Narrative:

This report is submitted to address an unsafe airport condition at the fresno chandler airport (fch) fresno; california. Chandler consist of one runway; 30/12 with multiple housing and large trees on the approach end of runway 30. A PAPI system has been installed for runway 30 to insure obstacle clearance from residential trees on the approach end of runway 30. Recently the FAA flight inspection shut down the PAPI system at chandler due to one tree protruding into the approach path of the PAPI light system area. The city of fresno airport division had the tree in question removed along with two other trees that could be within the approach path area in the near future. However; flight inspection; operating out of sacramento metro airport; sacramento; ca; have failed at this time to return to fresno chandler airport to re-evaluate the system and place it back into operations.now to the safety aspect of this shutdown. Without the PAPI system in operation; it places pilots; local residences on the approach end of runway 30; the city of fresno and the federal aviation administration at risk for injury and liability in the event of a landing accident due to an aircraft approaching too low to runway 30. In particular this becomes an even higher risk at night due to the inability for pilots to see and properly avoid trees on the end of the runway without the PAPI system in operation. This has been an ongoing concern for all pilots familiar with the area; however; it places non-local pilots in a higher risk hazardous position; not knowing the area and not having the aid of the PAPI system available. City of fresno requested the re-evaluation with the FAA without expedition action to place the system back into service which places the FAA in liability.resolution to the problem is very simple at this time. Flight inspection need to inspect and evaluate system for proper operation and clearance and place it back in service immediately in order to mitigate the risk and liability presently imposed due to the shutdown of the system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA pilot reported the approach for Runway 30 at FCH is unsafe because the PAPI lights are non-operational.

Narrative: This report is submitted to address an unsafe airport condition at the Fresno Chandler Airport (FCH) Fresno; California. Chandler consist of one runway; 30/12 with multiple housing and large trees on the approach end of runway 30. A PAPI system has been installed for runway 30 to insure obstacle clearance from residential trees on the approach end of runway 30. Recently the FAA Flight Inspection shut down the PAPI system at Chandler due to one tree protruding into the approach path of the PAPI light system area. The City of Fresno Airport Division had the tree in question removed along with two other trees that could be within the approach path area in the near future. However; Flight Inspection; operating out of Sacramento Metro Airport; Sacramento; Ca; have failed at this time to return to Fresno Chandler Airport to re-evaluate the system and place it back into operations.Now to the safety aspect of this shutdown. Without the PAPI system in operation; it places pilots; local residences on the approach end of runway 30; the City of Fresno and the Federal Aviation Administration at risk for injury and liability in the event of a landing accident due to an aircraft approaching too low to runway 30. In particular this becomes an even higher risk at night due to the inability for pilots to see and properly avoid trees on the end of the runway without the PAPI system in operation. This has been an ongoing concern for all pilots familiar with the area; however; it places non-local pilots in a higher risk hazardous position; not knowing the area and not having the aid of the PAPI system available. City of Fresno requested the re-evaluation with the FAA without expedition action to place the system back into service which places the FAA in liability.Resolution to the problem is very simple at this time. Flight Inspection need to inspect and evaluate system for proper operation and clearance and place it back in service immediately in order to mitigate the risk and liability presently imposed due to the shutdown of the system.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.