Narrative:

We were departing with a flaps 3 takeoff and toga power. This was not a reduced power takeoff as is usually the case per the performance numbers we received on ACARS. It was a normal takeoff with no discrepancies noticed. We were assigned a left turn heading 320 with our takeoff clearance and began the turn as we were passing 400 ft AGL. When established in the turn and climbing through approximately 600 ft; we heard a very loud bang from the left engine and felt the airplane shudder in response. I immediately looked at the engine instruments on the east/wd (upper screen) and noticed the egt dial in red with a tick at the very upper end of the instrument and also noticed the rest of the engine instruments were in amber; many of them with xx's for the readouts. I had immediately thought we hit a goose as there were many reports of geese sightings during our approach just a couple of hours prior. As we were passing through a heading appropriate for a crosswind leg of a VFR pattern; my intention was to fly a visual pattern back to the field as quickly as possible. My main concern was the possibility of hitting another goose and losing our remaining engine. I was hand-flying at the time and thought we were at a safe altitude; and instructed the pilot monitoring (pm) to run the engine fail ECAM and secure the engine as we were headed right around for a return to [departure airport]. It became clear to both of us that ATC had cleared the area for us. They provided us an exceptional level of support and vectored us to a final. Though we had no time to contact dispatch; we did brief the flight attendants on the event (which they had already figured out) and told them that it should be an uneventful landing. At the time of our departure; [the airport] was changing over from a sole east operation to [a different plan] with winds increasing in speed out of the south. As I was trying to change the destination in the mcdu in order to set up the approach in the box; ATC provided us the frequency and vectored us over to [the runway]; providing us the new localizer frequency. I was unable to change the destination and abandoned that attempt in order to fly the localizer and G/south in for a safe landing. With a quartering tailwind; the approach was becoming increasingly unstable and as we were approaching the final gate at 500 ft AGL; I determined it was safest to go-around at about 700 ft. The procedures for the single-engine go-around were executed and ATC vectored us back to the downwind asking us the requested runway and the intercept mileage inbound. We requested a runway change to the longest runway given that we were overweight. We requested a five-mile final not wanting to go out too far. The second approach was flown meeting all the stabilized approach criteria at every gate to a smooth landing; as I wanted to minimize the vertical rate of descent at touchdown. We rolled out long; cleared the runway and stopped the aircraft on the parallel taxiway in order for the arff to inspect the engine from afar. They saw no visible damage. Before taxiing the aircraft further; I made a PA to the passengers advising them of the issue and that we were safely on the ground and apologized for not updating them sooner as we were very busy managing the event. We received our new gate assignment and parked the aircraft and did our parking checklist. Codes were sent for the overweight landing and the engine failure. We were met at the gate by flight operations management who ensured we were ok and we proceeded down to the tarmac to inspect the engine together after the passengers deplaned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing an engine failure shortly after takeoff.

Narrative: We were departing with a flaps 3 takeoff and TOGA power. This was NOT a reduced power takeoff as is usually the case per the performance numbers we received on ACARS. It was a normal takeoff with no discrepancies noticed. We were assigned a left turn heading 320 with our takeoff clearance and began the turn as we were passing 400 FT AGL. When established in the turn and climbing through approximately 600 FT; we heard a very loud bang from the left engine and felt the airplane shudder in response. I immediately looked at the engine instruments on the E/WD (upper screen) and noticed the EGT dial in red with a tick at the very upper end of the instrument and also noticed the rest of the engine instruments were in amber; many of them with XX's for the readouts. I had immediately thought we hit a goose as there were many reports of geese sightings during our approach just a couple of hours prior. As we were passing through a heading appropriate for a crosswind leg of a VFR pattern; my intention was to fly a visual pattern back to the field as quickly as possible. My main concern was the possibility of hitting another goose and losing our remaining engine. I was hand-flying at the time and thought we were at a safe altitude; and instructed the Pilot Monitoring (PM) to run the ENG FAIL ECAM and secure the engine as we were headed right around for a return to [departure airport]. It became clear to both of us that ATC had cleared the area for us. They provided us an exceptional level of support and vectored us to a final. Though we had no time to contact Dispatch; we did brief the flight attendants on the event (which they had already figured out) and told them that it should be an uneventful landing. At the time of our departure; [the airport] was changing over from a sole east operation to [a different plan] with winds increasing in speed out of the south. As I was trying to change the destination in the MCDU in order to set up the approach in the box; ATC provided us the frequency and vectored us over to [the runway]; providing us the new localizer frequency. I was unable to change the destination and abandoned that attempt in order to fly the LOC and G/S in for a safe landing. With a quartering tailwind; the approach was becoming increasingly unstable and as we were approaching the final gate at 500 FT AGL; I determined it was safest to go-around at about 700 FT. The procedures for the single-engine go-around were executed and ATC vectored us back to the downwind asking us the requested runway and the intercept mileage inbound. We requested a runway change to the longest runway given that we were overweight. We requested a five-mile final not wanting to go out too far. The second approach was flown meeting all the stabilized approach criteria at every gate to a smooth landing; as I wanted to minimize the vertical rate of descent at touchdown. We rolled out long; cleared the runway and stopped the aircraft on the parallel taxiway in order for the ARFF to inspect the engine from afar. They saw no visible damage. Before taxiing the aircraft further; I made a PA to the passengers advising them of the issue and that we were safely on the ground and apologized for not updating them sooner as we were very busy managing the event. We received our new gate assignment and parked the aircraft and did our parking checklist. Codes were sent for the overweight landing and the engine failure. We were met at the gate by Flight Operations Management who ensured we were OK and we proceeded down to the tarmac to inspect the engine together after the passengers deplaned.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.