37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1549071 |
Time | |
Date | 201806 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZOA.ARTCC |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Stratotanker 135 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Stratotanker 135 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | None |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute Instructor |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Person 2 | |
Function | Enroute Trainee |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Developmental |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Airspace Violation All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Two kc-135s (aircraft X) aircraft were refueling northbound ar-6 in a block altitude f250b270. I was training a d-side developmental on D-14. Three kc-135s (aircraft Y) were operating off the coast in W283/285ABCD and in communication with facsfac. We saw a data-block tag on aircraft Y indicating F260 with limited on [the second and third aircraft of aircraft Y] and the flight appeared to be approaching the eastern boundary of the warning airspace.facsfac called to get approval on routing on aircraft Y and advised they would be proceeding VFR. My developmental denied their request as we do not accept aircraft VFR in class alpha airspace. The call ended and aircraft Y continued into our airspace without approval on a northeast bound course. At this time the aircraft X was approximately 30 NM to the south-south-east of aircraft Y northbound and the present courses of two flights were not in conflict. I queried my student as to what we were doing with aircraft Y; whether we're taking a point-out or if we know what that aircraft is doing as they have already violated our airspace.my developmental called back and told them 'aircraft Y point out approved' and got off the line. I queried my student again because it still seemed open ended as to what aircraft Y was doing because they were not yet descending out of F260 to a VFR altitude and facsfac has a long history of violating our airspace and they are not to be trusted. I took over and called facsfac and asked them what aircraft Y was doing. Facsfac began to explain how the route they wanted wasn't going to work and he seemed to be unsure so I cut him off and told him to get that flight out of our airspace now because we have traffic. The aircraft Y was well clear of aircraft X at the time and not actually traffic but as I do not trust facsfac and was upset that they had already violated our airspace I was very assertive with them about getting that flight out of our airspace. After that call; aircraft Y was approaching the eastern edge of our airspace and still not descending to a VFR altitude. We watched the aircraft Y closely and after a few more radar hits the aircraft began to turn south towards aircraft X. I immediately brought the r-side's attention to it and he issued a turn to a 280 heading to aircraft X and began to issue traffic. I called facsfac back and told them to expedite descent on aircraft Y or turn them to the east for traffic we have northbound on ar-6. Aircraft X reported traffic in sight and advised they would be turning right as the two flights were now head-on at 7 miles and 800kts closure rate. Aircraft Y appeared to take evasive action with a very hard right hand turn as indicated by the radar history. The end result was that 5 kc-135s came within 2NM of each other all between altitudes of F240 to F270. Communication and a history of not following procedures by facsfac all played a role in this situation. Facsfac has had problems violating our airspace and properly inputting flight plans on aircraft exiting the warning airspace since I began working as a controller years ago and it has been a known issue and repeatedly addressed over the years. Our understanding was that aircraft Y would be proceeding VFR and at no point did they begin a descent to a VFR altitude until told too late. That flight had also progressed the width of our airspace to the eastern boundary and were turned back to proceed back westbound through our airspace again while remaining at altitude and not descending to a VFR altitude after being told to get that flight out of our airspace. They were also not given control of aircraft Y in our airspace for turns. I feel I should have been very specific from the first moment with facsfac about descending that flight right away. It was a surprise to all personnel on position that they would turn the aircraft towards our traffic and keep them at altitude. The incident is still being looked into as a possible near midair collision event at thistime. There are procedures already in place with facsfac to handle aircraft into and out of the warning areas. Facsfac does not follow these procedures and has consistently violated these procedures for years. Re-training of personnel needs to occur on some level. This incident could also be used for re-current training with ZOA controllers; specifically on how to interact with facsfac. They need to be told specifically what to do with their aircraft and there needs to be zero ambiguity. Even at that; there can't be any trust that the aircraft coming out of the warning areas will do as was coordinated. It's hard to say what exactly needs to happen but this is a very serious situation and some sort of immediate action must be taken in my opinion.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Oakland Center controllers reported FACSFAC violated their airspace creating a conflict with two flights of KC-135s.
Narrative: Two KC-135s (Aircraft X) aircraft were refueling northbound AR-6 in a block altitude F250B270. I was training a D-side developmental on D-14. Three KC-135s (Aircraft Y) were operating off the coast in W283/285ABCD and in communication with FACSFAC. We saw a data-block tag on Aircraft Y indicating F260 with limited on [the second and third aircraft of Aircraft Y] and the flight appeared to be approaching the eastern boundary of the warning airspace.FACSFAC called to get approval on routing on Aircraft Y and advised they would be proceeding VFR. My developmental denied their request as we do not accept aircraft VFR in class Alpha airspace. The call ended and Aircraft Y continued into our airspace without approval on a northeast bound course. At this time the Aircraft X was approximately 30 NM to the South-South-East of Aircraft Y northbound and the present courses of two flights were not in conflict. I queried my student as to what we were doing with Aircraft Y; whether we're taking a point-out or if we know what that aircraft is doing as they have already violated our airspace.My developmental called back and told them 'Aircraft Y point out approved' and got off the line. I queried my student again because it still seemed open ended as to what Aircraft Y was doing because they were not yet descending out of F260 to a VFR altitude and FACSFAC has a long history of violating our airspace and they are not to be trusted. I took over and called FACSFAC and asked them what Aircraft Y was doing. FACSFAC began to explain how the route they wanted wasn't going to work and he seemed to be unsure so I cut him off and told him to get that flight out of our airspace now because we have traffic. The Aircraft Y was well clear of Aircraft X at the time and not actually traffic but as I do not trust FACSFAC and was upset that they had already violated our airspace I was very assertive with them about getting that flight out of our airspace. After that call; Aircraft Y was approaching the eastern edge of our airspace and still not descending to a VFR altitude. We watched the Aircraft Y closely and after a few more radar hits the aircraft began to turn south towards Aircraft X. I immediately brought the R-side's attention to it and he issued a turn to a 280 heading to Aircraft X and began to issue traffic. I called FACSFAC back and told them to expedite descent on Aircraft Y or turn them to the east for traffic we have northbound on AR-6. Aircraft X reported traffic in sight and advised they would be turning right as the two flights were now head-on at 7 miles and 800kts closure rate. Aircraft Y appeared to take evasive action with a very hard right hand turn as indicated by the radar history. The end result was that 5 KC-135s came within 2NM of each other all between altitudes of F240 to F270. Communication and a history of not following procedures by FACSFAC all played a role in this situation. FACSFAC has had problems violating our airspace and properly inputting flight plans on aircraft exiting the Warning airspace since I began working as a controller years ago and it has been a known issue and repeatedly addressed over the years. Our understanding was that Aircraft Y would be proceeding VFR and at no point did they begin a descent to a VFR altitude until told too late. That flight had also progressed the width of our airspace to the eastern boundary and were turned back to proceed back westbound through our airspace again while remaining at altitude and not descending to a VFR altitude after being told to get that flight out of our airspace. They were also not given control of Aircraft Y in our airspace for turns. I feel I should have been very specific from the first moment with FACSFAC about descending that flight right away. It was a surprise to all personnel on position that they would turn the aircraft towards our traffic and keep them at altitude. The incident is still being looked into as a possible NMAC event at thistime. There are procedures already in place with FACSFAC to handle aircraft into and out of the Warning areas. FACSFAC does not follow these procedures and has consistently violated these procedures for years. Re-training of personnel needs to occur on some level. This incident could also be used for re-current training with ZOA controllers; specifically on how to interact with FACSFAC. They need to be told specifically what to do with their aircraft and there needs to be zero ambiguity. Even at that; there can't be any trust that the aircraft coming out of the Warning areas will do as was coordinated. It's hard to say what exactly needs to happen but this is a very serious situation and some sort of immediate action must be taken in my opinion.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.