Narrative:

Aircraft X and aircraft Y both departed dab in different directions. Because of our local procedure; I have to use identify for radar identification. I asked aircraft X to identify [but] saw both aircraft identify. Even though the tower is required to make sure the data block is correct and corresponds to the radar target of the aircraft; I had to play pretend I had no idea where they were. After 20 seconds; the identification disappeared from the data block and I had aircraft X identify again. Eventually I got them both radar identified. During a recent external compliance verification (ecv) dab was found non-compliant with respect to radar identification methods; specifically dab departures. The vast majority of our traffic remains in our local practice areas or with our satellite towers; all of which are assigned beacon codes from our local subset that do not generate fdio (flight data input/output) flight progress strips (fps). Our current procedure requires our local controllers to ensure departure aircraft have the correct auto-acquired data block information associated with the radar target prior to switching communications to departure. Although this is 100% safe and there is no question about radar identification; our procedure was ruled out of compliance with jo 7110.65 paragraph 5-3-2(a). The following addition to paragraph 5-3-2 would resolve the problem. Tower controllers with ctrds (certified tower radar display) ensure that auto-acquired data block information corresponds with the radar target of the departure aircraft. Procedures for this method must be outlined in a local facility directive or LOA.'with the above addition; local control knows which radar target is which departure aircraft and if the correct data block information is displayed; there can be no confusion on the part of the departure controller as to which aircraft is which. Since dab has decommissioned our manual drop tubes; we have run 3.5M operations without ever having our procedures questioned. The method is sound and our track record demonstrates such. The mitigation contained in a notice as a result of our noncompliance introduces unnecessary risk into our airspace without a change to the 7110. Identification remains in the data block for 20 seconds; which is not site adaptable. If the departure corridor is shared between two controllers and two aircraft identify simultaneously; radar identification is questionable given our current procedures because we have to play ignorant; disregarding the correct data block information attached to the correct radar target. This forces the departure controller(s) to stare at departure data blocks for idents; taking focus away from the rest of the airspace. Even with a standalone departure controller; identify drastically slows down the ability to identification aircraft and reduces the efficiency of the system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DAB Controller reported new required procedure creates an increased workload that jeopardizes safety.

Narrative: Aircraft X and Aircraft Y both departed DAB in different directions. Because of our local procedure; I have to use IDENT for radar identification. I asked Aircraft X to IDENT [but] saw both aircraft IDENT. Even though the Tower is required to make sure the data block is correct and corresponds to the radar target of the aircraft; I had to play pretend I had no idea where they were. After 20 seconds; the ID disappeared from the data block and I had Aircraft X IDENT again. Eventually I got them both radar identified. During a recent External Compliance Verification (ECV) DAB was found non-compliant with respect to radar identification methods; specifically DAB departures. The vast majority of our traffic remains in our local practice areas or with our satellite towers; all of which are assigned beacon codes from our local subset that do not generate FDIO (Flight Data Input/Output) Flight Progress Strips (FPS). Our current procedure requires our local controllers to ensure departure aircraft have the correct auto-acquired data block information associated with the radar target prior to switching communications to departure. Although this is 100% safe and there is no question about radar identification; our procedure was ruled out of compliance with JO 7110.65 paragraph 5-3-2(a). The following addition to paragraph 5-3-2 would resolve the problem. Tower controllers with CTRDs (Certified Tower Radar Display) ensure that auto-acquired data block information corresponds with the radar target of the departure aircraft. Procedures for this method must be outlined in a local facility directive or LOA.'With the above addition; local control knows which radar target is which departure aircraft and if the correct data block information is displayed; there can be no confusion on the part of the departure controller as to which aircraft is which. Since DAB has decommissioned our manual drop tubes; we have run 3.5M operations without ever having our procedures questioned. The method is sound and our track record demonstrates such. The mitigation contained in a notice as a result of our noncompliance introduces unnecessary risk into our airspace without a change to the 7110. ID remains in the data block for 20 seconds; which is not site adaptable. If the departure corridor is shared between two controllers and two aircraft IDENT simultaneously; radar identification is questionable given our current procedures because we have to play ignorant; disregarding the correct data block information attached to the correct radar target. This forces the departure controller(s) to stare at departure data blocks for IDENTs; taking focus away from the rest of the airspace. Even with a standalone departure controller; IDENT drastically slows down the ability to ID aircraft and reduces the efficiency of the system.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.