Narrative:

1 aircraft taking off and the other coming in. The landing aircraft reported the other in sight, but contrived to go directly at the other even after visibility sep was told to be used. 1 pilot reported it to be 800-1000' sep. This problem was due mainly to a computer malfunction because the flight plan was not in the computer, so no prior warning was given when he took off; i.e., it was too late to do anything by the time we knew he took off. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter stated the medium large transport was inbound from the south and was descending to 4000'. The large transport had departed to the south and was climbing to 5000' which is the normal altitude the tower assigns. The large transport contacted the departure controller about 3 mi after it departed. This was the first knowledge the controller had. He immediately pointed out the inbound medium large transport and had the large transport maintain visibility sep. Sep was not compromised. The breakdown occurred between the tower equipment and the TRACON equipment. The tower alerts the TRACON on departures by the BRITE ARTS 3 interface. To alert the departure controller of a departure, the tower local controller hits F8 on the keyboard and the beacon code of the departure and that activates the departure by flashing the aircraft in the departure controllers tab list. This system is a local patch to the software program. It does not work correctly all the time. Tower is responsible to ensure the departure controller has the departure information. The tower did advise the controller that the BRITE did not pass the departure. No ucr has been filed. Reporter said the facility has a new ASR-9 radar system and they are filing on ucr on it along with the interfacility departure problem.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATCT BRITE KEYBOARD SYSTEM DID NOT ACTIVATE A DEP IN THE DEP CTLR'S TAB LIST. SEPARATION BETWEEN A DEP AND INBOUND WAS NOT COMPROMISED.

Narrative: 1 ACFT TAKING OFF AND THE OTHER COMING IN. THE LNDG ACFT RPTED THE OTHER IN SIGHT, BUT CONTRIVED TO GO DIRECTLY AT THE OTHER EVEN AFTER VIS SEP WAS TOLD TO BE USED. 1 PLT RPTED IT TO BE 800-1000' SEP. THIS PROB WAS DUE MAINLY TO A COMPUTER MALFUNCTION BECAUSE THE FLT PLAN WAS NOT IN THE COMPUTER, SO NO PRIOR WARNING WAS GIVEN WHEN HE TOOK OFF; I.E., IT WAS TOO LATE TO DO ANYTHING BY THE TIME WE KNEW HE TOOK OFF. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATED THE MLG WAS INBND FROM THE S AND WAS DSNDING TO 4000'. THE LGT HAD DEPARTED TO THE S AND WAS CLBING TO 5000' WHICH IS THE NORMAL ALT THE TWR ASSIGNS. THE LGT CONTACTED THE DEP CTLR ABOUT 3 MI AFTER IT DEPARTED. THIS WAS THE FIRST KNOWLEDGE THE CTLR HAD. HE IMMEDIATELY POINTED OUT THE INBND MLG AND HAD THE LGT MAINTAIN VIS SEP. SEP WAS NOT COMPROMISED. THE BREAKDOWN OCCURRED BTWN THE TWR EQUIP AND THE TRACON EQUIP. THE TWR ALERTS THE TRACON ON DEPS BY THE BRITE ARTS 3 INTERFACE. TO ALERT THE DEP CTLR OF A DEP, THE TWR LCL CTLR HITS F8 ON THE KEYBOARD AND THE BEACON CODE OF THE DEP AND THAT ACTIVATES THE DEP BY FLASHING THE ACFT IN THE DEP CTLRS TAB LIST. THIS SYS IS A LCL PATCH TO THE SOFTWARE PROGRAM. IT DOES NOT WORK CORRECTLY ALL THE TIME. TWR IS RESPONSIBLE TO ENSURE THE DEP CTLR HAS THE DEP INFO. THE TWR DID ADVISE THE CTLR THAT THE BRITE DID NOT PASS THE DEP. NO UCR HAS BEEN FILED. RPTR SAID THE FAC HAS A NEW ASR-9 RADAR SYS AND THEY ARE FILING ON UCR ON IT ALONG WITH THE INTERFAC DEP PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.