Narrative:

Each comm radio has two frequency selections. An active and a standby available. A microswitch places one or the other frequency in the active mode. The flight proceeded normally from roa to gso. While being vectored for ILS approach to gso by gso approach the PNF anticipated a handoff to gso tower by selecting gso tower frequency on the active comm frequency (then on gso approach) rather than the standby (then on rda departure). The captain had intended this selection to be on the standby frequency. A short time later, the crew observed the aircraft passing across the localizer and made a call to advise the controller. This call was now being made to gso tower in error. Gso tower directed the crew to return to approach controller. The correct frequency was not specified. The captain thinking the microswitch had been moved in error (wrong again) selected the standby frequency to active and called roa departure (wrong again) for instructions. The captain thought he was now calling gso approach. Roa departure specified the correct frequency for return to gso approach. Gso approach was then called; crew was advised that contact had been lost with gso approach for some 15 mi. The flight was then revectored for a normal approach. Poor frequency management by the PNF captain was the probable cause of the error. Failure of gso tower to provide or failure of the crew to request a correct gso approach frequency contributed to an extension of the error. A contributing factor may have been fatigue: the crew had been on duty since 2200 local time, had flown 5 hours previous to error and had been 24 hours since end of last sleep (not uncommon for overnight freight pilots beginning a flight assignment). Captain has concluded not to anticipate frequency changes in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW USING RADIO EPQUI WITH STANDBY FREQ POSITION TUNES WRONG TWICE. LOST COM WITH APCH.

Narrative: EACH COMM RADIO HAS TWO FREQ SELECTIONS. AN ACTIVE AND A STANDBY AVAILABLE. A MICROSWITCH PLACES ONE OR THE OTHER FREQ IN THE ACTIVE MODE. THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY FROM ROA TO GSO. WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR ILS APCH TO GSO BY GSO APCH THE PNF ANTICIPATED A HDOF TO GSO TWR BY SELECTING GSO TWR FREQ ON THE ACTIVE COMM FREQ (THEN ON GSO APCH) RATHER THAN THE STANDBY (THEN ON RDA DEP). THE CAPT HAD INTENDED THIS SELECTION TO BE ON THE STANDBY FREQ. A SHORT TIME LATER, THE CREW OBSERVED THE ACFT PASSING ACROSS THE LOC AND MADE A CALL TO ADVISE THE CTLR. THIS CALL WAS NOW BEING MADE TO GSO TWR IN ERROR. GSO TWR DIRECTED THE CREW TO RETURN TO APCH CTLR. THE CORRECT FREQ WAS NOT SPECIFIED. THE CAPT THINKING THE MICROSWITCH HAD BEEN MOVED IN ERROR (WRONG AGAIN) SELECTED THE STANDBY FREQ TO ACTIVE AND CALLED ROA DEP (WRONG AGAIN) FOR INSTRUCTIONS. THE CAPT THOUGHT HE WAS NOW CALLING GSO APCH. ROA DEP SPECIFIED THE CORRECT FREQ FOR RETURN TO GSO APCH. GSO APCH WAS THEN CALLED; CREW WAS ADVISED THAT CONTACT HAD BEEN LOST WITH GSO APCH FOR SOME 15 MI. THE FLT WAS THEN REVECTORED FOR A NORMAL APCH. POOR FREQ MGMNT BY THE PNF CAPT WAS THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE ERROR. FAILURE OF GSO TWR TO PROVIDE OR FAILURE OF THE CREW TO REQUEST A CORRECT GSO APCH FREQ CONTRIBUTED TO AN EXTENSION OF THE ERROR. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN FATIGUE: THE CREW HAD BEEN ON DUTY SINCE 2200 LCL TIME, HAD FLOWN 5 HRS PREVIOUS TO ERROR AND HAD BEEN 24 HRS SINCE END OF LAST SLEEP (NOT UNCOMMON FOR OVERNIGHT FREIGHT PLTS BEGINNING A FLT ASSIGNMENT). CAPT HAS CONCLUDED NOT TO ANTICIPATE FREQ CHANGES IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.