landing gear viewport in the cabin, as the first officer was unable to locate it on his first attempt. First officer believes that the company will make changes in this regard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF ACR MLG ARRINVING BUR IS UNABLE TO LOWER RIGHT MAIN LNDG GEAR DUE TO FLASHLIGHT LEFT NEAR GEAR UPLOCK PIN ACTUATOR BY MAINTENANCE, THUS DISABLING THE ACTUATOR. FLT DIVERTS TO LAX WHERE THEY LAND WITH THE R MAIN GEAR UP.

Narrative: ACCORDING TO THE LOGBOOK THE ACFT HAD NOT BEEN FLOWN FOR 10 DAYS. MAINT, INCLUDING A NEW INTERIOR, HAD BEEN DONE AT OAK. I DID NOT DISCOVER THIS UNTIL REVEIWING THE LOGBOOK AFTER I HAD DONE THE EXTERIOR PREFLT. SINCE IT WAS F/O'S LEG, I DID THE EXTERIOR WHILE HE STARTED THE COCKPIT SETUP. THE TRIP WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL THE APCH PHASE. DURING THE APCH AT BUR WITH F/O AT THE CTLS, THE R MAIN GEAR 'UNSAFE' RED LIGHT CAME ON AND STAYED ON DURING GEAR EXTENSION WITH NO GREEN DOWN AND LOCKED LIGHT. WE WERE ABOUT 8-10 MI OUT AT ABOUT 3000'-4000' AND 180 KTS. IAS WITH 5 DEGS FLAPS. I RECYCLED GEAR WITH THE SAME RESULT. AFTER F/O MADE A GO-AROUND, I MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE GEAR LIGHT PROBLEM AND WHILE BEING VECTORED IN THE BUR AREA WE CYCLED THE GEAR SEVERAL TIMES. AFTER TALKING TO MAINT, WE CYCLED THE GEAR AT 270 KTS (AT 10000'), THE MAX GEAR EXTENSION SPD. INITIALLY I SUSPECTED A GEAR LIGHT PROB SINCE I HAD SEEN SIMILAR PROBS WHILE ON THE LGT WHICH WERE CORRECTED BEFORE LNDG. F/O WENT TO THE CABIN TO CHK THE GEAR DOWN LOCKS THROUGH THE VIEW PORT AND THE FIRST F/A WAS CALLED TO THE COCKPIT TO DISCUSS AN EMER EVACUATION PREPARATION. AFTER F/O CAME BACK, HE CALLED MAINT, THEN REENTERED THE CABIN. HE THEN CONFIRMED THE R MAIN GEAR WAS UP. HE RESUMED HIS DUTIES AND PREPARED FOR A LNDG AT LAX. THE F/AS WERE VERY PROFESSIONAL AND DID NOT 'CHIME' US OR IN ANYWAY DISRUPT OUR PROCS. THEY WERE VERY PATIENT AND PROBABLY UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORKLOAD IN THE COCKPIT. WHEN ASKED TO PREPARE THE CABIN THEY DID SO IN MINIMUM TIME AND RECONFIRMED THE BRACE SIGNAL. WHEN FINISHED THEY INFORMED ME THAT THEY WERE RETURNING TO THEIR SEATS FOR THE LNDG. AN AIR TFC CTLR TOLD US THAT ANOTHER ACFT HAD SEEN THE R GEAR UP WITH THE OTHERS DOWN. ALSO LATER WHILE PASSING NEAR BUR THE TWR SAW THE R MAIN GEAR UP. AT NO TIME DID I CONSIDER THE LNDG TO BE LIFE THREATENING, EVEN WITH ONE MAIN GEAR UP BECAUSE OF THE ENG SIZE. WHEN THE R MAIN GEAR WAS CONFIRMED UP, WE ELECTED TO GO TO LAX INSTEAD OFA PLANNED PASS BY BUR TWR. F/O AND I SET UP FOR LAX AN HE BEGAN CHKLISTS INCLUDING THE 'PARTIAL GEAR OR GEAR UP LNDG CHKLIST.' LAX WAS CHOSEN FOR ITS LONG RWYS AND EMER EQUIP. I ASKED THAT EMER EQUIP BE STANDING BY AND ASSUMED THAT THEY KNEW FROM BUR APCH THAT OUR R GEAR WAS UP. ON OUR WAY TO LAX, I INFORMED THE PAXS OF THE PROB AND TOLD THEM THE LNDG SHOULD NOT BE A MAJOR PROB BECAUSE OF THE LARGE DIAMETER ENG, BUT THAT WE WOULD EVACUATE THE ACFT WHEN IT CAME TO A STOP. WHEN THE R ENG DID CONTACT THE PAVEMENT, DIRECTIONAL CTL WAS MAINTAINED AND DECELERATION WAS FINE UNTIL AT A VERY SLOW SPD THE ACFT BEGAN TURNING TO THE R WITH SOME SHAKING. I SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS TO STOP THE ACFT, SET THE BRAKE, PULLED THE FIRE HANDLES (INCLUDING APU) AND ROTATED THE #2 FIRE HANDLE TO DISCHARGE THE EXTINGUISHER. I SUSPECTED SOME FRICTION FIRE WHERE THE ENG WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE RWY. EVACUATION WENT SMOOTHLY. IN FACT BY THE TIME (ONLY A FEW SECS) F/O AND I ENTERED THE CABIN THE F/A'S HAD ALL SLIDES INFLATED, AND ALL BUT ABOUT 10 PAXS OFF. THESE WERE WAITING TO GO OUT THE L WING EXIT SO WE REDIRECTED THEM TO THE FRONT DOORS. THEN THE CREW EXITED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. CALLBACK COMPLETED TO RPTR #2. MECHS DISCOVERED THAT WHEN THE ACFT WAS SVCED PRIOR TO THIS FLT, THE R GEAR STRUT WAS SVCED AND A MECH HAD L A FLASHLIGHT RESTING ABOVE THE GEAR UPLOCK ACTUATOR. WHEN THE GEAR RECYCLED, THE FLASHLIGHT WAS CRUSHED BY THE ACTUATOR AND THE ACTUATOR WAS DENTED. THIS PREVENTED THE ACTUATOR FROM BEING ABLE TO PULL THE GEAR UPLOCK PIN. AFTER THE INCIDENT, THE FLT CREW RE-ENACTED THE SCENARIO IN THE SIMULATOR. THE COMPANY SUGGESTED THAT THE CREW MIGHT HAVE TAKEN MORE TIME TO CONFER WITH THE COMPANY IN ORDER TO FIND A SOLUTION. DURING CALLBACK, THE F/O SAID THAT BOTH HE AND THE CAPT HAD RECENTLY COME FROM FLYING LARGER ACFT, AND THAT THEIR PERCEPTION OF JUST WHAT CONSTITUTED A CRITICALLY LOW FUEL STATE WAS DISTORTED BY THEIR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN THAT OTHERACFT. THE FLT LANDED WITH 6000 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING, AND THE COMPANY THOUGHT THAT, HAD THE FLT CREW USED AN ADDITIONAL 2000 LBS, THEY WOULD HAVE GAINED PERHAPS 15-20 MINS OF TIME FOR TROUBLESHOOTING AND PREPARATION. AS IT WAS THE F/O SAID THAT, ONCE THE DECISION WAS MADE TO GO TO LAX, THE FLT CREW WAS SO BUSY IN TRYING TO PREPARE FOR THE LNDG THAT THEY COMPLETELY FORGOT ABOUT THE GEAR PROB. THE FLT CREW WAS UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE PRELNDG CHKLISTS PRIOR TO LNDG, AS THEY WERE ENTIRELY CONSUMED WITH TRYING TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT, COMPLY WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS, PULL OUT THEIR APCH PLATES, WATCH OUT FOR TFC, AND REPROGRAM THE FMC. ONLY ABOUT 5 MINS ELAPSED BTWN DECISION TO LAND AT LAX AND T/D. HAD THE CREW BEEN ABLE TO CONFER WITH THE COMPANY MORE EXTENSIVELY, THE COMPANY HAD A SPECIAL TEAM THAT COULD HAVE BEEN HOOKED UP ACROSS THE COUNTRY WITH DIRECT COM BTWN THEM AND THE FLT CREW FOR PURPOSES OF TROUBLESHOOTING AND PREPARING FOR AN EMER LNDG. THAT TEAM WOULD HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE FLT CREW ATTEMPT TO DEPLOY THE LNDG GEAR BY USING THE T-HANDLE LOCATED IN THE COCKPIT FLOOR. ALTHOUGH THE FLT CREWS ARE NOT TOLD THIS DURING THEIR TRNING, THAT T-HANDLE ACTUALLY HAD A DIRECT CABLE CONNECTION TO THE GEAR UNLOCK PIN, AND THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT THE CREW COULD HAVE MANUALLY EXTRACTED IT. THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO USING THE T-HANDLE IN THE GEAR UP LNDG PROC BECAUSE ITS USE IS USUALLY PREDICATED ON A LOSS OF HYD PWR WHICH DID NOT EXIST IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE. COMPANY HAD ONLY RECENTLY PROMOTED THE USE OF THE TROUBLESHOOTING TEAM IN THEIR FLT CREW NEWSLETTER, BUT RPTR HAD NOT YET READ IT. THE F/O SUGGESTED THAT THE COMPANY MORE CLRLY MARK THE LOCATION OF THE LNDG GEAR VIEWPORT IN THE CABIN, AS THE F/O WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE IT ON HIS FIRST ATTEMPT. F/O BELIEVES THAT THE COMPANY WILL MAKE CHANGES IN THIS REGARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.