Narrative:

We were operating to elp. The first error in this chain of events is when I noticed we were level at 8;000 feet at an indicated airspeed of 280 knots going direct to aguas. I pointed out to the captain that we needed to reduce our airspeed immediately. Shortly thereafter we began our speed reduction we were instructed to begin a descent to 6;000 feet and cleared visual 22. At this present time we were approximately 250 knots descending and roughly 16-17 miles from the field. The captain was utilizing speed brakes during this descent and asked for slats to be extended at 240 knots. From that point forward I tried to back the captain up with configuring as early as permissible with respect to aircraft limitations. With that being said; while I was doing my job to back him up; I was not nearly assertive enough in my other duties making him aware of our aircraft state with regard to our stabilized approach criteria. I mentioned that we were 'high' and 'fast'; however; if I said we were 'unstabilized' I don't recall it. At the very least I can say with confidence I wasn't said assertive enough if it was mentioned. I think the captain and myself had tunnel vision with getting the aircraft configured and on speed. I think there was some expectation bias as well that played into that we are accustomed to flying so many approaches where the FAF is 2-4 miles further out than this particular approach into elp. Coupled with the higher altitude/higher TAS also compounded the chain of events that led to this unstabilized approach. As far as what caused the event. As crews we know that no single instance can cause the outcome of something. In this case I think we were left a little high by center control (some in part due to some ATC issues) and then on our own doing of being at such a high speed at 8;000 feet and a high altitude airport. A potential second contributing factor today was that this was only our second leg together. As is with each new trip with a coworker you try and get a feel for how they fly the airplane and when they like to configure for approach to landing. I needed to be more assertive or just ask him when would you like to slow down and configure for approach; so that we are sharing the same mental model. I also had late van in but the night prior; and was only able to get about 2 hours of sleep in the sort. It's hard to also ignore the potential effects of fatigue as a potential contributing factor. Our evening was a late duty day and we were 22 minutes late arriving.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Widebody Transport flight crew reported being high and fast and not meeting stabilized approach criteria before landing.

Narrative: We were operating to ELP. The first error in this chain of events is when I noticed we were level at 8;000 feet at an indicated airspeed of 280 knots going direct to AGUAS. I pointed out to the Captain that we needed to reduce our airspeed immediately. Shortly thereafter we began our speed reduction we were instructed to begin a descent to 6;000 feet and cleared visual 22. At this present time we were approximately 250 knots descending and roughly 16-17 miles from the field. The Captain was utilizing speed brakes during this descent and asked for slats to be extended at 240 knots. From that point forward I tried to back the Captain up with configuring as early as permissible with respect to aircraft limitations. With that being said; while I was doing my job to back him up; I was not nearly assertive enough in my other duties making him aware of our aircraft state with regard to our stabilized approach criteria. I mentioned that we were 'high' and 'fast'; however; if I said we were 'unstabilized' I don't recall it. At the very least I can say with confidence I wasn't said assertive enough if it was mentioned. I think the Captain and myself had tunnel vision with getting the aircraft configured and on speed. I think there was some expectation bias as well that played into that we are accustomed to flying so many approaches where the FAF is 2-4 miles further out than this particular approach into ELP. Coupled with the higher altitude/higher TAS also compounded the chain of events that led to this unstabilized approach. As far as what caused the event. As crews we know that no single instance can cause the outcome of something. In this case I think we were left a little high by center control (some in part due to some ATC issues) and then on our own doing of being at such a high speed at 8;000 feet and a high altitude airport. A potential second contributing factor today was that this was only our second leg together. As is with each new trip with a coworker you try and get a feel for how they fly the airplane and when they like to configure for approach to landing. I needed to be more assertive or just ask him when would you like to slow down and configure for approach; so that we are sharing the same mental model. I also had late van in but the night prior; and was only able to get about 2 hours of sleep in the sort. It's hard to also ignore the potential effects of fatigue as a potential contributing factor. Our evening was a late duty day and we were 22 minutes late arriving.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.