Narrative:

Climbing out of dfw northbound, we were asked by ATC to fly 300 KTS or greater when able. The captain (PNF) acknowledged and asked for deviations east of course for a thunderstorm. Passing 10000', the captain called company with outbnd tires and fuel. He then called the flight service manager (fsm) via the interphone. He began saying something to the effect that they may want to stay seated and some other unintelligible comments. He was speaking very softly and using quite a bit of excess verbiage to make this point. He began to repeat his discourse from the start as if the fsm had asked him to repeat himself. He began louder but then dwindled off to a mumble. He then slammed the interphone into the hook and called the fsm to the cockpit via the cabin chime system. The fsm was immediately in the cockpit as they had argued the night before over the same sort of miscom and she was eager to figure out what he was trying to say, in the meantime, I had accelerated the aircraft to 330 KTS IAS as per company policy and reported to ATC the speed change from 250 KTS at 10000'. I also began an easterly deviation around an isolated thunderstorm cell. After a heated discussion with the fsm, the captain returned his attention to the cockpit and was upset that we were doing 330 KTS. In trying to give me a command to slow the aircraft, he spoke softly, almost mumbling, and again using excess verbiage. All I understood was that I was to slow for turbulence. I immediately began to slow to turbulence penetration speed of 280 KTS as per company policy and expected the captain (PNF) to relay this operation requirement to ATC. He did not relay anything and we were soon quizzed by ATC as there was jet traffic behind us. After some shouting, I learned he had wanted a non-standard 300 KT climb but was unable to convey that fact to me in a timely fashion. While this incident did not cause a conflict to my knowledge, I feel it is indicative of a 20 yr first officer mindset where politeness and difference are standard. I feel that the upgrade to captain should be accompanied by a cockpit resource management course that emphasizes clear, concise , direct commands in a pressure situation. A final note, the captain was a former air force pilot who flew in vietnam. This 'first officer' syndrome obviously strikes military as well as civilian trained pilots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG FLT CREW HAS MAJOR DISTR IN COCKPIT COMS WHICH DEVELOPS INTO SPEED DEVIATION.

Narrative: CLBING OUT OF DFW NBND, WE WERE ASKED BY ATC TO FLY 300 KTS OR GREATER WHEN ABLE. THE CAPT (PNF) ACKNOWLEDGED AND ASKED FOR DEVS E OF COURSE FOR A TSTM. PASSING 10000', THE CAPT CALLED COMPANY WITH OUTBND TIRES AND FUEL. HE THEN CALLED THE FLT SVC MGR (FSM) VIA THE INTERPHONE. HE BEGAN SAYING SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY MAY WANT TO STAY SEATED AND SOME OTHER UNINTELLIGIBLE COMMENTS. HE WAS SPEAKING VERY SOFTLY AND USING QUITE A BIT OF EXCESS VERBIAGE TO MAKE THIS POINT. HE BEGAN TO REPEAT HIS DISCOURSE FROM THE START AS IF THE FSM HAD ASKED HIM TO REPEAT HIMSELF. HE BEGAN LOUDER BUT THEN DWINDLED OFF TO A MUMBLE. HE THEN SLAMMED THE INTERPHONE INTO THE HOOK AND CALLED THE FSM TO THE COCKPIT VIA THE CABIN CHIME SYS. THE FSM WAS IMMEDIATELY IN THE COCKPIT AS THEY HAD ARGUED THE NIGHT BEFORE OVER THE SAME SORT OF MISCOM AND SHE WAS EAGER TO FIGURE OUT WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO SAY, IN THE MEANTIME, I HAD ACCELERATED THE ACFT TO 330 KTS IAS AS PER COMPANY POLICY AND RPTED TO ATC THE SPD CHANGE FROM 250 KTS AT 10000'. I ALSO BEGAN AN EASTERLY DEV AROUND AN ISOLATED TSTM CELL. AFTER A HEATED DISCUSSION WITH THE FSM, THE CAPT RETURNED HIS ATTN TO THE COCKPIT AND WAS UPSET THAT WE WERE DOING 330 KTS. IN TRYING TO GIVE ME A COMMAND TO SLOW THE ACFT, HE SPOKE SOFTLY, ALMOST MUMBLING, AND AGAIN USING EXCESS VERBIAGE. ALL I UNDERSTOOD WAS THAT I WAS TO SLOW FOR TURB. I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO SLOW TO TURB PENETRATION SPD OF 280 KTS AS PER COMPANY POLICY AND EXPECTED THE CAPT (PNF) TO RELAY THIS OPERATION REQUIREMENT TO ATC. HE DID NOT RELAY ANYTHING AND WE WERE SOON QUIZZED BY ATC AS THERE WAS JET TFC BEHIND US. AFTER SOME SHOUTING, I LEARNED HE HAD WANTED A NON-STANDARD 300 KT CLB BUT WAS UNABLE TO CONVEY THAT FACT TO ME IN A TIMELY FASHION. WHILE THIS INCIDENT DID NOT CAUSE A CONFLICT TO MY KNOWLEDGE, I FEEL IT IS INDICATIVE OF A 20 YR F/O MINDSET WHERE POLITENESS AND DIFFERENCE ARE STANDARD. I FEEL THAT THE UPGRADE TO CAPT SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT COURSE THAT EMPHASIZES CLR, CONCISE , DIRECT COMMANDS IN A PRESSURE SITUATION. A FINAL NOTE, THE CAPT WAS A FORMER AIR FORCE PLT WHO FLEW IN VIETNAM. THIS 'F/O' SYNDROME OBVIOUSLY STRIKES MIL AS WELL AS CIVILIAN TRAINED PLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.