Narrative:

Company failed to update the navigation database on aircraft X; an originator in ZZZ; a maintenance base. I elected to call out local maintenance after the first officer (first officer) discovered the out of date database on the preflight. I then called dispatch; who connected me with maintenance control. The maintenance controller exerted pressure on me to MEL the aircraft rather take a delay. I deemed it necessary to update the aircraft with a current data base in order to operate in the national airspace system (NAS). I believe that I can correctly deduce that numerous aircraft in the company fleet were not updated; as the next day a cover sheet was attached to the weather package that read the following: '…please verify that your navigation database is current in the FMC… if the SID/STAR plate does not display waypoint latitude and longitude; pilots are approved to verify waypoints in the jeppfd-pro. If ATC changes your clearance after you've verified waypoints on a SID or STAR; consider asking for radar vectors to better manage cockpit workload.'are you kidding me; ask for radar vectors 'to better manage cockpit workload?' how about managing 'cockpit workload' by updating the navigation databases to begin with? This is an unacceptable demand of the company on our pilots and the FAA's controllers. We are operating the aircraft in the NAS; with extremely crowded skies and massive weather systems; but [the company] wants us to go heads down to verify each waypoint; and if rerouted place the burden of navigation on the controllers. He has obviously not been in the system in a flight deck in the last two months. This is an unacceptable additive condition to place on the crews before even leaving the gate. It can take a crew from the green to the red instantaneously. Moreover; two legs later we were going to take the aircraft to ZZZ1 and pass within yards of a prohibited area. The same company that resisted updating the data base directs its crews on the ZZZ1 pages and ZZZ1 safety alert to 'when ZZZ1 is in a south flow; the FAA has requested company flight crews to request the RNAV (rnp) runway xy. The rnp approach provides improved operational efficiency and predictable lateral/vertical path which will assist in remaining clear of the prohibited area.' I resolved the issue before departing by conferencing in the chief pilot who agreed with me that any resultant delay was worth the time to provide the crews with the tools they need; and the customers with the safety that they deserve. We only took a 16 minute delay to assure flying safely.hold the leadership accountable for updating the navigation data bases across the fleet. [Company's] operational control of mels and scheduled maintenance is sophisticated enough thatthese navigation data updates should not be missed. This is such a common occurrence that I actually have the dates for the navigation data base revision cycles programmed into my phone. We are constantly told that as crews we need to learn to operate more complex aircraft in more complex (and in the case of international destinations; less familiar) environments. Company leadership has an obligation to provide the crews with the most basic of navigation aids. In this case; we are talking about current maps on the aircraft. I actually witnessed a check airman de-certify a captain because his efb (electronic flight bag) was not up to date. I agree with the check airman; because as pilots we have an obligation to make sure that our charts are current. As pilots the company has the right to ask us to bring our best game to the flight deck. The company has the same obligation with their aircraft. Also; this MEL is an administrative control item. I have the greatest respect for the FAA and have had the privilege to work with the FAA on many safety initiatives. I would specifically like to address the FAA representative: how is this even possible? Why would the FAA allow a part 121 carrier to operate its aircraft in the NAS with out of datenav data bases/out of date charts? Why would an aircraft be allowed in rvsm airspace with an out of date navigation database? MEL relief should be for aircraft system failures; not a 'planned out' for management. Finally; this willful act violates every tenant of our very successful and effective [risk management] program. Please consider the following. Assessing risk: proactive management anticipates problems. When a crew member assesses the state of the aircraft and asks that the navigation data base be updated (40 minutes before departure in a maintenance base!); the request should not be met with derision by the maintenance controller. Factors increasing risk: task loading; additive conditions; crew factors. Use resources to improve performance and reduce risk. Policies; procedures; flows: policies should not be in place that increase risks of navigational errors and crew fatigue; channelize attention and increase risk in general. Automation: by definition the automation is compromised and unreliable when the navigation data base is out of date. Managing the automation becomes a full time job for both crew members to verify the course; detracting from other flight deck duties. This continued failure of the company to update the navigation databases has to be addressed. At the very least company should provide their pilots with the tools to do their job. Pilots; along with the flight attendants and customers they carry; and the controllers operating the NAS; have every reason to expect that from a business that made many millions dollars in operating income last quarter. Whereas as the tone of this report may lead you to believe that I am anti-company; the actual opposite is true. I love this company. I love the company enough to hold it accountable at the operational level. More importantly; I hold the trust that I have with my passengers and crew even higher.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier pilot reported the company failed to update aircraft navigation database.

Narrative: Company failed to update the NAVIGATION DATABASE on Aircraft X; an originator in ZZZ; a Maintenance Base. I elected to call out Local Maintenance after the FO (First Officer) discovered the out of date database on the preflight. I then called Dispatch; who connected me with Maintenance Control. The Maintenance Controller exerted pressure on me to MEL the aircraft rather take a delay. I deemed it necessary to update the aircraft with a current data base in order to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). I believe that I can correctly deduce that numerous aircraft in the Company fleet were not updated; as the next day a cover sheet was attached to the weather package that read the following: '…Please verify that your navigation database is current in the FMC… If the SID/STAR plate does not display waypoint latitude and longitude; Pilots are approved to verify waypoints in the JeppFD-Pro. If ATC changes your clearance after you've verified waypoints on a SID or STAR; consider asking for radar vectors to better manage cockpit workload.'Are you kidding me; ask for radar vectors 'to better manage cockpit workload?' How about managing 'cockpit workload' by updating the NAV databases to begin with? This is an unacceptable demand of the Company on our Pilots and the FAA's Controllers. We are operating the aircraft in the NAS; with extremely crowded skies and massive weather systems; but [the company] wants us to go heads down to verify each waypoint; and if rerouted place the burden of navigation on the Controllers. He has obviously not been in the system in a flight deck in the last two months. This is an unacceptable additive condition to place on the Crews before even leaving the gate. It can take a Crew from the Green to the Red instantaneously. Moreover; two legs later we were going to take the aircraft to ZZZ1 and pass within yards of a Prohibited Area. The same company that resisted updating the data base directs its Crews on the ZZZ1 pages and ZZZ1 Safety Alert to 'When ZZZ1 is in a south flow; the FAA has requested Company Flight Crews to request the RNAV (RNP) Runway XY. The RNP approach provides improved operational efficiency and predictable lateral/vertical path which will assist in remaining clear of the Prohibited Area.' I resolved the issue before departing by conferencing in the Chief Pilot who agreed with me that any resultant delay was worth the time to provide the Crews with the tools they need; and the Customers with the Safety that they deserve. We only took a 16 minute delay to assure flying safely.Hold the leadership accountable for updating the NAV data bases across the fleet. [Company's] operational control of MELs and scheduled maintenance is sophisticated enough thatthese NAV data updates should not be missed. This is such a common occurrence that I actually have the dates for the NAV data base revision cycles programmed into my phone. We are constantly told that as crews we need to learn to operate more complex aircraft in more complex (and in the case of international destinations; less familiar) environments. Company Leadership has an obligation to provide the crews with the most basic of navigation aids. In this case; we are talking about current maps on the aircraft. I actually witnessed a Check Airman de-certify a Captain because his EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) was not up to date. I agree with the Check Airman; because as pilots we have an obligation to make sure that our charts are current. As pilots the Company has the right to ask us to bring our best game to the flight deck. The Company has the same obligation with their aircraft. Also; this MEL is an Administrative Control Item. I have the greatest respect for the FAA and have had the privilege to work with the FAA on many safety initiatives. I would specifically like to address the FAA Representative: how is this even possible? Why would the FAA allow a Part 121 Carrier to operate its aircraft in the NAS with out of dateNAV data bases/out of date charts? Why would an aircraft be allowed in RVSM airspace with an out of date NAV database? MEL relief should be for aircraft system failures; not a 'planned out' for management. Finally; this willful act violates every tenant of our very successful and effective [risk management] program. Please consider the following. Assessing Risk: Proactive management anticipates problems. When a Crew Member assesses the state of the aircraft and asks that the NAV data base be updated (40 minutes before departure in a Maintenance Base!); the request should not be met with derision by the Maintenance Controller. Factors Increasing Risk: Task Loading; Additive Conditions; Crew Factors. Use Resources to Improve Performance and Reduce Risk. POLICIES; Procedures; Flows: Policies should not be in place that increase risks of navigational errors and Crew fatigue; channelize attention and increase risk in general. Automation: by definition the automation is compromised and unreliable when the NAV data base is out of date. Managing the automation becomes a full time job for both Crew Members to verify the course; detracting from other flight deck duties. This continued failure of the Company to update the NAV databases has to be addressed. At the very least Company should provide their Pilots with the tools to do their job. Pilots; along with the flight attendants and customers they carry; and the controllers operating the NAS; have every reason to expect that from a business that made many millions dollars in operating income last quarter. Whereas as the tone of this report may lead you to believe that I am anti-Company; the actual opposite is true. I love this Company. I love the Company enough to hold it accountable at the operational level. More importantly; I hold the trust that I have with my passengers and crew even higher.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.