Narrative:

While at the gate we obtained our clearance which contained a route change affecting our filed arrival into iah. This arrival was changed in the FMS; and both pilots were on the same page. Instead of the zeekk arrival; we would fly the gesnr. These two arrivals share the same lateral path; and differ in the vertical path; as well as the landing direction. The flight was otherwise uneventful; and my first officer (first officer) briefed the zeekk arrival prior to the top of descent. The briefing was inadequate; and not how I normally perform them; but I suffered from no doubt that the correct procedure was loaded into the FMS. As the TOD was still 10 miles away; my first officer initiated his descent; with no vpi depicted. He was concerned that we would be high over zeekk. I did not share this concern; but I referenced my chart to make sure. Zeekk indicated between 12;000 ft and 14;000 ft and we were descending through 16;000 ft with plenty of distance left to make it. The line check pilot (lcp) administering the line check asked us to verify our assigned altitude at zeekk. I stated 'zeekk between twelve and fourteen'. He stated that his chart was indicating between seventeen and twenty. It was then that I realized I was referencing the wrong arrival. Oddly enough; we both were. A ten year first officer; paired with an 18 year (lcp qualified) captain had made the same mistake; at the exact same time. We communicated our altitude to ATC [and] the flight continued uneventfully. Runway changes and the opd arrival changes which commonly accompany them are always a threat. We talked about it at the gate; and felt it was addressed. The arrival briefing was inadequate. Although all of the required elements were covered; it was rough and hard to follow. This led to an error; in that both pilots were indeed on the same page; but it was the wrong page. Descending without a [vertical path indicator] is a threat. He verbalized his intention to start down early; so as to make the crossing restriction. We descended through 17;000 ft without a clearance; and did not trap the error until 15;500 ft. I will insist on effective briefings in the future. The root cause of this error was me not speaking up when I was uncomfortable with the operation. It was my line check; and as a line check pilot myself; I just shrugged off my reservations and decided to bring them up later in the crew self-critique. 'What could the company do to prevent this from happening again in the future'? Tough question; and difficult to answer without sounding as though I am deflecting blame; defending my actions or rationalizing a bad behavioral marker. I will say this: I don't file very many reports; but when I do it is because we fouled up an opd. Normally it is because the wrong one is loaded in the FMS. This time was the other way around; a first for me. An effective briefing at the appropriate time would have prevented this altitude deviation. I should've used inquiry to better establish a shared mental model of when we would begin the descent. I could've closed out the zeekk arrival in the efb instead of leaving it where I could still reference it; which could've been done at the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 Captain reported overshooting an altitude restriction on arrival into IAH because the wrong procedure had been loaded.

Narrative: While at the gate we obtained our clearance which contained a route change affecting our filed arrival into IAH. This arrival was changed in the FMS; and both pilots were on the same page. Instead of the ZEEKK arrival; we would fly the GESNR. These two arrivals share the same lateral path; and differ in the vertical path; as well as the landing direction. The flight was otherwise uneventful; and my First Officer (FO) briefed the ZEEKK arrival prior to the top of descent. The briefing was inadequate; and not how I normally perform them; but I suffered from no doubt that the correct procedure was loaded into the FMS. As the TOD was still 10 miles away; my FO initiated his descent; with no VPI depicted. He was concerned that we would be high over ZEEKK. I did not share this concern; but I referenced my chart to make sure. ZEEKK indicated between 12;000 ft and 14;000 ft and we were descending through 16;000 ft with plenty of distance left to make it. The Line Check Pilot (LCP) administering the line check asked us to verify our assigned altitude at ZEEKK. I stated 'ZEEKK between twelve and fourteen'. He stated that his chart was indicating between seventeen and twenty. It was then that I realized I was referencing the wrong arrival. Oddly enough; we both were. A ten year FO; paired with an 18 year (LCP qualified) Captain had made the same mistake; at the exact same time. We communicated our altitude to ATC [and] the flight continued uneventfully. Runway changes and the OPD arrival changes which commonly accompany them are always a threat. We talked about it at the gate; and felt it was addressed. The Arrival Briefing was inadequate. Although all of the required elements were covered; it was rough and hard to follow. This led to an error; in that both pilots were indeed on the same page; but it was the wrong page. Descending without a [vertical path indicator] is a threat. He verbalized his intention to start down early; so as to make the crossing restriction. We descended through 17;000 ft without a clearance; and did not trap the error until 15;500 ft. I will insist on effective briefings in the future. The root cause of this error was me not speaking up when I was uncomfortable with the operation. It was my line check; and as a line check pilot myself; I just shrugged off my reservations and decided to bring them up later in the crew self-critique. 'What could the company do to prevent this from happening again in the future'? Tough question; and difficult to answer without sounding as though I am deflecting blame; defending my actions or rationalizing a bad behavioral marker. I will say this: I don't file very many reports; but when I do it is because we fouled up an OPD. Normally it is because the wrong one is loaded in the FMS. This time was the other way around; a first for me. An effective briefing at the appropriate time would have prevented this altitude deviation. I should've used Inquiry to better establish a shared mental model of when we would begin the descent. I could've closed out the ZEEKK Arrival in the EFB instead of leaving it where I could still reference it; which could've been done at the gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.