Narrative:

We had a scheduled pushback at xx:35 left with an inoperative APU at a very crowded gate and ramp. When I called for clearance, the controller advised us of a departure 'window'. When we called for pushback clearance at xx:xx, we were told to hold the push to allow traffic with an earlier departure time to push and taxi. Landing traffic on runway 8 behind us would not allow both aircraft to push together. I called to ask what the plans were since we had a xx:xx 'wheels up' and still had not started #2 engine. Ground's response was very terse. Subsequent discussions between the captain and the ground controller, and then a tower supervisor left everyone somewhat uptight, but normalcy appeared to soon be restored. During our push and taxi out an air carrier landed on runway 8, a commuter departed on runway 26, the air carrier that we had held for was to depart on runway 15 and we were told to expect runway 33 for departure. We began to taxi to runway 33 but were suddenly told to stop because we had xed the hold line at the base of the tower. Ground turned us east away from runway 33 and told us to hold with the runway to our back, while an air carrier departed runway 15. The hold line at the base of the tower is not visible under any but perfect conditions; there is no mention of it or picture on the airport page, or on company pages. I have two points, one general and one specific. The first is that we have several obligations in an increasing complex ATC environment. Among them are that we keep our cool when things get tight. Tone of voice can effect subsequent performance of everyone on frequency. Another responsibility is that we all make input when the 'system' approachs the boundaries of safe operation. In my opinion, burbank is approaching those limits. My second point is very specific. The hold lines and related instructions should be much clrer at burbank.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRAFFIC AT BUR CREATED UNTIMELY HOLD FOR PUSHBACK. FLC ON TAXIING TO RWY 33 OVERRAN HOLD LINE.

Narrative: WE HAD A SCHEDULED PUSHBACK AT XX:35 L WITH AN INOPERATIVE APU AT A VERY CROWDED GATE AND RAMP. WHEN I CALLED FOR CLRNC, THE CTLR ADVISED US OF A DEP 'WINDOW'. WHEN WE CALLED FOR PUSHBACK CLRNC AT XX:XX, WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD THE PUSH TO ALLOW TFC WITH AN EARLIER DEP TIME TO PUSH AND TAXI. LNDG TFC ON RWY 8 BEHIND US WOULD NOT ALLOW BOTH ACFT TO PUSH TOGETHER. I CALLED TO ASK WHAT THE PLANS WERE SINCE WE HAD A XX:XX 'WHEELS UP' AND STILL HAD NOT STARTED #2 ENG. GND'S RESPONSE WAS VERY TERSE. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS BTWN THE CAPT AND THE GND CTLR, AND THEN A TWR SUPVR L EVERYONE SOMEWHAT UPTIGHT, BUT NORMALCY APPEARED TO SOON BE RESTORED. DURING OUR PUSH AND TAXI OUT AN AIR CARRIER LANDED ON RWY 8, A COMMUTER DEPARTED ON RWY 26, THE AIR CARRIER THAT WE HAD HELD FOR WAS TO DEPART ON RWY 15 AND WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 33 FOR DEP. WE BEGAN TO TAXI TO RWY 33 BUT WERE SUDDENLY TOLD TO STOP BECAUSE WE HAD XED THE HOLD LINE AT THE BASE OF THE TWR. GND TURNED US E AWAY FROM RWY 33 AND TOLD US TO HOLD WITH THE RWY TO OUR BACK, WHILE AN AIR CARRIER DEPARTED RWY 15. THE HOLD LINE AT THE BASE OF THE TWR IS NOT VISIBLE UNDER ANY BUT PERFECT CONDITIONS; THERE IS NO MENTION OF IT OR PICTURE ON THE ARPT PAGE, OR ON COMPANY PAGES. I HAVE TWO POINTS, ONE GENERAL AND ONE SPECIFIC. THE FIRST IS THAT WE HAVE SEVERAL OBLIGATIONS IN AN INCREASING COMPLEX ATC ENVIRONMENT. AMONG THEM ARE THAT WE KEEP OUR COOL WHEN THINGS GET TIGHT. TONE OF VOICE CAN EFFECT SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCE OF EVERYONE ON FREQ. ANOTHER RESPONSIBILITY IS THAT WE ALL MAKE INPUT WHEN THE 'SYS' APCHS THE BOUNDARIES OF SAFE OPERATION. IN MY OPINION, BURBANK IS APCHING THOSE LIMITS. MY SECOND POINT IS VERY SPECIFIC. THE HOLD LINES AND RELATED INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE MUCH CLRER AT BURBANK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.