Narrative:

While on climbout and reaching around 13;000-14;000 feet. We were given direct to ZZZ on one of the arrivals. Reaching 14;000 feet.; the aircraft experienced a left engine failure. As pilot flying; I disengaged autopilot; leveled off at 14;000 feet.; stabilized the aircraft; engaged autopilot and asked PNF (pilot not flying) to [advise ATC] with intentions to return to our departure airport since it was the nearest airport we had just departed and were familiar with.since we were in IMC and knowing we were running 1 generator; I had the PNF start the APU. I transferred the controls to the PNF and told them to get us back towards the airport for landing. We ran the qrc for left or right severe eng fire or failure inflight; followed by and directed as: QRH eng failure inflight; QRH inflight engine shutdown abnormal; and QRH for single eng approach and landing abnormal. Seeing as the engine failure occurred relatively close to the airport; but happened without us knowing the root cause for the engine failure; we elected to not attempt a restart and return to the airport. As PNF; I followed the notification procedures of '2 in and 2 out.' ATC was aware of the issue and vectoring us for the ILS back. I sent an ACARS message to dispatch notifying them on the left engine failure and intention to return to our departure airport. I [communicated] with the flight attendant and told her about the left eng failure; 10 minutes until landing; no signal; no brace; and that it would be a normal landing using normal maneuvers; a possible longer rollout on touchdown; and we will see some fire trucks as a precautionary step. She verified cabin was normal and no smoke or unusual smells. I made a passenger announcement and as calmly as possible notified them we had a left engine failure and that we would be returning to our departure airport. They may see some fire trucks and not to be alarmed since it was a precautionary normality in these instances.when I came back after these notifications; I talked to the PF (pilot flying) to verify where we were in relation to the airport and the status of the aircraft and how they were doing. We continued on an extended downwind for vectors to landing briefs when ATC asked us if we were ready for the approach. As PNF; but as captain; I elected to brief the ILS approach and then fly it. I got the current weather. (Knowing it would turn into a visual on the long 17 miles of final for 12 since we just flew this approach coming into the airport we just departed as well). We set up for a briefed approach for landing. I set the approach speeds per the flip cards. I know that it was a very stressful moment and was trying to remember what I had forgotten. I asked the PF at the time how they were doing and if there was anything we needed to talk about. We exchanged controls and I was the PF now. We completed a descent checklist. We both kind of took a deep breath and asked ATC for approach clearance. We were given direct to ZZZ1. We were still at 14;000 feet; so we started down to 10;500 feet. When we were cleared for the approach. (ATC cleared us at or above 10;000 feet.) as we were approaching 8;600 feet; I called for flaps 8; flaps 20. Gear down; flaps 30. Flaps 45; before landing checklist. We were at the FAF fully configured and at this point the PNF asked about flaps 20 only. Since we were VFR and had the runway insight and inside the FAF; I felt the safer course of action was to continue flaps 45 landing rather than reconfigure or go-around on short final and just make a normal as possible landing. Left had the PNF back me up on the speed; and on the rudder; and on the localizer/GS as I disconnected the autopilot to hand fly the rest of the approach. I had the PNF verify the emergency vehicles were in place. We landed the aircraft safely using normal maneuvers and turned off of [the] runway at A3. As we turned off the runway; we asked tower if they saw any smoke or flames from the left engine. They verified negative. We were given a taxi A3; a; cross runway on east to our gate. After crossing the runway; I called for after landing checklist. We pulled into gate xx and deplaned passengers.we are not sure of the reason for the engine failure. We followed all pre departure briefings including the complex special departure procedure. At the time of the event; we had that initial moment of shock; but training soon set in. It was both our first actual engine failure in an airplane. After the whole night of thinking what we did wrong; what we could have done; and what we missed; I believe we were distracted at a critical point in time to overlook in the checklist a flaps 20 landing only. We were in actual icing conditions and I wanted to spend minimal time there preparing for the approach. ATC asked if we were ready to fly the approach and we felt rushed and asked for more time to complete checklists. With these distractions; I believe this is how we were interrupted in the checklists. I remember the runway reporting wet; ficon (field condition) 5/5/5; increasing our landing distance 25% per the QRH and using caution for 1 operable thrust reverser. We had 9;500 feet. Of runway. Terrain was a threat and I was concerned about making this landing my only landing and trying to avoid a single engine go-around. On final I remember a comment like; 'have we missed anything; what else can we do' and the first officer saying that we should focus on landing because we agreed we had done everything we could do at this point in time. We made the decision to continue safely landing the aircraft and that is what we did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reported experiencing an engine failure during climbout; which resulted in a successful return to the departure airport.

Narrative: While on climbout and reaching around 13;000-14;000 feet. we were given direct to ZZZ on one of the arrivals. Reaching 14;000 feet.; the aircraft experienced a left engine failure. As pilot flying; I disengaged autopilot; leveled off at 14;000 feet.; stabilized the aircraft; engaged autopilot and asked PNF (Pilot Not Flying) to [advise ATC] with intentions to return to our departure airport since it was the nearest airport we had just departed and were familiar with.Since we were in IMC and knowing we were running 1 generator; I had the PNF start the APU. I transferred the controls to the PNF and told them to get us back towards the airport for landing. We ran the QRC for L or R Severe Eng Fire or Failure Inflight; followed by and directed as: QRH Eng Failure Inflight; QRH Inflight Engine Shutdown Abnormal; and QRH for Single Eng Approach and Landing Abnormal. Seeing as the Engine failure occurred relatively close to the airport; but happened without us knowing the root cause for the engine failure; we elected to not attempt a restart and return to the airport. As PNF; I followed the notification procedures of '2 in and 2 out.' ATC was aware of the issue and vectoring us for the ILS back. I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch notifying them on the L ENG Failure and intention to return to our departure airport. I [communicated] with the Flight Attendant and told her about the L eng failure; 10 minutes until landing; no signal; no brace; and that it would be a normal landing using normal maneuvers; a possible longer rollout on touchdown; and we will see some fire trucks as a precautionary step. She verified cabin was normal and no smoke or unusual smells. I made a passenger announcement and as calmly as possible notified them we had a left engine failure and that we would be returning to our departure airport. They may see some fire trucks and not to be alarmed since it was a precautionary normality in these instances.When I came back after these notifications; I talked to the PF (Pilot Flying) to verify where we were in relation to the airport and the status of the aircraft and how they were doing. We continued on an extended downwind for vectors to landing briefs when ATC asked us if we were ready for the approach. As PNF; but as Captain; I elected to brief the ILS approach and then fly it. I got the current weather. (Knowing it would turn into a visual on the long 17 miles of final for 12 since we just flew this approach coming into the airport we just departed as well). We set up for a briefed approach for landing. I set the approach speeds per the flip cards. I know that it was a very stressful moment and was trying to remember what I had forgotten. I asked the PF at the time how they were doing and if there was anything we needed to talk about. We exchanged controls and I was the PF now. We completed a descent checklist. We both kind of took a deep breath and asked ATC for approach clearance. We were given direct to ZZZ1. We were still at 14;000 feet; so we started down to 10;500 feet. when we were cleared for the approach. (ATC cleared us at or above 10;000 feet.) As we were approaching 8;600 feet; I called for Flaps 8; Flaps 20. Gear down; Flaps 30. Flaps 45; before landing checklist. We were at the FAF fully configured and at this point the PNF asked about Flaps 20 only. Since we were VFR and had the runway insight and inside the FAF; I felt the safer course of action was to continue Flaps 45 landing rather than reconfigure or go-around on short final and just make a normal as possible landing. l had the PNF back me up on the speed; and on the rudder; and on the LOC/GS as I disconnected the autopilot to hand fly the rest of the approach. I had the PNF verify the emergency vehicles were in place. We landed the aircraft safely using normal maneuvers and turned off of [the] runway at A3. As we turned off the runway; we asked tower if they saw any smoke or flames from the left engine. They verified negative. We were given a taxi A3; A; cross runway on E to our gate. After crossing the runway; I called for after landing checklist. We pulled into gate XX and deplaned passengers.We are not sure of the reason for the engine failure. We followed all pre departure briefings including the complex special departure procedure. At the time of the event; we had that initial moment of shock; but training soon set in. It was both our first actual engine failure in an airplane. After the whole night of thinking what we did wrong; what we could have done; and what we missed; I believe we were distracted at a critical point in time to overlook in the checklist a Flaps 20 landing only. We were in actual icing conditions and I wanted to spend minimal time there preparing for the approach. ATC asked if we were ready to fly the approach and we felt rushed and asked for more time to complete checklists. With these distractions; I believe this is how we were interrupted in the checklists. I remember the runway reporting WET; FICON (Field Condition) 5/5/5; increasing our landing distance 25% per the QRH and using caution for 1 operable thrust reverser. We had 9;500 feet. of runway. Terrain was a threat and I was concerned about making this landing my only landing and trying to avoid a single engine go-around. On final I remember a comment like; 'have we missed anything; what else can we do' and the first officer saying that we should focus on landing because we agreed we had done everything we could do at this point in time. We made the decision to continue safely landing the aircraft and that is what we did.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.