Narrative:

Our routing; for thunderstorm avoidance; added about 25 mins to the normal scheduled flight time. As a result; we arrived into ZZZ 26mins late (running the aircraft at maximum possible forward speed and acquiring any and every short cut we could wheedle out of ATC). Scheduled for a 61 min turn in ZZZ; we now had yet another aircraft change (again; originally scheduled to keep the same aircraft all day) and; our 26 min late arrival changed our 61 min turn time into 35 mins; again with us changing planes (pull full paperwork; evaluate aircraft status; weather at destination; enroute weather; fuel requirements; etc). As we were evaluating the status of [the] aircraft; we discovered that the aircraft's rotating beacon was deferred inoperative (this was a night flight). Also; the aircraft had ignition problems requiring a 'manual start procedure'. Problem here is the A319/320 flight manual requires the first officer (first officer) verify that the beacon is working prior to attempting a manual engine start (assumption is more head's down time to start engine using this procedure; hence ensure beacon on to warn ground personnel of engine starting process). With the beacon deferred inoperative; we opted to call technical support maintenance control. At the airframes desk we tried to come up with a safe procedure that we could employ to allow us to fly [the] aircraft; without violating the intent of the flight manual (ensure the safety of the ground crew). After getting off the phone; and per our discussion; I briefed my first officer on the planned sequence of events. Once complete; I walked down to the lead of our ground crew and advised him of the same. We would close the door and pull the jetway. We did not require electrical power from the jetway nor an air cart for starting. We would turn on our white wingtip strobe lights as a warning during engine start. We would start our first engine in the gate area with our ground crew essentially standing guard to keep any wayward intruders from wandering too close to our engines and getting hurt. Once we have a good start on our first engine; we would call for pushback clearance and once cleared; secure our strobes (allowing the 'wanded' wing walkers to be our protection as we moved away from the gate). When clear of our push personnel; we would taxi to a somewhat remote area to start our second engine (away from potential areas for ground personnel). We completed the above as quickly as safety allowed. Once airborne; we re-evaluated what had transpired. We decided we had acted with safety as the foremost and utmost priority; the fact is our manual states the beacon must be on. No deferred inoperative option. Since the procedures utilized were fabricated on the spot between myself and maintenance control; they undoubtedly were not the best plan. I had been assured that we were ok to go by our experts at maintenance control; but now question the validity of that assurance. With the myriad of issues going on with aircraft X; the attempted pressuring by customer service to get the flight out 'on time'; we probably should've walked off the aircraft and gone into a quiet planning area to have a thorough discussion (including the chief pilot; dispatch; maintenance control; my first officer and myself) and re-evaluated this situation. Bottom line; I think I should have refused this aircraft for an inoperative beacon combined with the manual start requirement; based on the way our manual is currently written. Especially since this was a night flight. What we did was safe but the 'letter' of the manual was not followed. The fact we were tired from the issues of the day; we did not receive our crew meal (hadn't had a chance to eat since breakfast) on the flight to ZZZ due to catering issues with the late unscheduled plane swap; it was getting late in the day and we were unsure about the legality of this combination of deferrals; all should've led me to a refusal. I did not. Our flight to ZZZ1 was uneventful.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Flight Crew reported working around conflicting deferred items may have violated the MEL.

Narrative: Our routing; for thunderstorm avoidance; added about 25 mins to the normal scheduled flight time. As a result; we arrived into ZZZ 26mins late (running the aircraft at maximum possible forward speed and acquiring any and every short cut we could wheedle out of ATC). Scheduled for a 61 min turn in ZZZ; we now had yet another aircraft change (again; originally scheduled to keep the same aircraft all day) AND; our 26 min late arrival changed our 61 min turn time into 35 mins; again with us changing planes (pull full paperwork; evaluate aircraft status; weather at destination; enroute weather; fuel requirements; etc). As we were evaluating the status of [the] aircraft; we discovered that the aircraft's rotating beacon was deferred inoperative (this was a night flight). Also; the aircraft had ignition problems requiring a 'manual start procedure'. Problem here is the A319/320 flight manual requires the First Officer (F/O) verify that the beacon is working prior to attempting a manual engine start (assumption is more head's down time to start engine using this procedure; hence ensure beacon on to warn ground personnel of engine starting process). With the beacon deferred inoperative; we opted to call Technical Support Maintenance Control. At the airframes desk we tried to come up with a safe procedure that we could employ to allow us to fly [the] aircraft; without violating the intent of the flight manual (ensure the safety of the ground crew). After getting off the phone; and per our discussion; I briefed my F/O on the planned sequence of events. Once complete; I walked down to the lead of our ground crew and advised him of the same. We would close the door and pull the jetway. We did not require electrical power from the jetway nor an air cart for starting. We would turn on our white wingtip strobe lights as a warning during engine start. We would start our first engine in the gate area with our ground crew essentially standing guard to keep any wayward intruders from wandering too close to our engines and getting hurt. Once we have a good start on our first engine; we would call for pushback clearance and once cleared; secure our strobes (allowing the 'wanded' wing walkers to be our protection as we moved away from the gate). When clear of our push personnel; we would taxi to a somewhat remote area to start our second engine (away from potential areas for ground personnel). We completed the above as quickly as safety allowed. Once airborne; we re-evaluated what had transpired. We decided we had acted with safety as the foremost and utmost priority; the fact is our manual states the beacon MUST be on. No deferred inoperative option. Since the procedures utilized were fabricated on the spot between myself and Maintenance Control; they undoubtedly were not the best plan. I had been assured that we were ok to go by our experts at Maintenance Control; but now question the validity of that assurance. With the myriad of issues going on with Aircraft X; the attempted pressuring by customer service to get the flight out 'on time'; we probably should've walked off the aircraft and gone into a quiet planning area to have a thorough discussion (including the Chief Pilot; Dispatch; Maintenance Control; my F/O and myself) and re-evaluated this situation. Bottom line; I think I should have refused this aircraft for an inoperative beacon combined with the manual start requirement; based on the way our manual is currently written. Especially since this was a night flight. What we did was safe but the 'letter' of the manual was not followed. The fact we were tired from the issues of the day; we did not receive our crew meal (hadn't had a chance to eat since breakfast) on the flight to ZZZ due to catering issues with the late unscheduled plane swap; it was getting late in the day and we were unsure about the legality of this combination of deferrals; all should've led me to a refusal. I did not. Our flight to ZZZ1 was uneventful.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.