Narrative:

Aircraft was operating on autoplt with VNAV, LNAV engaged. MCP (mode control panel) lights had failed to function normally (would not illuminate) so information as to their engagement was through the eadi. I noticed that when the aircraft reached the top of descent point, the aircraft did not start down. I immediately initiated a descent but got behind the aircraft and therefore may not have made a crossing restriction, 5 mi south of ble at 11000'. The reason that I am not sure if we made the restriction is that since we initiated the descent 5 mi past my calculated descent point, I was in a hurry to get down. Approximately 12-15 mi from bli, I recalled that we had to be slowed to 250 KTS, 9 DME south of bli. I leveled off, slowed to 250, then continued to descend but forgot about the 5 mi/11000' restriction. The copilot later assured me that we made the restriction but I'm still not convinced. Alot was happening all at once. (MCP panel failure, autoplt failed to descend, airspeed restriction, altitude restriction). I was unfamiliar with the arrival procedure, and should reviewed the restriction during the descent (I had already reviewed them once prior to the descent). This entire arrival, approach was very rushed. Perhaps the solution is to not use the autoflt system, on short legs, until you are totally familiar with the system. Better crew coordination, and a more thorough review of the arrival procedure would benefit as well. An excellent solution to he entire problem would be to require at least 50 hard hours of initial operating experience with an instrument/check airman, for all newly trained capts with no FMC/autoflt experience. Unfortunately, this would cost the companies more in training time, and is most likely unacceptable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR ADVTECH MLG CAPT FEELS THAT CROSSING RESTRICTION NOT MET ON ACORD TWO STAR TO CYVR.

Narrative: ACFT WAS OPERATING ON AUTOPLT WITH VNAV, LNAV ENGAGED. MCP (MODE CTL PANEL) LIGHTS HAD FAILED TO FUNCTION NORMALLY (WOULD NOT ILLUMINATE) SO INFO AS TO THEIR ENGAGEMENT WAS THROUGH THE EADI. I NOTICED THAT WHEN THE ACFT REACHED THE TOP OF DSNT POINT, THE ACFT DID NOT START DOWN. I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A DSNT BUT GOT BEHIND THE ACFT AND THEREFORE MAY NOT HAVE MADE A XING RESTRICTION, 5 MI S OF BLE AT 11000'. THE REASON THAT I AM NOT SURE IF WE MADE THE RESTRICTION IS THAT SINCE WE INITIATED THE DSNT 5 MI PAST MY CALCULATED DSNT POINT, I WAS IN A HURRY TO GET DOWN. APPROX 12-15 MI FROM BLI, I RECALLED THAT WE HAD TO BE SLOWED TO 250 KTS, 9 DME S OF BLI. I LEVELED OFF, SLOWED TO 250, THEN CONTINUED TO DSND BUT FORGOT ABOUT THE 5 MI/11000' RESTRICTION. THE COPLT LATER ASSURED ME THAT WE MADE THE RESTRICTION BUT I'M STILL NOT CONVINCED. ALOT WAS HAPPENING ALL AT ONCE. (MCP PANEL FAILURE, AUTOPLT FAILED TO DSND, AIRSPD RESTRICTION, ALT RESTRICTION). I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARR PROC, AND SHOULD REVIEWED THE RESTRICTION DURING THE DSNT (I HAD ALREADY REVIEWED THEM ONCE PRIOR TO THE DSNT). THIS ENTIRE ARR, APCH WAS VERY RUSHED. PERHAPS THE SOLUTION IS TO NOT USE THE AUTOFLT SYSTEM, ON SHORT LEGS, UNTIL YOU ARE TOTALLY FAMILIAR WITH THE SYS. BETTER CREW COORD, AND A MORE THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE ARR PROC WOULD BENEFIT AS WELL. AN EXCELLENT SOLUTION TO HE ENTIRE PROB WOULD BE TO REQUIRE AT LEAST 50 HARD HRS OF INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE WITH AN INSTR/CHK AIRMAN, FOR ALL NEWLY TRAINED CAPTS WITH NO FMC/AUTOFLT EXPERIENCE. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS WOULD COST THE COMPANIES MORE IN TRNING TIME, AND IS MOST LIKELY UNACCEPTABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.