Narrative:

During preflight we noted a maintenance write up from the inbound crew. It read; 'first officer (first officer) low speed regime tape jumps up and down from bottom scale to full scale'. I had experienced the same discrepancy a couple of weeks before. Essentially; the amber warning band indicating low airspeed and approaching stall speed erroneously rises up to the red over speed band. It basically cues you that you're flying too slow and need to do something about it. Your initial instinct is to lower the nose to gain airspeed. There is little to no safe indicated airspeed; ie; out of the caution. It is extremely disorienting; and has a very real possibility of causing unsafe conditions if combined with other situations (engine out; wind shear; terrain; traffic; etc...). We discussed the situation while in ops and generally agreed this was unacceptable. The captain called maintenance for more information. Maintenance said it was a discrepancy popping up on the 767-300 fleet. They said maintenance was on the aircraft working on the problem. I talked to another 767 crew and discussed the problem; they agreed that it was unacceptable and they would refuse the aircraft. During my crew discussion; I emphasized that the discrepancy did not show up on the ground and a simple operations (operating system software) check clearing the item without fixing the problem would also be unacceptable. We then headed to aircraft.the crew was receiving a line check from an lca (line check airman); so the preflight briefing took longer than normal; we were late heading to the aircraft and were rushing.maintenance was still working on the issue when we arrived and began our preflight. When they finished their checks; that said it operations check normal and cleared it. I discussed the problem with the mechanic and asked if they had fixed anything. No; they hadn't. We were discussing refusing the aircraft and he stated that further checks would require hook in up the air data probes to an air source.as a crew we began our discussion about refusing the aircraft. I restated the disorienting effect of the discrepancy and the possible multiplication of difficulties in additional situations. I also let the captain know that I was not comfortable taking the aircraft. I stated that it was a defect that could quickly manifest in an unsafe situation and that we should refuse the aircraft and get another one; if available. There was no swaying the captain. The other first officer agreed with me and felt it unsafe. I was surprised to get no support from the captain. I did not feel it was a safe condition; so I refused to fly the aircraft despite the captains decision. Xx also agreed and also refused.the lca was there to observe and did not interject himself into the situation.the captain then began making appropriate phone calls to flight operations. He got a hold of the chief pilot and appraised him of the situation. I then spoke to him on the phone and he tried to convince me to take the aircraft. I tried to get him to accept that it was an unnecessary safety risk; to no avail. I felt pressure to accept the legal dispatch; but having experienced the defect; I refused. The result was being taken off the trip with no pay. The other first officer also refused.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 First Officers reported refusing to fly a trip due to the First Officer's airspeed indicator malfunctioning.

Narrative: During preflight we noted a maintenance write up from the inbound crew. It read; 'FO (First Officer) low speed regime tape jumps up and down from bottom scale to full scale'. I had experienced the same discrepancy a couple of weeks before. Essentially; the amber warning band indicating low airspeed and approaching stall speed erroneously rises up to the red over speed band. It basically cues you that you're flying too slow and need to do something about it. Your initial instinct is to lower the nose to gain airspeed. There is little to no safe indicated airspeed; ie; out of the caution. It is extremely disorienting; and has a very real possibility of causing unsafe conditions if combined with other situations (engine out; wind shear; terrain; traffic; etc...). We discussed the situation while in ops and generally agreed this was unacceptable. The Captain called Maintenance for more information. Maintenance said it was a discrepancy popping up on the 767-300 fleet. They said maintenance was on the aircraft working on the problem. I talked to another 767 crew and discussed the problem; they agreed that it was unacceptable and they would refuse the aircraft. During my crew discussion; I emphasized that the discrepancy did not show up on the ground and a simple OPS (Operating System Software) check clearing the item without fixing the problem would also be unacceptable. We then headed to aircraft.The crew was receiving a Line Check from an LCA (Line Check Airman); so the preflight briefing took longer than normal; we were late heading to the aircraft and were rushing.Maintenance was still working on the issue when we arrived and began our preflight. When they finished their checks; that said it OPS check normal and cleared it. I discussed the problem with the mechanic and asked if they had fixed anything. No; they hadn't. We were discussing refusing the aircraft and he stated that further checks would require hook in up the air data probes to an air source.As a crew we began our discussion about refusing the aircraft. I restated the disorienting effect of the discrepancy and the possible multiplication of difficulties in additional situations. I also let the Captain know that I was not comfortable taking the aircraft. I stated that it was a defect that could quickly manifest in an unsafe situation and that we should refuse the aircraft and get another one; if available. There was no swaying the Captain. The other First Officer agreed with me and felt it unsafe. I was surprised to get no support from the Captain. I did not feel it was a safe condition; so I refused to fly the aircraft despite the Captains decision. XX also agreed and also refused.The LCA was there to observe and did not interject himself into the situation.The Captain then began making appropriate phone calls to Flight Operations. He got a hold of the Chief Pilot and appraised him of the situation. I then spoke to him on the phone and he tried to convince me to take the aircraft. I tried to get him to accept that it was an unnecessary safety risk; to no avail. I felt pressure to accept the legal dispatch; but having experienced the defect; I refused. The result was being taken off the trip with no pay. The other FO also refused.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.