Narrative:

Around 40 knots we had a spurious ECAM which went away so quickly I could not tell what it was. This occurred again around 70 knots but again went away before I could tell what it was. I felt in both instances it was safer to continue because I could not identify what and if there was a problem. Anyone with experience on the airbus knows that they occasionally have spurious ecams where these ecams aren't real issues. We also have been warned to guard against aborting for an ECAM regarding not entering a flex temperature and then aborting because of the ECAM regarding not having the thrust levers in the toga detent. So; we need to identify what the problem is first before aborting. It seemed the safest and least risk was to continue unless it was a real ECAM (of which I did not know what it even was). As I thought about it later; the ECAM probably was inhibited when we reached 80 knots and then reappeared at 1500 feet when the inhibit was released. Anyway; not long after takeoff we had a hydraulic Y rsvr lo lvl ECAM. First officer took the airplane and radios. After doing the steps on the ECAM we [advised] departure and asked to return. I then sent an ACARS message to dispatch '7700 loss of Y hydraulics returning' or something to that effect. I then completed the ECAM steps and went to the QRH using the ipad. The problem was that it was bumpy so I was unable to get to the hydraulic Y rsvr lo lvl using the ipad because I could not type the ECAM title in the search window nor could I select it from the index. My fingers would not land where I wanted them to land. This is a great risk and safety issue if we were to take the paper version out. It was almost impossible to use the ipad in this case. Going to the paper QRH was the only way I could in a reasonable period of time get to the proper procedure. Later; my first officer was having similar problems getting to the overweight checklist in the ipad. [The first officer] was meanwhile doing a great job extending our downwind so we could complete all our checklists and procedures and communicating with ATC. I also spoke with the flight attendants and described the problem and that an evacuation was not planned and stressed that we expected a normal landing. I also said that fire trucks would come around the airplane after landing and that we would be on the ground in about 15 minutes. I then made a PA to the passengers.next; as I was getting the QRH out to look further at the procedure in the QRH (including the landing distance page) I also did a 'call me' to dispatch. I checked and saw we had accumulator pressure and briefed the inoperative systems. The fuel penalty part was not applicable. About the same time this was completed I received a message to contact dispatch. We were finally able to talk and told them the issue. [Maintenance] confirmed we were doing the right QRH procedure and asked about being overweight. I said we were and had looked at the overweight checklist. It was [the first officer's] leg and knew he did a great job so I allowed him to make the landing. I briefed him that I would read out every foot as we landed so we could land as soft as possible. We landed normally and so smoothly it was one of those 'are we on the ground yet' landings. We were met by mechanics and two from the flight office. We were so involved with all of this that I forgot to write up the mechanical failure. When I got to the new airplane I realized my mistake and called [maintenance] to make sure everything had been entered and was assured that had taken care of that.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing loss of Yellow hydraulic system.

Narrative: Around 40 knots we had a spurious ECAM which went away so quickly I could not tell what it was. This occurred again around 70 knots but again went away before I could tell what it was. I felt in both instances it was safer to continue because I could not identify what and if there was a problem. Anyone with experience on the Airbus knows that they occasionally have spurious ECAMs where these ECAMs aren't real issues. We also have been warned to guard against aborting for an ECAM regarding not entering a flex temperature and then aborting because of the ECAM regarding not having the thrust levers in the TOGA detent. So; we need to identify what the problem is first before aborting. It seemed the safest and least risk was to continue unless it was a real ECAM (of which I did not know what it even was). As I thought about it later; the ECAM probably was inhibited when we reached 80 knots and then reappeared at 1500 feet when the inhibit was released. Anyway; not long after takeoff we had a HYD Y RSVR LO LVL ECAM. First Officer took the airplane and radios. After doing the steps on the ECAM we [advised] Departure and asked to return. I then sent an ACARS message to Dispatch '7700 loss of Y hydraulics returning' or something to that effect. I then completed the ECAM steps and went to the QRH using the iPad. The problem was that it was bumpy so I was unable to get to the HYD Y RSVR LO LVL using the iPad because I could not type the ECAM title in the search window nor could I select it from the index. My fingers would not land where I wanted them to land. This is a great risk and safety issue if we were to take the paper version out. It was almost impossible to use the iPad in this case. Going to the paper QRH was the only way I could in a reasonable period of time get to the proper procedure. Later; my FO was having similar problems getting to the overweight checklist in the iPad. [The FO] was meanwhile doing a great job extending our downwind so we could complete all our checklists and procedures and communicating with ATC. I also spoke with the flight attendants and described the problem and that an evacuation was not planned and stressed that we expected a normal landing. I also said that fire trucks would come around the airplane after landing and that we would be on the ground in about 15 minutes. I then made a PA to the passengers.Next; as I was getting the QRH out to look further at the procedure in the QRH (including the landing distance page) I also did a 'CALL ME' to Dispatch. I checked and saw we had accumulator pressure and briefed the inoperative systems. The fuel penalty part was not applicable. About the same time this was completed I received a message to contact Dispatch. We were finally able to talk and told them the issue. [Maintenance] confirmed we were doing the right QRH procedure and asked about being overweight. I said we were and had looked at the overweight checklist. It was [the FO's] leg and knew he did a great job so I allowed him to make the landing. I briefed him that I would read out every foot as we landed so we could land as soft as possible. We landed normally and so smoothly it was one of those 'are we on the ground yet' landings. We were met by mechanics and two from the flight office. We were so involved with all of this that I forgot to write up the mechanical failure. When I got to the new airplane I realized my mistake and called [Maintenance] to make sure everything had been entered and was assured that had taken care of that.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.